




PRIVATE VENGEANCE AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 
Michael Edmund O’Neill* 
INTRODUCTION 
In early 1975, a cleaning woman discovered the lifeless body of se-
venty-five-year-old Inez Phillips stretched out on a bed with a large 
butcher knife “protruding from her upper chest.”1  An unknown as-
sailant had bound and gagged the elderly widow with duct tape, 
stabbed her repeatedly, and then crushed in the back of her skull 
with a blunt instrument.2  The murder reverberated throughout the 
victim’s small, close-knit Gladewater, Texas community because of its 
remarkable brutality.  Police investigations led officers to focus on Jo-
seph Stanley Faulder, a local vagrant.  After his arrest, Faulder con-
fessed to the crime.  He was subsequently convicted of killing Mrs. 
Phillips.3  Although this conviction was set aside because of the intro-
duction at trial of an improperly obtained confession, Faulder was re-
tried, convicted again by a jury, and sentenced to death.  Inez Phil-
lips’s murder and the ensuing conviction of Joseph Faulder might 
not stand out among similar heinous crimes save for one important 
fact:  an individual hired by the Phillips family, a privately retained 
prosecutor, tried the case against the defendant and secured the con-
viction.4 
Although public prosecutors handled Faulder’s initial prosecu-
tion, after Faulder’s capital conviction was overturned on appeal, the 
murder victim’s son hired private attorneys to investigate and then to 
re-prosecute the defendant.5  When the defense counsel objected to 
 
 * Associate Professor, George Mason University School of Law.  I’d like to thank Genevieve 
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 1 Faulder v. State, 611 S.W.2d 630, 631 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 
U.S. 874 (1980). 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Faulder v. Johnson, 81 F.3d 515, 517 (5th Cir. 1996), cert denied, 519 U.S. 995 (1996). 
 5 Id. at 518. 
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this unique arrangement, arguing the impropriety of permitting the 
victim’s family to control the prosecution, the private prosecutors—
one of whom was the former district attorney who had tried the de-
fendant previously—obtained a written appointment from the district 
attorney’s office designating the privately-retained counsel as special 
volunteer prosecutors.6  The Texas state and federal courts upheld 
the conviction,7 and the United States Supreme Court denied Fauld-
er’s petition for certiorari review.8 
Murder prosecutions—especially where the possibility of capital 
punishment looms—rank as the most serious within the American 
criminal justice system.9  What doubtless comes as a surprise to the 
experienced criminal justice practitioner, however, is that a private 
prosecutor could litigate Mr. Faulder’s criminal trial.  Indeed, when 
the criminal justice system is considered, most people, including 
members of the bar and the screenwriters for Law & Order, think only 
of the public prosecutor.  The public prosecutor—whether directly 
elected by the people or appointed by the people’s representatives—
has become the “central actor in the criminal justice system.”  In fact, 
“the American prosecutor enjoys an independence and discretionary 
privileges unmatched in the world.”10  Few understand, however, that 
public prosecutors were not always the dominant figures in the pros-
ecution of criminal trials.  Fewer still realize that even today several 
states authorize the hiring or appointment of private attorneys to 
prosecute criminal cases.  Despite the persistence of private prosecu-
tors, little has been written about their history or potential value to 
the criminal justice system.  Generally, what has been written is criti-
cal of the practice, arguing that it is the vestige of a bygone era and 
incompatible with the modern values that define today’s criminal jus-
tice system.  The aim of this Article is to challenge that position. 
This Article will examine the history and constitutionality of the 
private prosecution of criminal cases and assess the potential value of 
 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. at 517 (rejecting defendant’s habeas petition and explaining that defendant had been 
convicted, and lost on direct appeal). 
 8 Faulder v. Johnson, 519 U.S. 995 (1996). 
 9 See Richard O. Lempert, Desert and Deterrence:  An Assessment of the Moral Bases of the Case for 
Capital Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1177, 1182 (1981) (discussing retributivists’ concerns 
about erroneously sentencing to death an innocent person); James S. Liebman et al., Cap-
ital Attrition:  Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973–1995, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1839, 1844–50 (2000) 
(discussing through statistics the possibility of error in capital punishment). 
 10 Allen Steinberg, From Private Prosecution to Plea Bargaining:  Criminal Prosecution, the District 
Attorney, and American Legal History, 30 CRIME & DELINQ. 568, 568 (1984) (citation omit-
ted). 
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privately retained prosecutors to the justice system.  It is my conten-
tion that private prosecutions can be a useful adjunct to the more 
familiar public model, potentially freeing up scarce public resources 
while at the same time vindicating the interests—both of the victim 
and the public—in the enforcement of the criminal law.  It is widely 
acknowledged that the state possesses limited resources to allocate to 
the criminal justice system.11  Those resources, in turn, must be di-
vided among crime prevention activities, police officers, investigative 
functions (such as crime labs), courts, prisons, rehabilitation pro-
grams, probation and parole officers, and myriad other responsibili-
ties that make up the criminal justice system.  Enforcement is only 
one element of the criminal justice portfolio.  Individual victims and 
select communities—whether comprised of home owners or stores 
within a shopping mall—may have interests that overlap with those of 
the state, but which may nevertheless be distinct from those of the 
state and deserve vindication.  Similarly, if the state is able to conserve 
resources otherwise allocated to prosecutions, it might better be posi-
tioned to target resources to other under-resourced areas.  In the 
same way in which the actions of private individuals competing in the 
free market may benefit the society as a whole, if private resources 
can be tapped to enforce criminal statutes, the public at large may 
benefit as the result of those individual efforts. 
In Part I of this Article, I trace the history of criminal prosecution, 
demonstrating that public prosecutors did not always play the domi-
nant role in the adjudication of criminal cases.  I examine both the 
English and the American experience with private prosecutors, not-
ing that private prosecutions remain common in present-day England 
even as they have all but withered away in the United States.12 
 
 11 See Adam M. Gershowitz, An Informational Approach to the Mass Imprisonment Problem, 40 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 47, 76–77 (2008) (describing resource allocation inherent in the criminal 
justice system); Thomas P. Sullivan, Repair or Repeal—Report of the Illinois Governor’s Commis-
sion on Capital Punishment, 49 FED. LAW. 40, 44 (2002) (discussing proposed state criminal 
reforms, and weighing the costs with respect to the state budget); Ross E. Wiener, Inter-
Branch Appointments After the Independent Counsel:  Court Appointment of United States Attor-
neys, 86 MINN. L. REV. 363, 363, 383, 412 (2001) (explaining the role U.S. Attorneys play 
in the “inevitable rationing of limited resources”). 
 12 See Douglas Hay, Controlling the English Prosecutor, 21 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 165, 180 (1983) 
(stating that, by not including police in the private prosecution numbers, “[f]ewer than 
three percent of defendants are prosecuted by private individuals”); Patrick M. Fahey, 
Note, Payne v. Tennessee:  An Eye for an Eye and Then Some, 25 CONN. L. REV. 205, 208 
(1992) (contrasting the legitimacy of private prosecution of crime in Great Britain with 
the disapproval of private prosecution of crime in the United States); Michael T. McCor-
mack, Note, The Need for Private Prosecutors:  An Analysis of Massachusetts and New Hampshire 
Law, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 497, 500–01 (2004) (“According to a 1960 study, the Director 
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In Part II, I examine the contemporary role of private prosecutors 
in the United States, finding that a number of states permit—whether 
by common law tradition or express statute—privately retained law-
yers to pursue criminal cases.  I also consider the function of private 
justice in federal law, focusing on the establishment of qui tam actions 
and the creation of private attorneys general to enforce specific fed-
eral statues. 
In Part III, I analyze the doctrinal basis for the private prosecution 
of criminal cases, determining whether under current standards of 
due process and equal protection, such prosecutions remain constitu-
tionally permissible.  While sensitive to the real issues privately man-
aged prosecutions may pose to the criminal justice system, I neverthe-
less conclude that they survive constitutional scrutiny. Similarly, I 
explore prudential arguments against private criminal law enforce-
ment, focusing on both the ethical considerations swirling around 
private prosecutors as well as the general ulitity of private law en-
forcement schemes. 
Finally, in Part IV, I argue that the use of private prosecutors is 
likely to have a beneficial effect upon the criminal justice system and 
thus offer the contours of a model statute.  Turning to the policy ar-
guments for permitting the private prosecution of criminal cases, I 
note that private prosecutors may prove useful in trying cases that 
may otherwise go unnoticed by the system, may help relieve the bur-
dens of overworked public prosecutorial offices, and allow the use of 
expert prosecutors in particularly complex cases, such as in criminal 
trademark or patent cases.  If nothing else, leveraging private re-
sources to fund criminal investigations and prosecutions will have a 
beneficial effect upon deterrence strategies.  This benefit rests upon 
the Berccarian insight that it is the certainty, not necessarily the sever-
ity, of punishment that deters crime.13 
The use of private prosecutors, while hardly a complete solution 
to the myriad problems confronting our criminal justice system, may 
nevertheless be a viable means of expanding prosecutorial resources 
and thereby increasing the costs to potential criminals of engaging in 
untoward behavior.  As Adam Smith understood in discussing the 
“invisible hand” that guided free markets, the pursuit of self-interest, 
 
of Public Prosecutions handled only eight percent of the prosecutions in Great Britain, 
while private prosecutors or police accounted for the other ninety-two percent.”). 
 13 See Brian E. Forst, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment:  A Cross-State Analysis of the 
1960’s, 61 MINN. L. REV. 743, 762–63 (1977) (finding empirical support for Cesare Bec-
caria’s “two-hundred-year-old suggestion that certainty of punishment deters more effec-
tively than its severity”). 
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rightly understood, can yield benefits for society as a whole as well as 
for the individual.14 
I.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF PRIVATE PROSECUTION 
Traditionally, the aims of the criminal law have been to deter 
wrongdoing through the threat of prosecution and subsequent pun-
ishment and, when deterrence fails, to recompense the victim and 
provide just punishment to the offender.15  Punishment itself has 
been understood to function as a deterrent to prevent conduct soci-
ety abhors; but when deterrence fails, a court may impose punish-
ment to incapacitate the offender,16 to rehabilitate the offender,17 or 
to exist as an end in and of itself.18  Punishment, however, cannot ex-
ist without prosecution. 
The criminal justice system exists to provide a forum wherein 
wrongs perpetrated by one individual against another may be reme-
diated and social values may be vindicated.  Although societies, both 
ancient and modern, have selectively enforced criminal laws depend-
ing upon the immediate availability of resources and the shifting in-
terests of society,19 the nature of common law crimes has remained 
remarkably stable over time.  Murder, rape, theft, and other obvious 
criminal acts have long been recognized as “wrongs” in both common 
law and civil law jurisdictions.20 
 
 14 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 477 
(Edwin Cannan ed., Univ. of Chicago Press 1976) (1776). 
 15 See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 401 
(1958).  See generally 1 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 1 (15th ed. 1993) 
(examining the general purpose of criminal law). 
 16 See Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 343, 351–53 (1983) (“Im-
prisonment puts convicted criminals out of general circulation . . . .”). 
 17 See id. (“Punishment may help to reform the criminal so that his wish to commit crimes 
will be lessened . . . .”). 
 18 See Paul H. Robinson, Reforming the Federal Criminal Code:  A Top Ten List, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. 
REV. 225, 253 (1997) (explaining that one theory of punishment “sees the imposition of 
deserved punishment as a valuable end in itself, without regard to whether it avoids fu-
ture crimes”). 
 19 See Ronald J. Allen, The Police and Substantive Rulemaking:  Reconciling Principle and Expedi-
ency, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 62, 81–85 (1976) (discussing an application of the Roman jurist 
Julian’s concept of desuetude); Cynthia B. Herrup, Law and Morality in Seventeenth-Century 
England, 106 PAST & PRESENT 102, 104–06 (1985) (describing the use of legal discretion 
and the actual application of the law in seventeenth-century England); Teemu Ruskola, 
Note, Law, Sexual Morality, and Gender Equality in Qing and Communist China, 103 YALE L.J. 
2531, 2564 (1994) (speaking to the practice of selective enforcement of laws in the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China). 
 20 W. H. Hitchler, Crimes and Civil Injuries, 39 DICK. L. REV. 23, 23–24 (1934). 
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While the nature of common law crimes has remained fairly 
steady over time, the manner in which society handles remediation 
for criminal behavior has evolved.  Western society once generally 
viewed crime as a harm perpetrated against the individual;21 hence 
crimes were prosecuted in much the same way as suits in tort were li-
tigated:  individuals squared off in a state-provided forum.  Religion, 
however, especially in those nations dominated by Christianity, also 
understood crime to be an offense against God.22  Because the 
Church represented God on earth, crimes could be seen as offenses 
against the organization of the Church as well.23  In an age of the di-
vine right of kings to rule, and—at least in England—of the King’s 
position as head of the Church—crime came to be viewed as harm 
perpetrated against the state.24  To this end, the state would allow 
public prosecutors to press a case against the defendant not only in 
the victim’s name, but in the King’s name as well.25  I suspect the 
King’s advisors also viewed criminal prosecutions as a means of initi-
ating social control as well as serving as a vehicle to collect revenue.  
Nevertheless, the civil justice system remained the more appropriate 
avenue for individuals to seek redress for harms perpetrated against 
them as individuals. 
This theoretical understanding of crime as a harm to the state ver-
sus crime as a harm to the victim has crucial practical consequences.  
If crime is viewed as a harm principally against the victim, then the 
state has no (or only a minor) role in seeking remediation.  For ex-
ample, just as in a civil suit in tort, the state merely provides a forum 
wherein the injured party can obtain justice; similarly, in a private 
criminal law model, the aggrieved victim (or other interested party) 
initiates prosecution and the state serves only as mediator. 
 
 21 See Dianne Molvig, Violence and the Judicial System:  Stemming the Tide of Violence in Our 
Courthouses, WIS. LAW., July 1997, at 10, 59 (emphasizing that a “fundamental concept in 
human history” is the concept “of crime as a violation against an individual and his or her 
family and community”). 
 22 See Jordan J. Ballor, To Reform or to Abolish?  Christian Perspectives on Punishment, Prison, and 
Restorative Justice, 6 AVE MARIA L. REV. 481, 502 (2008) (discussing the Christian tradition’s 
understanding of crime and sin). 
 23 HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION:  THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL 
TRADITION 187 (1983). 
 24 See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *269 (“[T]he king shall be reputed the only 
supreme head in earth of the church of England . . . .”); Harold J. Berman, The Origins of 
Historical Jurisprudence:  Coke, Selden, Hale, 103 YALE L.J. 1651, 1666 (1994) (paraphrasing 
Richard Hooker’s thoughts on absolute monarchy and divine appointment). 
 25 See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 24, at *298 (discussing modes of prosecution); see also 3 id. 
at *254 (inquiring into “the mode of redressing those injuries to which the crown itself is 
a party”). 
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Although the aim of this Article is not to provide a comprehensive 
analysis of the history of private prosecutions in English or American 
law, it is important to review briefly the history of criminal prosecu-
tions in general in order to understand the transformation of the 
criminal prosecution system from a privately managed system to one 
dominated by public officers. 
A.  The Concept of Private Prosecutions in English Law 
Criminal prosecution in England is commonly divided into two 
periods:  the period before the 1879 Act creating the Office of the 
Public Prosecutor, and the time period since.26  Prior to the 1879 Act, 
private citizens and non-police agencies tended to dominate criminal 
prosecution.  During the time period following that Act, however, 
public prosecutions began to gain purchase and have since come to 
fill the dominant, albeit not exclusive, role in prosecuting crimes. 
1.  Early England and Privately Managed Criminal Prosecutions 
Before the early-nineteenth century, English law recognized that 
the victim of a crime was generally responsible for the crime’s prose-
cution.27  Blackstone discussed the nature of the English “appeal,” 
which is not, as is commonly understood in contemporary American 
law, a petition to a superior court to remedy an error committed in 
an inferior court but, instead, an “original suit” instigated by a “pri-
vate subject against another” to obtain redress for a wrong.28 
English law erected a rudimentary criminal justice system as a 
means to mediate between parties and to allow those wronged to ob-
tain recompense.29  Under the English system, the victim of a crime 
 
 26 See K. W. LIDSTONE ET AL., PROSECUTIONS BY PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS AND NON-POLICE 
AGENCIES 2–3 (1980).  A number of articles traverse this same territory, and doubtless in a 
more concise and elegant fashion, including Juan Cardenas, The Crime Victim in the Prose-
cutorial Process, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 357, 359–73 (1986); Thomas J. Robinson, Jr., 
Private Prosecution in Criminal Cases, 4 WAKE FOREST INTRAMURAL L. REV. 300, 300–11 
(1968); Andrew Sidman, Comment, Outmoded Concept of Private Prosecution, 25 AM. U. L. 
REV. 754, 756–65 (1976); and W. Scott Van Alstyne, Jr., Comment, The District Attorney—A 
Historical Puzzle, 1952 WIS. L. REV. 125, 125–37 (1952). 
 27 See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 24, at *161 (“The party offending is here bound, by the 
fundamental contract of society, to obey the direction of the legislature, and pay the for-
feiture incurred to such persons as the law requires.  The usual application of this forfei-
ture is either to the party aggrieved . . . .”). 
 28 4 id. at *312. 
 29 See JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 40–47 (2003) (discuss-
ing structure of pretrial procedure organized by statute). 
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would prosecute.30  Professor John Langbein has explained that “the 
criminal trial was expected to transpire as a lawyer-free contest of 
amateurs.”31  Even in the case of a serious offense, “the prosecution 
was . . . not [typically] represented by counsel.  The victim of the 
crime commonly served as prosecutor.”32  The victim was not entirely 
alone, however, for the Marian Committal Statute of 155533 empow-
ered local magistrates to issue search and arrest warrants and to order 
accused persons to be held prior to trial.34  The warrant effectively in-
demnifed those conducting the search or effecting the seizure of the 
person.  Similarly, pre-trial detention prevented the accused from 
fleeing and thereby escaping justice.  Parliament thus laid the foun-
dation of a rudimentary criminal justice system in which the victim 
could search and seize evidence and even arrest the offender without 
fear of tort liability.  Underlying the criminal justice system of the 
time was the view that, since the principal harm was inflicted on the 
victim, the victim was in the best position to avenge the wrong: 
The fact that the private vengeance of the person wronged by a crime was 
the principal source to which men trusted for the administration of crim-
inal justice in early times is one of the most characteristic circumstances 
connected with English criminal law, and has had much to do with the 
development of what may perhaps be regarded as its principal distinctive 
peculiarity, namely the degree to which a criminal trial resembles a pri-
vate litigation.35 
The sense that justice has been rendered to the victim is not inconse-
quential—all peoples desire justice.  The concept of revenge is as old 
as mankind.  The state, in providing an orderly means by which jus-
tice might be meted out, helps to satiate this yearning for justice: 
[N]o stronger or more effectual guarantee can be provided for the due 
observance of the law of the land . . . than is given by the power . . . of 
testing the legality of any conduct of which [the victim] disap-
proves . . . by a criminal prosecution.  Many such prosecutions . . . have 
given a legal vent to feelings in every way entitled to respect, and have 
decided peaceably, and in an authentic manner, many questions of great 
constitutional importance.36 
 
 30 See 1 SIR JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 245 
(London, MacMillan 1883) (“The history of appeals or accusations by a private person 
and trial by battle go together, as trial by battle was an incident of appeals.”). 
 31 LANGBEIN, supra note 29, at 11. 
 32 Id. 
 33 2 & 3 Phil. & M., c. 10 (1555) (Eng.). 
 34 LANGBEIN, supra note 29, at 40–41. 
 35 STEPHEN, supra note 30, at 245; see also Cardenas, supra note 26, at 359. 
 36 STEPHEN, supra note 30, at 496. 
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As in the civil courts, the privately initiated prosecution could 
proceed with counsel’s assistance, but counsel was compensated by 
the victim.37  To discourage the possibility of a frivolous prosecution, 
the law required the approval of a justice of the peace or an indict-
ment by a grand jury before the private prosecution could com-
mence.38  The grand jury acted “as a filtering mechanism to dispose of 
groundless or insubstantial prosecutions, sparing the defendant the 
peril and indignity of public trial in a transparently weak case.”39 
If the screening function served to weed out inappropriate or 
otherwise malicious prosecutions, then, so did private prosecutions 
themselves serve as a check upon centralized authority.40  Certainly, 
the Framers of the Bill of Rights recognized the possibility that the 
government could use criminal prosecution as a tool of oppression;41 
hence, many provisions of the Bill of Rights may be read as a code of 
criminal procedure, ensuring the defendant basic procedural rights.42 
The aim of a criminal prosecution lay not only in justice-as-
revenge, however, but also in restitution.  Blackstone explained that 
the “private process for the punishment of public crimes had proba-
bly its origin in those times when a private pecuniary satisfaction, 
called a weregild, was constantly paid to the party injured, or his rela-
tions, to expiate enormous offenses.”43  The weregild was simply the 
 
 37 See J. J. TOBIAS, CRIME AND POLICE IN ENGLAND 1700–1900, at 119 (1979) (“Fees would 
have to be paid to various people to see the prosecution through, and if the prosecutor 
had called upon the assistance of a parish constable or someone else, he would be re-
quired to share the reward.”). 
 38 See LANGBEIN, supra note 29, at 45. 
 39 Id. (footnote omitted). 
 40 See Juan Cardenas, The Crime Victim in the Prosecutorial Process, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
357, 361 (1986) (explaining the view that “a private prosecutorial system was necessary to 
limit the power of the Crown”); Hay, supra note 12, at 167 (“One of the crucial safeguards 
of the citizenry against an executive contemptuous of liberty was the right of private pros-
ecution.”). 
 41 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 424–50, 661–65, 707–17, 757–59, 766 reprinted in THE FOUNDERS’ 
CONSTITUTION (Philip Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 2000), available at http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/bill_of_rightss11.html.  Mr. Goodhue, though 
not supporting the immediate passage of the Bill of Rights, acknowledges, “it is the wish 
of many of our constituents, that something should be added to the Constitution, to se-
cure in a stronger manner their liberties from the inroads of power.”  Id.  Arguing, in-
stead for the immediate passage of a Bill of Rights, Mr. Madison explains that “if all pow-
er is subject to abuse . . . then it is possible the abuse of the powers of the General 
Government may be guarded against in a more secure manner than is now done.”  Id. 
 42 See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:  FIRST 
PRINCIPLES (1997) (identifying specific constitutional provisions as creating a criminal 
code of sorts). 
 43 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 24, at *313.  See generally 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC 
WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, at 
450–51 (2d ed. 1923). 
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price the offender would have to pay to make the victim whole.  This 
is not unlike a civil suit wherein damages are sought for precisely the 
same purpose. 
Procedural rules evolved to control private prosecutions.  Black-
stone noted, for example, that crimes prosecuted by appeal were lim-
ited to certain types of heinous offenses committed against a specific 
victim or that victim’s property, such as larceny, rape, and murder, 
and standing was limited only to certain individuals.44  A man’s mur-
der, for example, could only be prosecuted by the spouse or by a 
male heir “to the four nearest degrees of blood.”45  Not unlike a civil 
case, then, standing served as a means of limiting the pool of poten-
tial complainants who could prosecute a case.  Moreover, jeopardy 
attached to a private prosecution, and the punishments meted out 
mirrored those of a case initiated by the King’s attorneys.46 
Unlike contemporary America, where punishment more often 
than not comes in the form of incarceration and making the victim 
whole seems to be of secondary concern, English society appeared to 
be far more concerned about recompense to the victim than inca-
pacitating the offender.  Even capital cases might be settled through 
bargaining rather than the actual imposition of the death penalty.47  
In early societies in particular, the value of a human capital was con-
siderable; to remove the offender from society (either by forfeiture of 
life or imprisonment) made little sense.  Although a victim (or a vic-
tim’s family) might have an urge for revenge that might be satiated 
only by imposition of the death penalty, there was little else to be 
gained if the perpetrator was not in a position to provide restitu-
tion—whether through money, forfeiture of property, or indentured 
servitude.  A private prosecution thus enabled the victim not only to 
obtain restitution but also to conclude that he had obtained some 
measure of justice. 
Despite the predominance of privately managed criminal prosecu-
tions, the King, as sovereign, could elect to intervene in a criminal 
trial: 
[W]hen . . . his immediate officers were . . . assured that a man had 
committed a gross misdemeanor, either personally against the king or his 
 
 44 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 24, at *314–15. 
 45 Id. at *315. 
 46 Id. 
 47 See Daniel Klerman, Settlement and the Decline of Private Prosecution in Thirteenth-Century Eng-
land, 19 LAW & HIST. REV. 1, 4 (2001) (describing a “special kind of appeal that was 
brought by a convicted criminal who had already been sentenced to hang” whereby the 
criminal could have his life spared if he or she “successfully appealed several of his ac-
complices”). 
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government, or against the public peace and good order, they were at li-
berty . . . to convey that information to the Court of the King’s Bench by 
a suggestion on record, and to carry on the prosecution in his majesty’s 
name.48 
Even in circumstances in which the Crown was not directly threat-
ened, the King might choose to insert himself in a criminal case.  
Professor Langbein has documented that “[g]overnment interven-
tion . . . in noteworthy criminal cases unrelated to affairs of state is 
well evidenced for the 1750s.”49  Langbein explains that “when the 
central authorities wanted to strengthen a criminal prosecution, they 
did it by sending in the lawyers.”50  Despite the occasional interven-
tion by the Crown, however, the private criminal prosecution re-
mained a cornerstone of English law.  J. Chitty, in his influential crim-
inal law commentaries, explained the “right” of prosecution: 
[E]very man is of common right entitled to prefer an accusation against a 
party whom he suspects to be guilty. . . . even an individual who has, for 
the purpose of detecting a suspicious person, afforded him an opportu-
nity to commit the particular crime, is not thereby precluded from be-
coming a prosecutor, and instituting proceedings against him . . . .51 
A preference for private prosecution may be attributed to the slow 
development of a centralized system of government or a general re-
luctance to raise taxes to support public prosecutions.52  A crime in-
volving the conversion of private property, for example, might not be 
so disruptive of the public order that the King would feel a sense of 
obligation to prosecute a case against the malefactor.  Nevertheless, 
“the idea of wrong to a person or his kindred is still primary, and that 
of offense against the common weal secondary, even in the gravest 
cases.”53  It goes without saying that when wronged, the individual vic-
tim will feel it far more acutely than the state. 
In time, professional societies arose to bear “some of the costs as-
sociated with the risk of being victimized by a serious crime.”54  Essen-
tially, members paid a subscription fee and, if victimized, could count 
on the association to offer a reward and to bear the costs of the inves-
 
 48 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 24, at *309–10. 
 49 LANGBEIN, supra note 29, at 121. 
 50 Id. 
 51 1 J. CHITTY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 1–2 (1816); cf. Robinson, supra 
note 26, at 301. 
 52 See Klerman, supra note 47, at 45 (detailing the chronology of the private prosecution in 
England). 
 53 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 43, at 46. 
 54 LANGBEIN, supra note 29, at 133. 
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tigation and prosecution of the offense.55  Professor Leon Radzi-
nowicz has explained that such societies were established to secure 
the interests of merchants who might otherwise be victimized.56  
Communities “weighed” offenses in light of their perceived harm to 
the social order.  As described by Professor Radzinowicz, monetary 
rewards provided to prosecutors for bringing cases involving house-
breaking (modern burglary) in the counties of Middlesex and Hert-
ford netted twenty pounds; livestock theft, seven pounds; grand lar-
ceny, five pounds; and petty larceny, three pounds.57  This is precisely 
the sort of “harmfulness weighing” that modern legislatures engage 
in to determine the relative severity of punishment for various crimi-
nal offenses.58 
It is unclear why private prosecutions began to wane; to date, no 
one has been able to provide a complete account of their fall from 
prominence.  The evolving understanding of crime as an offense 
against the state doubtless contributed to the decline—this under-
standing might have been fueled by the state’s decision to seek rents 
in the form of criminal fines and to quell concerns with private jus-
tice.  Over time, the Crown came to shoulder a higher percentage of 
criminal prosecutions.  Professor Daniel Klerman, in an empirical 
analysis of privately initiated prosecutions in thirteenth-century Eng-
land, offers an alternate explanation as to the apparent decline.59  
Based upon his statistical analysis, Klerman suggests that judicial atti-
tudes towards settlement and pressure to move cases to jury trial, 
more than anything, accounted for the decline in private prosecu-
tions.60  He observes that: 
[W]hen judges put nonprosecuted appellees to jury trial, the number of 
appeals [private prosecutions] declined.  It is possible, however, that the 
appeal did not decline in importance because crime victims did not need 
to initiate an appeal in order to settle.  All they had to do was threaten to 
appeal.  If such threats resulted in settlement before appeal was initiated 
at county court, the king’s suit procedure would not be invoked because 
 
 55 Id. at 133.  Professor Langbein provides the interesting example of a 1770 Association of 
“several Gentlemen, Tradesmen, Farmers and others of the County of Nottingham, To 
Prosecute Horse Stealers.”  Id. at 132. 
 56 2 LEON RADZINOWICZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION 
FROM 1750, at 116–19 (1948).  For a discussion of those societies, see Thomas J. Robin-
son, Jr., Comment, Private Prosecution in Criminal Cases, 4 WAKE FOREST INTRAMURAL L. 
REV. 300, 302–03 (1968). 
 57 2 RADZINOWICZ, supra note 56, at 125. 
 58 See generally WESLEY CRAGG, THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT:  TOWARDS A THEORY OF 
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 26 (1992) (discussing development of retributivism). 
 59 Klerman, supra note 47, at 47–48, 53–55. 
 60 Id. at 57–58. 
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it was only triggered if an appeal was initiated.  In addition, such threats 
to appeal, even if followed by settlement, would not be mentioned in le-
gal records.  It is thus possible that although the number of recorded ap-
peals dropped, the number of preappeal settlements rose, so that the 
overall social impact of appeals and settlements induced by the threat of 
appeals remained constant.61 
While the exact reasons for the decline remain shrouded by history, 
certainly private prosecutions, not unlike civil tort actions, might be 
expected to encourage settlements prior to trial.  Such cases would 
not have been recorded; hence the perceived decline may not have 
been a real decline. 
One might further speculate that the emergence of the associa-
tions designed to incentivize the prosecution of certain offenses, 
coupled with the burgeoning understanding that criminal offenses 
were also breaches against the state (perhaps leavened by the state’s 
realization that it might be able to have a slice of any restitution pro-
vided to victims as well as fines directly payable to the state itself)62 led 
to the establishment of public prosecutors.  General tax revenue 
came to support public prosecution, thereby obviating the need for 
any special associations or guilds to bear the cost of prosecution.  In 
1879, Parliament passed the Prosecution of Offenses Act, which 
(among other things) established an office of the Director of Public 
Prosecutions “to institute, undertake, or carry on such criminal pro-
ceedings . . . and to give such advice and assistance to chief officers of 
police, clerks to justices, and other persons . . . concerned in any 
criminal proceeding.”63  As noted, however, “[t]his act conferred no 
sweeping official powers on the Director, but merely gave him powers 
of [a] very technical nature . . . amounting to little more than those 
of a private prosecutor.”64  Although Parliament fiddled with the of-
fice over the years (including abolishing it altogether and then resur-
recting it), subsequent legislative enactments clarified that 
”[n]othing in the Prosecution of Offences Act[] . . . shall preclude 
any person from instituting or carrying on any criminal proceedings, 
but the Director of Public Prosecutions may undertake at any stage 
the conduct of those proceedings if he thinks fit.”65  Thus, while the 
right of private prosecution remained, its scope was trimmed by the 
 
 61 Id. 
 62 See id. at 6 (discussing shift from paying injured kin to paying the “church, king, or com-
munity at large”). 
 63 42 & 43 Vict., c. 22, § 2 (1879) (Eng.). 
 64 Robinson, supra note 56, at 306. 
 65 Prosecution of Offenses Act, 1908, 8 Edw. 7, c. 3, § 2(3) (Eng.). 
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acknowledgment that the public prosecutor possessed plenary au-
thority to intercede in a private prosecution or to quash it altogether. 
2.  The Contemporary Function of Private Prosecutors in England 
Although privately initiated prosecutions remain commonplace in 
England,66 what constitutes a “private” prosecution is somewhat dif-
ferent from the way in which such prosecutions are understood in the 
United States.  In England, the term “private prosecution” has come 
to mean a prosecution not formally involving the police.67  Local gov-
ernments, governmental agencies, trade and professional associa-
tions, and individuals all may bring private prosecutions.68 
Following the 1985 adoption of the Prosecution of Offenses Act,69 
the English crown began to shoulder a greater burden of conducting 
criminal prosecutions.  While the police may assist the private com-
plainant in a private prosecution, oftentimes the Crown may inter-
cede in a matter of significant public interest.  If, for example, the 
crime is one of violence or a breach of the public order, the police 
will become the official complainant, and the government will handle 
the case.70  However, the Prosecution of Offenses Act did not end the 
practice of privately initiated prosecutions.  Such prosecutions re-
main a cornerstone of the English criminal justice system.71 
Although the individual’s right to commence and maintain a pri-
vate prosecution was preserved under the Prosecution of Offenses 
Act,72 the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) was nonetheless granted 
considerable authority to take over, end, or otherwise control a pri-
vate prosecution.  The CPS’s own website, however, acknowledges 
that: 
[T]here is nothing wrong in allowing a private prosecution to run its 
course through to verdict and, in appropriate cases, sentence.  The fact 
that a private prosecution succeeds is not an indication that the case 
should have been prosecuted by the CPS.  Parliament has specifically al-
 
 66 See generally LIDSTONE, supra note 26, at 15 (exploring the significant minority of cases in 
which the police are not the prosecutors). 
 67 See RICHARD J. STAFFORD, PRIVATE PROSECUTIONS, Introduction (1989) (discussing private 
prosecutions in contemporary England). 
 68 See id. 
 69 Prosecution of Offences Act, 1985, c. 23, § 3(2) (Eng.). 
 70 The Crown Prosecution Service, Public Order Offences Incorporating the Charging 
Standard, http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/p_to_r/public_order_offences/ (last visited Feb. 
16, 2010). 
 71 See Abraham S. Goldstein, History of the Public Prosecutor, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND 
JUSTICE 1286, 1286 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983). 
 72 Prosecution of Offences Act, 1985, c. 23, § 6(1) (Eng.). 
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lowed for this possibility by the way section 6 is constructed:  there is no 
requirement for the CPS to take over a private prosecution.73 
The standards under which the CPS might supplant a private prose-
cution are identified as situations in which “either the evidential suf-
ficiency stage [a patently frivolous prosecution] or the public interest 
stage [in other words, society must have some sort of stake in the 
prosecution] . . . is not met”; or “the prosecution is vexatious” (a ma-
licious prosecution or one in which any rational prosecutor would 
forgo bringing a case).74 
The circumstances under which the CPS takes over and continues 
a private prosecution involve those instances in which there is suffi-
cient evidence to maintain a prosecution and such a case is in the 
public interest.75  Arguably, while a prosecution may be in the public 
interest, institutional, cultural, or fiscal concerns may prevent the 
case from going forward.  The avenue of the personally initiated pri-
vate prosecution exists to redress institutional failings.  In 2007, for 
example, police failed to prosecute the murder of a young black man 
from Liverpool, Stephen Lawrence.76  The family, as well as a number 
of commentators, argued that the failure to prosecute the case could 
be attributed to lingering racism.  The family therefore initiated a 
private prosecution to seek justice for their murdered son.77  Private 
prosecutions thus remain a vital part of the English criminal justice 
system.78 
B.  Prosecutions in the Colonies and Early America 
Mirroring the English view of considering crime to be a private 
concern,79 private criminal prosecutions in the American colonies 
appear to have been commonplace, but not exclusive.  Scholarship 
tracing the origins of the prosecutorial function in colonial America 
 
 73 The Crown Prosecution Service, Private Prosecutions, http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/p_to
_r/private_prosecutions/index.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2010). 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 See Luke Traynor, Integration Not Working Says City Debate Vote, LIVERPOOL ECHO, July 12, 
2007, at 15, available at http://www.liverpoolecho.co.uk/liverpool-news/local-news
/2007/07/12/integration-not-working-says-city-debate-vote-100252-19444008/. 
 77 See Press Release, The Crown Prosecution Service, CPS Advise on Stephen Lawrence Re-
Investigation (May 5, 2004), http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/press_releases/120_04 (last vi-
sited Feb. 16, 2010). 
 78 By at least one count, roughly “37 percent of non-motoring offences” were privately pros-
ecuted.  See STAFFORD, supra note 67, Introduction. 
 79 See Richard Gaskins, Changes in the Criminal Law in Eighteenth-Century Connecticut, 25 AM. J. 
LEGAL HIST. 309, 313 (1981) (“[C]rimes against public morality were systematically down-
graded . . . while crimes against property were gradually up-graded.”). 
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demonstrates that colonial legislatures, borrowing from the Dutch, 
often established offices for public prosecutors.80  Until the late-
nineteenth century, however, private prosecutions dominated the le-
gal landscape.81 
In her comprehensive history of the American prosecutor, to 
which anyone writing in the field owes a significant debt, Professor 
Joan Jacoby traces the roots of the American prosecutor to England, 
explaining that the colonists largely replicated the legal systems with 
which they were most familiar.82  For example, the Massachusetts Bay 
Colony, one of the largest settlements in the American colonies, 
strove to emulate the English example by adopting the English justice 
of the peace model.83  According to George Haskins, “[replicating 
English systems in America] was what they were used to . . . it com-
ported well with the leaders’ ideas about the functions of government 
and law.”84 
Although the colonists transplanted English law to America, they 
adapted it to meet the needs of a geographically sprawling patchwork 
of “colonies . . . spread along the Eastern seaboard . . . for almost two 
thousand miles with only distant connections to the central govern-
ment in England and with virtually no ties to one another.”85  And 
while the bulk of early colonial settlers may have had English roots, 
 
 80 Connecticut has been cited as “the first colony to appoint public prosecutors.”  See JOAN 
E. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR:  A SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 17 (1980).  In 1704, the 
Queen’s attorney in Connecticut, the colonial equivalent of the district attorney, was em-
powered to “prosecute and implead in the lawe all criminall offenders, and to doe all 
other things necessary or convenient as an atturney to suppresse vice and imorallitie.”  3 
CHARLES J. HOADLY, THE PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF CONNECTICUT:  FROM 
AUGUST, 1689, TO MAY, 1706, at 468 (1868); see also Jack M. Kress, Progress and Prosecution, 
423 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 99, 103 (1976) (“In May of 1704, the Connecticut 
Assembly passed the law which is generally recognized as creating the first permanent of-
fice of public prosecutor on a colony-wide basis . . . .”).  Interestingly, the job of the attor-
ney general in New Hampshire, first appointed in 1683, was to present criminal indict-
ments before the grand jury.  See ELWIN L. PAGE, JUDICIAL BEGINNINGS IN NEW HAMPSHIRE 
1640–1700, at 60 (1959). 
 81 See Steinberg, supra note 10, at 571–72; see also Stephanie A.J. Dangel, Note, Is Prosecution a 
Core Executive Function?  Morrison v. Olson and the Framers’ Intent, 99 YALE L.J. 1069, 1071–
72 (1990) (describing original understanding of the role of prosecutors). 
 82 See generally JACOBY, supra note 80. 
 83 See Joan E. Jacoby, The American Prosecutor in Historical Context, PROSECUTOR, Mar./Apr. 
2005, at 34, 38, available at http://www.mcaa-mn.org/docs/2005/AmericanProsecutor
HistoricalContext52705.pdf (noting “the Massachusetts Bay Colony modeled its court sys-
tem after the rural British justice of the peace courts”). 
 84 GEORGE LEE HASKINS, LAW AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY MASSACHUSETTS:  A STUDY IN 
TRADITION AND DESIGN 177 (1960). 
 85 JACOBY, supra note 80, at 11.  See also JOHN BLUM ET AL., THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE 59 
(1963). 
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immigrants from other cultures brought with them their own ideas 
with respect to government’s role in enforcing criminal law.86  Profes-
sor John Blum, in discussing the settlers’ diverse ancestry and who 
that ancestory affected their legal forms, has noted: 
[N]one of their institutions [were] quite like its English counterpart; the 
heritage of English ideas that went with the institutions was so rich and 
varied that Americans were able to select and develop those that best 
suited their situation and forget others that meanwhile were growing 
prominent in the mother country.87 
Similarly, Professor Jacoby has explained that in the colonies of New 
York and New Jersey, which enjoyed a preponderance of colonists 
from Holland, “the British common law methods of prosecution were 
altered early because of the influence of Dutch law and the duties of 
a Dutch judicial officer, the schout.”88  Among the duties exercised by 
the schout was that of “[the] present[ment of] criminal charges 
against alleged criminals.”89  As described by Professor Jacoby, the 
schout acted as a sort of one-man criminal justice system:  collecting 
evidence, presenting it before a court, contacting witnesses, and noti-
fying the accused of the charges leveled against him.90 
The confluence of the colonists’ varied legal traditions and the 
growing need to maintain order in a burgeoning society thus drove 
modifications to the English system and enabled the colonists to craft 
a prosecutorial system that best served their local interests.  The statu-
tory creation of a public prosecutor in certain colonies was one such 
innovation.  Professor Jack Kress has observed that the public prose-
cutor appears to be 
[A] distinctive and uniquely American contribution . . . . Whereas Ameri-
cans typically describe their legal system as based upon the English com-
mon law . . . the public prosecutor is a figure virtually unknown to the 
English system, which is primarily one of private prosecution to this day.91 
Nevertheless, Connecticut’s Constitution appears to be the only 
such charter to refer to a local prosecutor,92 which may be attributed 
to that one-time colony’s establishment of a system of public prosecu-
tors by 1704.93  Professor Jacoby’s work identifies few mentions of pub-
lic prosecutors in the time period immediately after the federal Con-
 
 86 See Jacoby, supra note 83, at 38. 
 87 BLUM ET AL., supra note 85, at 59. 
 88 JACOBY, supra note 80, at 13 (citing Van Alstyne, supra note 26, at 125). 
 89 Id. at 14. 
 90 See id. (listing the duties of the justices of the peace). 
 91 Jack M. Kress, supra note 80, at 100. 
 92 See JACOBY, supra note 80, at 22; see also Sidman, supra note 26, at 763 (exploring the his-
tory of private prosecutions). 
 93 Id. at 10. 
676 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 12:3 
 
stitution’s ratification,94 noting that “[o]nly five of these first thirteen 
constitutions . . . mention the office of the Attorney General.”95  How-
ever, those charters, as was common for the day, relegated that office 
to one primarily of legal advisor, not prosecutor.  According to Pro-
fessor Jacoby, and buttressed by a review of the relevant documents, 
of the state constitutions adopted at that time, only Connecticut and 
New York appear to refer to the office of the public prosecutor.96 
Without a practice of establishing an office for the prosecution of 
crimes, it is no surprise then that the colonists and early Americans 
imported from England the practice of private prosecutions of crimi-
nal offenses.97  The absence of police forces and public prosecutors 
necessitated such a practice: 
[The crime victim] served as policeman and prosecutor who, if he chose 
to apprehend an offender and initiate a prosecution, did so directly and 
at his own expense.  He did not have to rely on other government agen-
cies.  On the contrary, he could not rely on them even if he had wanted 
to because they either did not exist or did not perform the function he 
sought.98 
The enterprising colonists, left to their own devices, established 
legal forums to resolve disputes and provide a peaceable means of 
seeking restitution.  And, it appears, that without statutorily estab-
lished public prosecutors, privately-retained prosecutors managed the 
majority of criminal enforcement actions.99 
For crimes against property, the victims, it appears, tended to 
bring private prosecutions to seek redress.100  Such an arrangement 
makes perfect sense101—especially if the threat of criminal punish-
ment forced settlement or if the defendant had little ability to satisfy 
 
 94 See id. at 273. 
 95 Id. at 22.  The constitutions of Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Vir-
ginia include the office of attorney general in the judicial article.  Id.  The attorney gen-
eral in New Hampshire, first appointed in 1683, was to present criminal indictments be-
fore the grand jury.  See PAGE, supra note 80, at 60. 
 96 N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXVII; JACOBY, supra note 80, at 22; Jacoby, supra note 83, at 34.  
Secondary references to public prosecutors, as Professor Jacoby notes, are equally rare.  
For example, an 1816 manual for bar members describing New York government covers 
twenty-one officers without mentioning public prosecutors.  See generally JOHN TAPPEN, 
THE COUNTY AND TOWN OFFICER (1816). 
 97 See Jacoby, supra note 83, at 37–38. 
 98 William F. McDonald, Towards a Bicentennial Revolution in Criminal Justice:  The Return of the 
Victim, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 649, 649 (1976) (footnote omitted). 
 99 See Steinberg, supra note 10, at 571–72 (discussing the dominance of private prosecutions 
in the colonies). 
100 See Jacoby, supra note 83, at 37. 
101 See Gaskins, supra note 79, at 313–15 (explaining why property crimes were handled in 
civil proceedings). 
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a civil judgment.  Indeed, contemporary scholarship suggests that the 
number of tort cases dwarfed those of criminal cases in colonial 
America.102  If a civil suit proved impractical, the victim of a crime 
would need some sort of ability to seek recompense to repair the 
harm done.  Under such an arrangement, the state would have little 
need to involve itself, except to provide its citizens with a forum to 
settle disputes in a court of law rather than by force of arms.103 
Thus, ministerial functionaries, such as justices of the peace or al-
dermen, used informal procedures to deal with privately initiated 
prosecutions.104  Private litigants retained control over their cases and 
could choose to settle even in circumstances in which a grand jury 
might have returned an indictment.105  If there is a dearth of refer-
ences to private prosecutions in colonial America, it probably is a 
product of the inadequate record keeping of the times, as well as the 
fact that a case settled after the threat of prosecution might never 
have been recorded and would be lost to modern researchers. 
And for the most part, early attorneys general and district attor-
neys functioned more as legal advisors than actual prosecutors.106  For 
example, attorneys general provided legal advice to other govern-
ment functionaries and rendered legal opinions interpreting statutes, 
state contracts, or judicial opinions.107  District prosecutors, instead of 
performing the functions we commonly think of today, performed 
the administrative tasks of a quasi-judicial official or served the courts, 
 
102 See generally Goldstein, supra note 71, at 1286.  In fact, the number of so-called public 
crimes remained fairly small during this time—perhaps because evolving societies con-
cerned with survival had other, more pressing issues on which to focus.  For a discussion 
along these lines, see William E. Nelson, Emerging Notions of Modern Criminal Law in the Re-
volutionary Era:  An Historical Perspective, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 450 (1967). 
103 See, e.g., Rutgers v. Waddington (N.Y. Mayor's Ct. 1784), reprinted in SELECT CASES OF THE 
MAYOR’S COURT OF NEW YORK CITY 1674–1784, at 57–59 (Richard B. Morris ed., 1935) 
(describing how in 1783, a victim used private prosecution for trespass to vindicate an an-
ti-Tory state policy “in derogation of the sixth article of the treaty of peace”). 
104 See, e.g., JULIUS GOEBEL, JR. & T. RAYMOND NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL 
NEW YORK 341, 347–50, 366–67, 379–82 (1944) (describing relatively informal procedures 
used in private prosecutions); see also Steinberg, supra note 10, at 572–73 (highlighting 
the importance of alderman and justices of the peace to the criminal justice system and 
describing the types of offenses they handled). 
105 See, e.g., Donna J. Spindel, The Administration of Criminal Justice in North Carolina, 1720–
1740, 25 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 141, 161 (1981) (suggesting that many prosecutions were 
dismissed when a party failed to appear); Steinberg, supra note 10, at 574 (arguing that, 
in Pennsylvania, private control over the settlement of cases persisted into nineteenth 
century). 
106 See Dangel, supra note 81, at 1073 (“First, colonial attorneys general and district attorneys 
performed non-prosecutorial tasks . . . .”). 
107 See id. 
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which often were responsible for their appointment.108  While select 
jurisdictions empowered public prosecutors to quash privately initi-
ated suits,109 few permitted them to initiate criminal cases.110 
Following the Constitution’s ratification in 1789, state constitu-
tions slowly began to acknowledge offices of public prosecution, but 
without ending the practice of private prosecution where it had pre-
viously existed.111  Interestingly, district attorneys, who actively man-
aged prosecutions, tended to be elected while attorneys general, who 
served exclusively as legal advisors to the government, often re-
mained appointed officials.112  Why this dichotomy persisted is un-
clear.113  One might argue, however, that their difference in function 
dictated that attorneys general ought to be appointed by those whom 
they advised, while public prosecutors, who might be counted on to 
represent the interests of a particular victim as well as the state, were 
best elected directly by the people.  Similarly, concerns about the 
centralization of prosecutorial authority may have fueled popularly 
elected prosecutors who operate with a significant degree of inde-
pendence from other governmental departments.  A desire to ensure 
that public prosecutors could be held directly accountable by the 
people would thus conform to the idea of a carefully checked and ba-
lanced government, even if a prosecutor created to represent the in-
 
108 The public prosecutor often acted as a judicial clerk and set the stage for the private 
prosecutor and defendant to present their case before the court.  See JACOBY, supra note 
80, at 23 (stating that in the nineteenth century district attorneys were minor court fig-
ures and served primarily judicial, not executive, roles); see also Steinberg, supra note 10, 
at 577 (describing a public prosecutor’s duties as including organizing the court’s calen-
dar). 
109 See People v. Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co., 12 Ill. App. 263, 265 (Ill. App. Ct. 1882) 
(per curiam) (“He may commence public prosecutions, in his official capacity by infor-
mation and he may discontinue them when, in his judgment, the ends of justice are satis-
fied.”). 
110 Cf. Goldstein, supra note 71, at 1286 (“[L]ike its English ancestor, [America] places ex-
traordinary emphasis on local autonomy and charging discretion.”). 
111 See, e.g., MISS. CONST. of 1832, art. IV, § 25 (“There shall be an attorney general . . . .”).  
Mississippi in 1817 and Louisiana in 1812 separated the prosecuting attorney from the at-
torney general, who served as advisor to the executive.  See LA. CONST. of 1812, art. IV, § 7 
(“There shall be an attorney general for the state, and as many other prosecuting attor-
neys for the state as may be hereafter found necessary.”); MISS. CONST. of 1817, art. V, 
§ 14 (“There shall be an attorney general for the State, and as many district attornies as 
the general assembly may deem necessary . . . .”). 
112 States distinguished the prosecutor from the attorney general, who was a legal advisor to 
the executive, and the sheriff, who embodied the executive function of law enforcement.  
See JACOBY, supra note 80, at 22–25 (comparing the roles of attorneys general and sher-
iffs). 
113 See generally Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 329 S.E.2d 22, 25 (Va. 1985) (providing the Su-
preme Court of Virginia’s discussion of the historical development of the private prosecu-
tor). 
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terests of justice as opposed to the popular will might better be insu-
lated from politics in the same way in which judges are.  But, if the 
underlying point of electing public prosecutors was to ensure their 
ties to the community, then they were probably not thought of either 
as being at odds with privately managed prosecutions or even as be-
ing a necessity, given the availability of such privately managed prose-
cutions.  As Professor Jacoby acknowledges, the public prosecutor was 
“for the first half-century at least . . . . clearly a minor actor in the 
court’s structure.”114 
Commonwealth v. Williams115 is among the earliest cases to criticize 
the practice of private prosecution.  In Williams, the defendants were 
charged with burglarizing a bank in Charlestown, Massachusetts.  At 
trial, the court granted the District Attorney’s motion to have a pri-
vate attorney aid in prosecuting the case.  The defendants were con-
victed.  On appeal, the defendants argued that the conviction should 
be overturned because the private attorney was permitted to aid in 
the prosecution.116  The Court nevertheless upheld the conviction, 
explaining that with the permission of the court, private counsel may 
aid a public prosecutor in a case.117   The Court noted that while pub-
lic prosecutors would be expected to shoulder the primary duty in 
arguing a criminal case to a jury, exceptions may occur in particular 
cases with the court’s permission.  The Court thus concluded that it 
lay within the judge’s discretion to grant the district attorney’s re-
quest for assistance and, in turn, implicitly upheld the principle that 
privately-managed prosecutions were legitimate.118 
One is left curious as to why states moved to adopt public prosecu-
tion schemes.  An argument can be made for the ability of the state to 
collect fines assessed against convicted criminals when the prosecutor 
is a government agent.  Indeed, early English history suggests that the 
monarch was more interested in obtaining a “cut” from the criminal 
proceeds—predictable rent-seeking behavior—than in ensuring the 
victim was adequately recompensed.119  Moreover, even in circum-
 
114 JACOBY, supra note 80, at 23. 
115 56 Mass. (2 Cush.) 582 (1849) (finding the indictments for the offense sufficient and 
overruling the defense’s motion). 
116 Id. at 584 (stating that the court had permitted a private attorney to aid in the prosecu-
tion and that he had opened the case to the jury and examined several witnesses). 
117 Id. at 585. 
118 See id. (“While we deem it our duty to say, that such additional counsel is not, under ordi-
nary circumstances, to be permitted, yet, when sanctioned by the court . . . it will not fur-
nish any sufficient ground for setting aside a verdict.”). 
119 See Linda B. Deutschmann & Aaron Young, Crime and Delinquency, in SOCIAL PROBLEMS 69, 
70 (Norman A. Dolch et al. eds., 2d ed. 2007) (“In early England, crimes were violations 
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stances in which no fine is sought, the incarceration of the offender 
both provides “justice” to the victim as well as a benefit to society by 
removing from the community—at least in some circumstances—a 
threat to the social order.  But, since neither incarceration nor the 
death penalty were common punishments in colonial America (death 
sentences were sometimes imposed, but seldom carried out), the rea-
sons private prosecutions were rejected in favor of their public coun-
terparts remain unclear. 
Professor Allen Steinberg provides an interesting explanation for 
the decline of private prosecutions in early Pennsylvania.120  Professor 
Steinberg analyzed Pennsylvania criminal justice data to provide a 
window into the history of criminal prosecution in that state.  He 
concluded that, contrary to some assertions, “the fee system [by 
which private prosecutions were maintained] did not prevent anyone 
from participating in this criminal justice relationship.”121  In fact, 
Steinberg unearthed evidence that “[g]rand jurors, judges, and jour-
nalists frequently commented on the ease with which the poorest Phi-
ladelphians, and those otherwise excluded from public life, made use 
of this system.”122  Steinberg asserts that the system of private prosecu-
tion declined “not because it ceased to be effective for the citizens us-
ing it, but because it was an ineffective means of law enforcement in 
the matter of breaches of the public order.”123  Philadelphia’s increas-
ing concern with maintaining public order, especially in circum-
stances in which no victim might be found, led to the creation of a 
public police force.  The public police force, in turn, “initiat[ed] 
more criminal prosecutions than ever before” and did so “without a 
private complainant.”124 
The blossoming of public prosecutions coupled with “increased 
dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of aldermen and grand jurors to 
restrain excessive private prosecution”125 led Pennsylvania, at least, to 
undertake efforts to limit the scope of private prosecutions.  Accord-
ing to Professor Steinberg, this was done, in no small part, by elimi-
nating the office of aldermen, a low-level ministerial position largely 
 
of the ‘King’s Peace.’  Fines were paid to the king, who made a profit from providing jus-
tice.” (citation omitted)). 
120 See Steinberg, supra note 10; cf. Christopher Tomlins, In This Issue, 19 LAW & HIST. REV. xv 
(2001) (noting that “most crimes in premodern societies were prosecuted privately”). 
121 Steinberg, supra note 10, at 574. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 579. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 581. 
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responsible for adjudicating privately initiated prosecutions.126  The 
rise of the public police force, which brought a corresponding in-
crease in the number of criminal prosecutions, and the restructuring 
of the judicial system with an increasing reliance upon judges and an 
independent judiciary, effectively squeezed out private prosecutions 
in Pennsylvania.127 
C.  The Rapid Decline of Private Criminal Law Enforcement in the United 
States 
By the turn of the twentieth century, the use of private prosecu-
tors appears largely to have faded from the scene.  In his Article, The 
Office of Prosecutor in Connecticut, Judge Walter M. Pickett summed up 
the status of criminal prosecution in the following words: 
In all criminal cases in Connecticut, ‘the state’ is the prosecutor.  The 
offenses are aginst [sic] ‘the state.’  The victim of the offense is not a 
‘party’ to the prosecution nor does he occupy any relation to it other 
than that of a ‘witness,’ an interested witness mayhap but none the less 
only a witness. 
It is not necessary that the injured party make complaint, nor is he 
required to give bond to prosecute; he is in no sense a ‘relator.’  He can-
not in any way control the prosecution and whether reluctant or no, he 
can be compelled like any other witness to appear and testify. 
As expressed in the case of Malley v. Lane[,] . . . ‘[t]he peace is that 
state and sense of safety which is necessary to the comfort and happiness 
of every citizen, and which government is instituted to secure.’128 
Malley, decided in 1921 when a new “wave of democratization” was 
sweeping the country,129 illustrates the trend towards subordinating 
the interests of the victim to those of society.  The individual’s loss in 
such a scheme is not explicitly stated as such; rather, the cost of the 
offense to society is the dominant consideration.  Rather than accept-
ing Adam Smith’s insight in which society as a whole benefits when 
individuals pursue their own rightly understood interests,130 it can be 
 
126 Id. at 582. 
127 Professor Steinberg notes that “[a]ny attempt to generalize about the history of American 
criminal prosecution is fraught with danger.”  Id. at 583.  Nevertheless, he makes a strong 
case for doing precisely that:  namely, using the Pennsylvania experience as a means of 
understanding the broader decline of private prosecutions in the nineteenth and early-
twentieth centuries. 
128 Walter M. Pickett, The Office of Prosecutor in Connecticut, 17 AM. INST. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 348, 356–57 (1926) (quoting Malley v. Lane, 115 A. 674, 676 (Conn. 
1921)); cf. JACOBY, supra note 80, at 11. 
129 See generally Renske Doorenspleet, Reassessing the Three Waves of Democratization, 52 WORLD 
POL. 384 (2000) (identifying a period of democratization between 1826 and 1926). 
130 See generally SMITH, supra note 14, at 477. 
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argued that democratic ideals necessitated the demise of the private 
prosecutor.  Professor Jacoby offered a similar insight:  “Private pros-
ecution [became] inconsistent with the American concept of democ-
ratic process and[, thus,] had a short life span in the American colo-
nies.”131 
The states’ decision to eschew privately managed prosecutions in 
favor of public ones might not have been purely an evolution in de-
mocratic thinking and democratic institutions.  Douglas Campbell 
argues that private prosecutions (at least in England) constituted a 
system “by the rich and for the rich” destined to fail in a democracy.132  
“Bought” justice could never equate to public justice.  Professor Jaco-
by has echoed this concern, positing that:  “[t]he rejection of the 
general notion of a privileged class within society also resulted in the 
rejection of ideas and forms that tended to protect that privilege.  In 
colonial America, public prosecution was an available and progressive 
remedy for a population dedicated to a more democratic society.”133  
Certainly, this is not simply an indictment leveled at colonial America 
or early England.  Recent news reports condemn the cost of private 
prosecutions but note that they are necessary to buttress an “ineffec-
tive[]” criminal justice system.134  And yet, while there is no doubt an 
advantage to be gained by having the state initiate and maintain a 
prosecution, what benefit is accrued to the victim (other than a gen-
eral feeling that someone is doing something)?  The fine, after all, 
goes to the state.  Mandatory victim restitution is only a fairly recent 
innovation.135  If the goal is general deterrence, does it matter who 
conducts the prosecution?  While it is often argued that a public 
prosecutor will be more fair than her private counterpart because of 
her obligation to “justice,” not merely to a self-interested client, is 
that necessarily so? 
Presumably, the state’s decision to monopolize criminal prosecu-
tions is in part incentivized by the fact that fines levied against the 
convict will go to the state.  Ultimately, whatever the causes—the de-
mocratic impulse, economic factors, or the mounting complexity of 
the law—privately initiated prosecutions played less and less of a role 
as the nation’s system of criminal prosecution evolved. 
 
131 JACOBY, supra note 80, at 10. 
132 2 DOUGLAS CAMPBELL, THE PURITAN IN HOLLAND, ENGLAND, AND AMERICA 444 (1892). 
133 JACOBY, supra note 80, at 17. 
134 See Protection—What Protection?, SCOTSMAN (Edinburgh), April 21, 2007, at 25. 
135 See FINES AND RESTITUTION IN FEDERAL COURTS 7 (Maxwell R. Silverstein ed., 2003) 
(“[M]andatory restitution as part of a federal criminal sentence is a relatively recent 
idea.”). 
Mar. 2010] PRIVATE VENGEANCE AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 683 
 
Yet, it is crucial to bear in mind the criminal law’s justification of 
general deterrence.  That said, even with the advantages of public 
prosecution, it arguably does not matter who conducts the prosecu-
tion.  Nor is it clear than a public prosecutor will act more fairly than 
a private counterpart seeking personal justice for his client.  While 
the public prosecutor may have an obligation to seek impartial justice 
for the state, he or she is not always immune from local or national 
political pressures in how to conduct the office.  It is not necessarily 
so that a public prosecutor will be more fair than her private coun-
terpart because of her obligation to “justice,” rather than a victim 
seeking personal justice, or “vengeance.”  And conversely, while there 
are admittedly advantages to be gained from the state initiating and 
carrying out prosecutions, little benefit typically, other than a sense 
that something is being done, accrues to the victim in a public prose-
cution system. 
II.  CONTEMPORARY PRIVATE PROSECUTION IN THE UNITED STATES 
Although several states continue to allow private prosecutions,136 
most jurisdictions have either disallowed privately managed prosecu-
tions completely, or severely limited the role a private prosecutor may 
play.137  The Texas case discussed at the beginning of this Article may 
represent something of an anomally.  Iowa and North Dakota, for ex-
ample, have laws prohibiting a private attorney from accepting a fee 
for prosecuting a criminal case.138  Illinois, Kentucky, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, and Nebraska have laws that prevent a former prosecutor 
from acting as private counsel in a subsequent civil case that relies on 
the same factual scenario as he or she had previously prosecuted as a 
 
136 See 17 AM. JUR. 2D Contempt § 152 (2004) (pointing out that courts will require the ap-
pointment of a disinterested attorney even though interested parties may be appointed to 
assist); see also Christopher Vaeth, Annotation, Disqualification or Recusal of Prosecuting At-
torney Because of Relationship with Alleged Victim or Victim’s Family, 12 A.L.R. 5TH 909, 924 
(1993) (describing an Ohio case where a court concluded that the disqualification of a 
special prosecutor employed by the victim was not required). 
137 David E. Rigney, Annotation, Participation of Private Counsel for Beneficiary of Court Order 
Allegedly Violated by Defendant, in Prosecution of Federal Criminal Contempt Proceeding, 96 A.L.R. 
FED. 519, 520 (1990) (observing that “private counsel may participate with government or 
disinterested court-appointed counsel . . . so long as the private attorney does not effec-
tively control the proceeding”). 
138 See, e.g., State v. Williams, 217 N.W.2d 573, 575 (Iowa 1974) (discussing statute prohibit-
ing private attorney from accepting fees for private prosecution of a criminal case); State 
v. Kent, 62 N.W. 631, 635 (N.D. 1895) (holding that statute forbidding lawyer from ac-
cepting fees for private prosecution of a criminal case did not apply to privately retained 
special counsel). 
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criminal matter.139  Likewise, in Colorado, the Supreme Court has 
held that private prosecutions are themselves prejudicial, at least 
when those prosecutions are factually related to subsequent civil pro-
ceedings.140 
Nevertheless, even while diminished in scope, private prosecu-
tions continue to play a role in the criminal justice system.  Private 
prosecutions often occur as the result of a court seeking enforcement 
of a judicial order, when private counsel posesses specialized knowl-
edge about a case, or when a public prosecutor’s office is conflicted 
out of a case.  I will briefly discuss common instances of private pros-
ecution in the sections that follow. 
A.  The Private Prosecution of Criminal Contempt Citations 
The majority of the modern-day cases involving privately managed 
prosecutions deal with the issue of whether a private attorney may 
lawfully prosecute a contempt citation after an adverse party’s alleged 
violation of a court order.  Extant cases posit three different methods 
by which a private attorney may prosecute criminal contempt.  First, 
the court may, sua sponte, appoint a private prosecutor; second, the 
plaintiff may retain private counsel with the court’s consent; or fi-
nally, the public prosecutor may seek the assistance of private counsel 
 
139 See People v. Kidd, 81 N.E.2d 892, 895 (Ill. 1948) (“The state’s attorney shall . . . not be 
retained or employed, except for the public, in a civil case depending upon the same 
state of facts on which a criminal prosecution shall depend.”); Commonwealth v. Tabor, 
384 N.E.2d 190, 195–96 (Mass. 1978) (“[N]o prosecuting officer shall . . . be concerned as 
counsel or attorney for either party in a civil action depending upon the same facts in-
volved in such prosecution or business.” (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12, § 30 (1978))); 
People v. Hillhouse, 45 N.W. 484, 486 (Mich. 1890) (“The statute is positive and peremp-
tory that the attorney shall not be permitted to prosecute, or aid in prosecuting, any per-
son for an alleged criminal offense, where he is engaged or interested in any civil suit or 
proceeding depending upon the same state of facts, against such person, direcly or indi-
rectly.”); Fitzgerald v. State, 110 N.W. 676, 677 (Neb. 1907) (“No prosecuting attorney 
shall . . . be concerned as an attorney or counsel for either party, other than for the state 
or county, in any civil action depending upon the same state of facts upon which any 
criminal prosecution, commenced or prosecuted, shall depend.”).  Relying on a statute 
prohibiting public prosecutors from receiving compensation from crime victims, the Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Judicial Court initially struck down private prosecution in 1855 in the 
case of Commonwealth v. Gibbs.  See 70 Mass. (4 Gray) 146, 148 (1855) (“[T]he appoint-
ment was irregular in point of law.”).  That court has since held that “a private citizen has 
no judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution of another.”  Taylor v. Newton Div. of 
Dist. Court Dept., 622 N.E.2d 261, 262 (Mass. 1993). 
140 See People v. Jiminez, 528 P.2d 913, 915–16 (Colo. 1974) (en banc) (prohibiting prosecu-
tor from representing party in divorce proceeding arising from same facts that gave rise 
to the criminal case). 
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to undertake the action.  Each of these situations will be discussed in 
turn. 
1.  Trial Court Appointment 
In circumstances in which the complainant alleges that the ad-
verse party has violated a court order, the trial court may respond by 
selecting a prosecutor to undertake enforcement of the contempt ac-
tion.  In Rogowicz v. O’Connell, for example, the plaintiff alleged that 
the defendant violated the court’s protective order.141  The court had 
issued the order after the plaintiff filed a domestic violence peti-
tion,142 but the county prosecutor thought the matter was “civil in na-
ture” and declined to prosecute.143  The trial court exercised its au-
thority to appoint private counsel sua sponte and selected the 
director of New Hampshire’s Legal Assistance Domestic Violence 
Project to prosecute.144  The respondent challenged the court’s deci-
sion to appoint a private prosecutor.145  Although the New Hampshire 
Supreme Court agreed that the trial court enjoyed the power to ap-
point private counsel to enforce its order, it held that the court erred 
in the appointment of the Project’s attorney because counsel would 
personally benefit from the court order.146 
Federal district courts have also had occasion to appoint private 
prosecutors to enforce contempt citations.  The district court in Unit-
ed States v. Vlahos, for example, appointed a private prosecutor in a 
criminal contempt proceeding.147  There, the contempt proceeding 
arose from the alleged violation of a court order issued in a civil case 
brought by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) against the re-
spondent.148  Initially, the court refused to allow the FTC itself to pros-
ecute the alleged contempt.149  Other government prosecutors were 
sought out, but the court similarly disqualified those government at-
 
141 786 A.2d 841, 842 (N.H. 2001). 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 See id. (“The record is not clear on how [the director of New Hampshire’s Legal Assis-
tance Domestic Violence Project] assumed the role of prosecutor, but a pleading she 
filed alleges that the family division requested her appearance.”). 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 843, 845. 
147 No. 93 CR 360, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11781, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 24, 1993) (“[T]his court 
deemed its request that the appropriate prosecutorial authority handle this matter to 
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torneys because of their connection to the FTC.150  As a result, the 
court found that its request for appropriate prosecutorial authority 
was “constructively denied” and instead appointed a private attorney 
to prosecute.151  The court relied on its inherent authority to ensure 
enforcement of its orders.152 
2.  Plaintiff Initiated Appointment of Private Counsel 
While courts may choose to appoint a private prosecutor sua 
sponte, a somewhat more common scenario is for the plaintiff in-
volved in the underlying civil litigation to request appointment of 
private counsel to prosecute the contempt action. 
Where the contempt action arises from an underlying civil case, 
plaintiffs will often seek to use the private attorney who litigated the 
civil cause.  For instance, in Wilson v. Wilson, the respondent in the 
underlying civil case tried to use the same attorney from a divorce 
proceeding to prosecute two contempt actions arising from the civil 
trial.153  Although the trial court approved, the Court of Appeals of 
Tennessee overruled this appointment, apparently because of the 
concern that counsel had a stake in the underlying cause.154  In Wood-
side v. Woodside, however, the plaintiff prosecuted a criminal con-
tempt charge of failing to pay court-ordered child support by using 
her attorney from the divorce proceedings.155  Unlike the outcome in 
Wilson, however, in this case, the Court of Appeals in Tennessee af-
firmed the appointment.156 
Similarly, in Green v. Green, the plaintiff used her personal attorney 
from the underlying civil action to prosecute her former husband for 
contempt after he violated a civil protection order issued by the 




152 See id. at *2–3 (“[T]he U.S. Attorney’s Office argues that the court’s power to appoint a 
private attorney is an inherent power of self-protection that should be used only as a last 
resort.  This court agrees wholeheartedly . . . .”). 
153 No. 01A01-9704-CV-00152, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 199, at *1–2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 20, 
1998) (describing plaintiff’s motions to disqualify private counsel because of involvement 
in divorce proceeding). 
154 See id. at *2–3 (explaining that this type of appointment is contrary to judicial and attor-
ney ethical standards). 
155 No. 01-A-01-9503-PB-00121, 1995 Tenn. App. LEXIS 694, at *1–2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 
1995) (describing ex-husband’s notice of appeal regarding his ex-wife’s retention of pri-
vate counsel for the contempt prosecution). 
156 Id. at *14. 
157 642 A.2d 1275, 1276 (D.C. 1994) (“[T]he wife’s attorneys acted as the prosecuting attor-
neys during the intrafamily contempt proceedings . . . .”). 
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pointment, explaining that the appointment would expedite the in-
trafamily proceeding, which was a goal of the family justice system.158 
Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Stock Buyers International, Inc. is another exam-
ple of a situation in which the plaintiff sought to use the attorneys 
from the civil action to prosecute a criminal contempt action.159  In 
the underlying action, the plaintiff had filed a suit alleging that the 
defendant was infringing on registered trademarks,160 and the trial 
court issued a preliminary injunction order—it was this order that the 
plaintiffs claimed had been violated.161  The plaintiffs, therefore, re-
quested that their own attorney in the civil action be appointed to 
prosecute the contempt charges.162  The trial court allowed this ap-
pointment, along with lawyers from two other private law firms, who 
would also act as co-counsel for the plaintiffs.163  During the trial, no-
tably, only the privately hired attorneys were present—no one from 
the U.S. Attorney’s Office appeared.164  The Court of Appeals subse-
quently reversed the appointment, finding that it was a conflict of in-
terest to have counsel for an interested party (that is, interested in 
the underlying civil action) exercise full control of the proceedings.165  
It is important to note here, however, that the court did not quibble 
with the fact that private attorneys had been appointed, but merely 
took issue with the government attorneys’ failure to supervise the 
case.  Presumably, had the U.S. Attorney’s Office been more in con-
trol of the prosecution, it would have survived scrutiny. 
In re Sasson Jeans, Inc. demonstrates a more problematic situation 
in which a plaintiff, who was designated as the trustee of the defen-
dant debtor company’s assets, sought to prosecute the contempt ac-
tion himself.166  The Department of Justice appointed the plaintiff to 
serve as a “fiduciary vested with [the] public trust.”167  As the bank-
ruptcy trustee, the plaintiff was supervised by the Attorney General.  
He initiated the contempt proceedings after the defendant failed to 
 
158 Id. at 1276, 1279–80. 
159 760 F.2d 698, 699 (6th Cir. 1985) (“Polo also requested that its attorneys be appointed to 






165 Id. at 704. 
166 104 B.R. 600, 602 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding that the trustee’s prosecution of the alleged 
contempt charges violated the holding in a U.S. Supreme Court case). 
167 Id. at 604 (quoting In re Sasson Jeans, Inc., 83 B.R. 206, 217 n.5 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988)). 
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turn over the assets.168  The bankruptcy court had allowed the trustee 
to bring the action because of his role as a government representa-
tive; but without any sort of detailed analysis, the district court re-
versed the conviction because of the potential for a conflict of inter-
est.169  The court did not elaborate on this concern, however. 
Finally, in In re Peak, for example, the plaintiff brought a contempt 
action after the defendant violated a permanent injunction to refrain 
from illegal drug use.170  During a status hearing, the district court 
expressed its concern that no prosecutor had been designated to en-
force violation of the injunction.171  The court therefore encouraged 
the plaintiff to seek counsel from the U.S. Attorney’s Office or to ob-
tain help from a local legal clinic.172  Several months later, attorneys 
from a private firm entered an appearance for the plaintiff,173 which 
the trial court approved.174  On review, however, the D.C. Court of 
Appeals overruled the appointment because the private counsel 
could personally benefit from the proceeding.175 
In general, it is hard to understand why, intrinsically, it would be 
problematic for counsel to benefit from the prosecution.  While it is 
true that ethical canons generally prohibit lawyers from taking crimi-
nal cases on the basis of a contingency fee,176 defense counsel are rou-
tinely paid for their efforts.  Provided that the fee paid to private 
counsel is not based upon whether or not the prosecution is success-
ful and other ethical requirements are followed, there should be no 
other impediment to private counsel managing the prosecution.  I 
suspect the court’s primary concern was that a private prosecution in-
itiated by counsel who stands to benefit in the underlying civil pro-
ceeding “taints” the prosecution. 
3.  Private Counsel as an Adjunct to the Public Prosecutor 
Another common situation in which private prosecutions may 
arise occur in cases in which the private attorney simply collaborates 
with the government in bringing the prosecution.  In United States v. 
 
168 See id. at 602 (“[The bankruptcy judge] found Guez to have willfully violated his or-
ders . . . directing that assets of the debtor company be turned over to the trustee.”). 
169 Id. at 609. 
170 See In re Francine Peak, 759 A.2d 612, 613 (D.C. 2000). 




175 Id. at 620. 
176 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(d)(2) (2002). 
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Smith, for example, a privately appointed attorney acted as co-counsel 
to the government’s attorney.177  The defendant was charged with 
criminal contempt for failing to appear in court for a civil proceeding 
brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).178  The 
district court first appointed the private firm to represent the SEC in 
civil actions and to prosecute the criminal contempt citation.  How-
ever, by this time, the Supreme Court had decided Young v. United 
States ex rel Vuitton et Fils S.A.,179 so the firm filed a motion to vacate the 
appointment.180  The district court obliged and appointed lawyers 
from the firm as “Special Assistant[s] to the United States Attor-
ney.”181  Despite their designation as “Special Assistants,” the firm law-
yers did the bulk of the work during trial, including the examination 
of the witnesses and presentation of evidence.182  Due to the lack of 
involvement by the government’s office, however, the court of ap-
peals reversed the conviction.183 
B. Examining Private Prosecutions Maintained Under State Law 
Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsyl-
vania, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin 
each allow private counsel to participate in a criminal prosecution in 
some way.184  Although a comprehensive examination of each of those 
 
177 No. 87-1274, 1991 WL 113192, at *1 (9th Cir. June 24, 1991). 
178 Id. 
179 481 U.S. 787, 802 (1987) (disapproving of the appointment of private counsel for an in-
terested party to prosecute criminal contempt). 
180 Smith, 1991 WL 113192, at *1. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. at *2. 
183 Id. at *5. 
184 See, e.g., N.J. R. CT. 7:4-4(b) (1995) (current version located at N.J. R. CT. 7:8-7(b)); Hop-
kins v. State, 429 So. 2d 1146, 1154 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983) (“[A] special prosecutor’s em-
ployment by the victim to represent him in a civil action arising out of the same transac-
tion as the criminal proceeding does not deprive the defendant of a fair trial” and “the 
fact that the attorney was employed by those interested in the prosecution is wholly im-
material.” (quoting Brooks v. State, 228 So. 2d 24, 28 (Ala. Crim. App. 1969))); Allen v. 
State, 257 S.E.2d 5, 7 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that it is not improper for a special 
prosecutor to also represent the victim in a civil suit arising from the same underlying cir-
cumstances); Shuttleworth v. State, 469 N.E.2d 1210, 1217–18 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (pro-
viding that a prosecutor’s prior representation of the defendant’s wife in a couple’s di-
vorce proceeding did not disqualify him in a criminal action for non-support); State v. 
Ray, 143 N.E.2d 484, 485 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956) (holding that no constitutional or statu-
tory provisions prevent private prosecutors from assisting in criminal prosecutions); Com-
monwealth v. Musto, 35 A.2d 307, 310 (Pa. 1944) (holding that the trial court has discre-
tion to permit private prosecution); Wilson v. Wilson, 984 S.W.2d 898, 899–902 (Tenn. 
1998) (holding that there is no automatic disqualification for private counsel represent-
ing party in divorce proceeding and violation of criminal contempt action against oppos-
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individual state rules is beyond the scope of this Article, I will con-
sider several other circumstances in which states, subject to various 
limitations, permit privately-managed prosecutions. 
1.  The New Jersey Court Rule 
Prior to a 2007 amendment to the New Jersey Rules of Court, Rule 
7:4-4(b) permitted any attorney to appear on behalf of any complain-
ing witness and prosecute the action if the Attorney General or local 
prosecutor did not appear in court on behalf of the state.185  Thus, in 
State v. Bazin, the union representative for a postal worker brought 
actions for harassment and simple assault against a U.S. Postal Service 
inspector.186  After the plaintiff filed the complaint with the Hamilton 
Township Municipal Court, the U.S. Attorney’s Office, representing 
the defendant, filed a motion to have the matter removed to federal 
court.187  The Hamilton Township prosecutor, the Mercer County 
Prosecutor, and the New Jersey Attorney General’s office subse-
quently all refused to prosecute the matter.188  In response to those 
refusals, the plaintiff’s union retained the services of a private firm to 
prosecute the action on behalf of the State of New Jersey.189  The 
court allowed the appointment. 
In State v. Kinder, the court allowed the private prosecution of a 
simple assault case after the Municipal Prosecutor declined to bring 
the action.190  His refusal was not premised on any notion that the 
prosecution was not in the public interest; rather, his refusal was 
based on the belief that the prosecutor’s authority was limited to 
courts within the jurisdiction of the City of New Brunswick, while the 
matter at bar was in federal court.191 
New Jersey courts have also authorized private prosecutions in 
which the private attorney possessed special expertise.  In State v. Har-
 
ing party); State v. Ward, 17 A. 483, 485 (Vt. 1889) (holding that the trial court has dis-
cretion to permit private prosecution); Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 329 S.E.2d 22, 25–26 
(Va. 1985) (describing history of private prosecutions); State v. King, 396 S.E.2d 402, 411 
(W. Va. 1990) (allowing a private attorney to prosecute a criminal case while serving as 
the guardian ad litem of the alleged victim); Bird v. State, 45 N.W. 1126, 1126–27 (Wis. 
1890) (permitting a private prosecutor’s appointment as long as he had renounced pre-
vious employment by the alleged victim’s father). 
185 N.J. R. CT. 7:4-4(b) (1995) (current version at N.J. R. CT. 7:8-7(b)). 




190 701 F. Supp. 486, 487, 492 (D.N.J. 1988). 
191 Id. at 487–88. 
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ris, for instance, the court allowed a private attorney to prosecute a 
criminal trespass case.192  The private attorney, who had represented a 
number of apartment complexes in eviction proceedings, including 
the complex where the alleged trespass occurred, offered to prose-
cute the action.  The Municipal Prosecutor consented because the 
private attorney was familiar with the facts of the case, had expertise 
in handling the legal problems of apartment complexes, and had ex-
perience representing the apartment complex at issue in the past.193  
The Pemberton Township Municipal Court, however, declined to 
approve the appointment of private counsel.194  Nevertheless, the Su-
perior Court of New Jersey reversed the municipal court and allowed 
the appointment.195 
The New Jersey Rule was subsequently modified to limit the cir-
cumstances in which private prosecutors might be appointed.  The 
revised rule limited such prosecutions to cases involving so-called 
“cross-complaints” and “only if the court has first reviewed the private 
prosecutor’s motion to so appear” and was satisfied that “a potential 
for conflict exists for the municipal prosecutor due to the nature of 
the charges set forth in the cross-complaints.”196  Importantly, New 
Jersey did not eliminate private prosecutors; insteady, the state merely 
limited the circumstances under which they could operate. 
Even under the former rule which lacked the restrictions the 2007 
amendments brought, New Jersey courts had established certain limi-
tations on private prosecutions.  If a clear conflict of interest exists, 
for example, courts would not allow the private attorney to prosecute.  
In State v. Imperiale, the plaintiff tried, without counsel, to prosecute a 
simple assault case against his supervisor.197  The Municipal Prosecu-
tor of the Borough of Eatontown decided not to prosecute.198  The 
court, however, found too great a conflict of interest in having the 
victim himself act as prosecutor.199  It is unclear whether the court 
would have permitted the victim to retain private counsel to under-
take the prosecution. 
The New Jersey courts have also disallowed private attorney prose-
cutions if there is a lengthy litigious relationship between the parties 
in the action and a resultant conflict of interest, as was the case in 
 
192 620 A.2d 1083, 1088 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1992). 
193 Id. at 1085. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. at 1088. 
196 N.J. R. CT. 7:8-7(b). 
197 773 F. Supp. 747, 749 (D.N.J. 1991). 
198 Id. at 749. 
199 Id. at 756. 
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State v. Storm.  In this instance, the plaintiff had requested that the 
private attorney representing her in a civil action also serve as prose-
cutor in a criminal stalking and harassment case.  The defendant in 
the latter was also the opposing party in the civil case, which was be-
ing tried simultaneously.200  According to the court, both actions 
merely represented part of the on-going battle between the parties in 
their “lengthy litigious history.”201  For these reasons the court found 
that there was too much of a conflict of interest for the private attor-
ney to prosecute.202  In all likelihood, the court was more concerned 
about the tortured legal history between the parties and the possibil-
ity that the trial would devolve into an opportunity to pursue a per-
sonal vendetta rather than about countenancing a private prosecu-
tion per se. 
2.  The New York Experience 
Although New York has long permitted privately managed prose-
cutions, efforts have been made to restrict their use.  Professor Peter 
Davis has articulated a vigorous defense of the state’s common law 
private prosecution tradition.203  He argues that such prosecutions 
serve to vindicate the crime victim’s interests and to support the 
state’s efforts in combating crime.204  In People v. Benoit, litigants 
sought to use section 50 of the New York City Criminal Court Act to 
authorize a private attorney to prosecute an action after the District 
Attorney’s office declined.205  The statute, which authorized a private 
citizen to undertake a criminal prosecution after the local district at-
torney’s office has declined to pursue the case,206 was held unconstitu-
tional by the Criminal Court of the City of New York because the pri-
vate attorney was given too much discretionary authority.207  Rather 
than forbid the use of private prosecutors altogether, it merely re-
quired supervision by the prosecutor’s office. 
 
200 State v. Storm, 661 A.2d 790, 792 (N.J. 1995). 
201 Id. at 796. 
202 Id. 
203 See generally Peter L. Davis, The Crime Victim’s “Right” to a Criminal Prosecution:  A Proposed 
Model Statute for the Governance of Private Criminal Prosecutions, 38 DEPAUL L. REV. 329 
(1989) (discussing private prosecution as a supplementary model to the public prosecu-
tor’s monopoly on criminal prosecutions). 
204 See id. at 331–41. 
205 575 N.Y.S.2d 750, 751 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1991). 
206 See N.Y. CITY CRIM. CT. ACT § 50 (1989). 
207 Benoit, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 758. 
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The court in People v. Garfield examined sections 700 and 701 of 
New York County Law,208 the latter of which authorizes certain private 
prosecutions in some instances.209  In this case, the victim wished to 
prosecute the accused with the charge of leaving the scene of an ac-
cident,210 and first turned to the local district attorney, who declined 
to prosecute.  The victim then sought to undertake the prosecution 
himself, without counsel.211  However, like State v. Imperiale,212 the 
court found a conflict of interest in allowing the victim, without the 
assistance of counsel, to pursue what amounted to a “personal” pros-
ecution.213  Once again, it is unclear whether the court would have al-
lowed the prosecution to go forward with counsel’s assistance. 
3.  Current Statutes Allowing Private Prosecutors to Assist Public Officials 
The need to leverage private resources as a means of enforcing 
the criminal law did not dissipate completely with the modern state’s 
monopolization of prosecutorial authority.  Indeed, several states au-
thorize private lawyers to serve as deputy prosecutors for a specified 
period of time.  The court in Fort Emory Cove Boat Owners Ass’n v. Co-
wett, for example, discusses California “Government Code section 
24101,” which allows the district attorney to appoint private attorneys 
as deputy district attorneys to enforce a state anchorage ordinance.214  
In this case, the district attorney appointed a private firm that previ-
ously served as counsel in a civil case challenging the constitutionality 
of the ordinance.215  The defendant sought an injunction to prevent 
the expenditure of public funds to cover the expenses of hiring the 
private attorneys.216  The court allowed the district attorney to make 
such an appointment in order to discharge his enforcement duties.217 
 
208 N.Y. COUNTY LAW §§ 700–701 (2004). 
209 See People v. Garfield, 574 N.Y.S.2d 501, 502 (N.Y. Just. Ct. 1991) (disqualifying accident 
victim from prosecuting criminal complaint against driver who hit him). 
210 Id. 
211 Id. 
212 See supra note 197. 
213 Garfield, 574 N.Y.S.2d at 503. 
214 Fort Emory Cove Boatowners Ass’n v. Cowett, 270 Cal. Rptr. 527, 531 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1990). 
215 Id. at 529. 
216 Id. 
217 Id. at 531. 
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Similarly, Seth v. State examines Delaware’s “Lend-A-Prosecutor” 
program.218  The State Attorney General established this program in 
cooperation with a private law firm.219  The law allows a firm to lend 
its attorneys to the state justice department for a specified time pe-
riod, during which they are deputized as “Special Deputy Attorneys 
General” to prosecute criminal cases under the Delaware Attorney 
General’s supervision.220  Although they are deputy prosecutors and 
devote their full time to the Delaware Justice Department, they con-
tinue to be paid by the private firm.221  The reviewing court in Seth 
upheld the program, finding its creation to be within the Attorney 
General’s powers.222  This arrangement, of course, looks more like a 
“prosecutorial internship” than it does like a formal private prosecu-
tion in which the crime victim retains private counsel; nevertheless, 
the program illustrates a situation in which a privately paid attorney 
may engage in criminal prosecution. 
4.  Common Law Tradition of Private Prosecutions Maintained 
Absent a formal statute or rule, a number of states permit private 
prosecutions as a matter of common law.  Virginia, for example, has 
traditionally allowed private prosecutions.223  Virginia’s courts, how-
ever, have restricted their use.  In Cantrell v. Commonwealth,224 a mur-
der trial, the victim’s parents hired a private attorney to assist the 
public prosecutor.225  In point of fact, the private attorney managed 
the prosecution and secured the defendant’s conviction.  On appeal, 
the defendant argued that, because the private attorney had actually 
controlled the prosecution, his Virginia due process rights had been 
violated.226  Agreeing with the defendant that the private attorney had 
indeed managed the prosecution (and not merely assisted), the court 
overturned the conviction on the grounds that the attorney was also 
representing the victim’s family in a related civil case and, hence, was 
 
218 592 A.2d 436, 438 (Del. 1991) (upholding a program allowing attorneys from a private 






223 See Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 329 S.E.2d 22, 25–26 (Va. 1985) (describing history, 
rooted in English common law, of allowing private prosecutions). 
224 Id. at 23. 
225 Id. at 24–25. 
226 Id. at 25. 
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serving two clients with different interests.227  Thus, there existed a 
possible conflict between his duties to each.228  As a result, the court 
held that this inherent conflict violated the defendant’s due process 
rights under the Virginia Constitution.229  Although the court re-
versed the conviction, it should be pointed out that it upheld the use 
of private prosecutors generally,230 noting both that the practice was 
subject to the trial court’s discretion and control,231 and the question 
of whether to abolish or regulate the common law practice of private 
prosecution was left to the legislature.232 
New Hampshire follows a similar common law tradition, but its 
courts have adopted additional limitations.  In State v. Martineau, the 
New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld the common law practice of 
appointing private prosecutors, but limited it to cases where the sen-
tence did not involve a possibility of imprisonment.233  After the po-
lice decided not to file criminal charges against the defendant, a pri-
vate citizen filed her own private criminal complaint against the 
defendant.234  The court noted that the New Hampshire legislature 
has never prohibited private citizens from initiating criminal pro-
ceedings, and therefore the practice is permissible so long as it is not 
“repugnant to the rights and liberties contained in the constitu-
tion.”235  Because of the potential for violation of the defendant’s 
rights and danger to the “sound administration of justice,” the court 
held that private prosecution is not permissible for criminal offenses 
that carry a sentence of imprisonment.236 
5.  Private Counsel and “Special Circumstance” Prosecutions 
Often, private prosecutions are sought when the private counsel 
may have familiarity with the case or possesses special expertise or 
knowledge.  Perhaps the most notorious example of a state-hired pri-
vate prosecutor was the prosecution of legendary former boxing hea-
 
227 Id. at 26. 
228 Id. 
229 Id. at 26–27. 
230 See id. at 26 (observing that, although the appearance of a private attorney was improper 
in the circumstances of this case, the holding does not disturb the common-law rule gen-
erally permitting private attorneys to assist in prosecutions). 
231 Id. at 25. 
232 Id. 
233 808 A.2d 51, 53–54 (N.H. 2002) (finding no authority under common law for private 
prosecutions of criminal offenses punishable by imprisonment). 
234 Id. at 52. 
235 Id. at 53 (internal quotations omitted). 
236 Id. at 54. 
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vyweight champion Mike Tyson.  In Tyson’s 1992 rape prosecution, 
the Indianapolis District Attorney’s Office opted to hire a private at-
torney to lead the prosecution.237  The attorney was selected not by 
the victim, but, rather, the government prosecutor who would have 
otherwise initiated the case.238 
State v. Culbreath239 and State v. Eldridge240 are further examples in 
which private counsel was retained because of the attorneys’ knowl-
edge of the particular issue.  In Culbreath, the Citizens for Community 
Values, Inc. (CCV) requested that a particular private attorney work 
with two county assistant district attorneys who were involved with the 
prosecution of obscenity cases.241  The attorney then served as part of 
a criminal investigation team that included in its number several gov-
ernment officials.242  Thereafter, the attorney was appointed as a 
“Special Assistant District Attorney.”  The State Attorney General ap-
pointed the attorney to represent the government both in pending 
civil litigation against the defendant as well as to pursue possible 
criminal indictments against him.243  Throughout this time, however, 
both the district attorney’s office and CCV paid the attorney’s fees.244  
The Supreme Court of Tennessee ultimately dismissed the indict-
ments because of the monies paid to the attorney by CCV, a special 
interest group.  The court was concerned that the members of CCV 
were not themselves victims, and CCV was instead an interested party 
that could ostensibly create a conflict of interest within the prosecu-
torial office.245 
Similarly, in State v. Eldridge, the court refused to allow a prosecu-
tion to be conducted by a private attorney who represented the victim 
in the underlying civil action.246  The district attorney had requested 
that the victim’s attorney be appointed a “special prosecutor[]” to 
pursue the murder prosecution because as he was also representing 
the victim in a civil matter that had been filed seven months prior 
and arose from the same incident,247 the private attorney was conver-
 
237 See Phil Berger, A Drama That Will Rival the Ring When Tyson Faces His Accuser, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 22, 1992, at B9. 
238 See id. (“The county has contracted to pay the [private lawyer] . . . .”). 
239 30 S.W.3d 309 (Tenn. 2000). 
240 951 S.W.2d 775 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). 
241 Culbreath, 30 S.W.3d at 311. 
242 Id. 
243 Id. at 312. 
244 Id. 
245 Id. at 309, 312. 
246 951 S.W.2d 775, 776–77 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). 
247 See id. at 779 (recounting the timeline of the private attorneys’ involvement in the prose-
cution and the related civil litigation). 
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sant with the facts and had spent considerable time on the case.248  
On review, however, the court deemed such an appointment to be a 
conflict of interest and therefore disallowed it.249 
6.  Private Counsel and Conflicts Within the Public Prosecutor’s Office 
Potential conflicts of interest, of course, are not limited to private 
representation but may arise in circumstances involving public prose-
cutors as well.  A district attorney may request that a private attorney 
handle a prosecution if the district attorney herself, or her office, has 
a conflict of interest.250  In Schumer v. Holtzman, the district attorney of 
Kings County decided to prosecute former Congressman Charles E. 
Schumer;251 however, the district attorney was worried about appear-
ing biased due to past political differences and the probability that 
her own staff would be called as witnesses in any subsequent prosecu-
tion.252  After the Governor refused to supersede her, the district at-
torney appointed the Dean of Brooklyn Law School as a “Special As-
sistant District Attorney.”253  The court, however, subsequently 
reversed the appointment because it believed that too much power 
had been delegated to a private attorney—not because it was a private 
prosecution per se.254 
A similar situation arose in Adkins v. Commonwealth, in which a 
grand jury indicted the defendant for murder and the use of a fire-
arm in the commission of murder.255  Prior to the indictment, the vic-
tim’s family hired a private attorney to assist in the investigation and 
the presentation of the case before the grand jury.256  The privately 
retained counsel worked with the state and even participated in the 
decision to submit the case to the grand jury.257  While the case was 
pending, a new Commonwealth attorney, who had previously repre-
sented the defendant’s daughter in another case, was elected to of-
 
248 Id. 
249 See id. at 781 (discussing conflicts of interests arising from the participation of private 
prosecutors). 
250 See Schumer v. Holtzman, 454 N.E.2d 522, 523–24 (N.Y. 1983) (dicussing prohibitions 
and powers of district attorney and appointed special assistant district attorneys). 
251 Id. at 523. 
252 Id. 
253 Id. 
254 See id. at 525 (“The conduct challenged here is not the appointment of respondent Trag-
er per se, but [the delegation of] power which is normally possessed only by an elected 
District Attorney.”). 
255 492 S.E.2d 833, 834 (Va. Ct. App. 1997). 
256 Id. 
257 Id. 
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fice.258  When the new attorney filed a motion to recuse herself and 
requested that a “special prosecutor” be appointed,259 the circuit 
court appointed the victim’s private attorney as the “special prosecu-
tor.”260  The Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed the conviction, 
however, because in its view, the appointment of the victim’s counsel 
created a conflict of interest for the private attorney.261 
The pattern emerging from these decisions is that a conflict of in-
terest is presumed to exist when the prosecuting attorney is compen-
sated by the victim.  Legal canons traditionally require that an attor-
ney zealously represent the interests of her client.262  Certain courts 
have viewed a victim-appointed attorney to have an inherent conflict 
of interest with a prosecutor’s broader commitment to justice.263  Od-
dly, at least post-indictment, it is unclear as to why a privately ap-
pointed attorney should have any less commitment to justice than a 
public prosecutor.  I suspect the reason is that the court may fear that 
during the course of the trial, a private prosecutor might make deci-
sions that better reflect the desires of a vengeful victim than an im-
partial tool of the state.  In such circumstances, the concern may be 
that the private prosecutor might be more inclined to withhold ex-
culpatory evidence from the defendant, be more obstructionist in 
terms of filing motions and conducting cross examinations, and press 
for a sentence that satisfies the victim’s sense of fairness rather than 
that of society.  Victims often feel shut out of the criminal justice 
process.264  The government is generally not present to represent the 
victim’s interests but rather to advance those of society as a whole.265  
Who then speaks for the victim?  This concern for the victim’s inter-
ests and the fear that his voice is muted in the criminal justice process 





261 Id. at 835–36. 
262 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. 2 (2006) (“As advocate, a lawyer zealously 
asserts the client’s position under the rules of the adversary system.”); see also MODEL 
CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (1980) (“The duty of the lawyer, both to his client 
and to the legal system, is to represent his client zealously . . . .” (footnotes omitted)). 
263 See People v. Benoit, 575 N.Y.S.2d 750, 751 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1991) (dismissing landlord’s 
continued private prosecution against tenant because landlord was no longer a disinter-
ested party having been indicted for same incident); People v. Calderone, 573 N.Y.S.2d 
1005, 1007 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1991) (finding inherent conflicts of interest where interested 
parties or their attorneys serve as private prosecutors). 
264 See Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Parcticipation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
911, 912 (2006) (discussing the lack of participation in the criminal justice system by lay-
men). 
265 See id. 
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en into account.  Tim Valentine has noted that “in some jurisdictions 
[private prosecutions are] the only way for victims of crime to get jus-
tice.  You either have a private attorney to assist the state in prosecut-
ing [the defendant] . . . or he just does not get prosecuted.”266  An in-
teresting twist on this is showcased by Olsen v. Koppy, in which the 
complainant had repeatedly asked the Morton County State’s Attor-
ney to initiate prosecutions against his wife and two males for adul-
tery and unlawful cohabitation.267  When the State’s Attorney de-
clined, the complainant asked the Morton County District Court to 
appoint a private attorney and to deduct the private attorney’s salary 
from the State Attorney’s salary.  The district court refused to do so, 
and the Supreme Court of North Dakota found that the decision was 
within the trial court’s discretion and thus not subject to appeal.268  
Presumably, the trial court could have appointed private counsel; 
however, its decision would similarly not have been subject to review. 
C.  Federal Law and Private Justice 
Private prosecutions have traversed a different path in federal law.  
While uncommon, federal law permits private justice under certain 
auspices:  through the creation of private causes of action in civil suits 
and by the establishment of so-called independent counsels.  As with 
a private criminal prosecution, private causes of action exist to lever-
age private resources to buttress law enforcement efforts.  The inde-
pendent counsel, on the other hand, exists as a temporary govern-
ment functionary. 
1.  Federal Criminal Prosecutions 
Little has been written about federal criminal law enforcement in 
the time period between American independence and the Constitu-
tion’s ratification.  Not until the enactment of the Judiciary Act of 
1789 do we see the foundation laid for a truly national criminal jus-
tice system.  That Act, among other things, instituted the office of At-
torney General and provided for the appointment of a marshal, one 
or more deputy marshals, and a U.S. Attorney for each judicial dis-
 
266 Tim Valentine, Private Prosecution, in PRIVATIZING THE UNITED STATES JUSTICE SYSTEM:  
POLICE, ADJUDICATION, AND CORRECTIONS SERVICES FROM THE PRIVATE SECTOR 226, 227 
(Gary W. Bowman et al. eds., 1992). 
267 593 N.W.2d 762, 763 (N.D. 1999). 
268 See id. at 767 (holding that the order denying an inmate’s request for a private attorney to 
initiate prosecutions against his wife and two males for adultery and unlawful cohabita-
tion could not be appealed). 
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trict.269  The Attorney General was empowered “to prosecute and 
conduct all suits in the Supreme Court in which the United States 
shall be concerned” and to give advice and render legal opinions 
“when required by the President of the United States, or when re-
quested by the heads of any of the [executive] departments.”270  The 
section creating the U.S. Attorneys provided for “a meet person 
learned in the law” to act as an attorney for the United States and “to 
prosecute in [each] district all delinquents for crimes and offences, 
cognizable under the authority of the United States.”271  Federal crim-
inal offenses were thus prosecutable by the presidentially-appointed 
and Senate-confirmed U.S. Attorneys (originally called United States 
district attorneys). 
Commentators have noted that this national prosecutorial system 
was not copied in whole from European models, but instead “drew 
from the existing forms that had evolved for local prosecutors in the 
thirteen original states.”272  The Attorney General’s function was pri-
marily one of providing legal advice to the President and his Cabinet.  
The prosecutorial authority was lodged within the local district of-
fices.  It is unclear whether, following the Constitution’s ratification, 
privately managed criminal prosecutions existed for violations of fed-
eral criminal law.  What is clear, however, is that the scope of federal 
criminal law was far more circumscribed than today.  Similarly, as no 
right of appeal existed in federal criminal cases early in the nation’s 
history, we have scant record of the nature of many federal criminal 
prosecutions. 
Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution empowers the President to 
“take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”273  Some scholars 
have argued, under a unitary executive view of presidential power, 
that an inherently executive function cannot be delegated to another 
branch of the government, to another governmental authority (such 
as an independent agency) or, presumably, to a private entity.274  
However, certainly courts could use their powers to enforce the law 
(using their judicial decrees and contempt citations, for example).  
In the absence of a presidentially-appointed, Senate-confirmed U.S. 
 
269 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 27, 35, 1 Stat. 73, 87, 92 (1789) (providing that a mar-
shal, deputy marshals, and U.S. Attorneys shall be established for U.S. judicial districts). 
270 Id. § 35. 
271 Id. 
272 JACOBY, supra note 80, at 19. 
273 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
274 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the 
Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 658–63 (1994) (describing how administrative practice and Eng-
lish practice support the notion that the Executive controls prosecutions). 
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Attorney, district courts could, and still can, appoint the U.S. Attor-
ney.275  And, in fact, if one turns to the practice of the newly inde-
pendent states, none lodged the authority to bring criminal prosecu-
tions exclusively under their “chief” executives. 
Indeed, recent legislative history provides an example of executive 
authority residing in government entities other than an administra-
tion official.  Although today there is no independent counsel statute 
in effect, in 1978 Congress passed the Ethics in Government Act, 
which permitted the Attorney General to appoint an “independent 
counsel,” separate from the Department of Justice, to investigate al-
leged misdeeds by certain government officials.276  Initially prompted 
by the Watergate scandal and concerns that presidentially appointed, 
senior Justice Department officials could not be counted on to inves-
tigate either its own personnel or other high-level executive branch 
officials, the purported intent of the law was to avoid the conflict of 
interest that might develop if the Executive Branch was forced to in-
vestigate its own officials.277  The independent counsel, as the title 
implies, had full prosecutorial authority.  After the original law ex-
pired in 1992,278 President William J. Clinton signed a new independ-
ent counsel statute into law in 1994,279  which expanded the laws to 
include the investigation and possible prosecution of members of 
Congress.280  In this iteration of the statute, the attorney general re-
quests the appointment of an independent counsel while a panel of 
judges makes the actual appointment.  The law was allowed to lapse 
in 1999 and Congress has not sought to re-enact an independent 
counsel statute.281 
Although the Attorney General was directly involved in the proc-
ess of appointment of an independent counsel, the individual ap-
pointed enjoyed virtual independence not only from the Executive 
Branch but from the government in general.  Not surprisingly, the 
statute was challenged for being, among other things, a violation of 
 
275 See 28 U.S.C. § 546(d) (2003), repealed by Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 502, 120 Stat. 246 (2006) 
(current version at 28 U.S.C.A. § 546 (West 2007)). 
276 28 U.S.C. §§ 591–598 (1982). 
277 S. Rep. No. 95-273, at 2–3 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4376, 4377–78. 
278 Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 2 U.S.C. §§ 701–709 (2005), amended by Pub. L. No. 
101–194, § 202, 103 Stat. 1724 (1991). 
279 Independent Counsel Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. § 591 (1994). 
280 Id. 
281 The Free Dictionary, Independent Counsel, http://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com
/independent+counsel (explaining that after independent counsels were used to investi-
gate various scandals surrounding President Clinton, the law was allowed to expire). 
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the Constitution’s exclusive grant of executive authority to the Presi-
dent—and officers directly controlled by him.282  The D.C. Circuit 
struck down the statute, holding that it violated executive authority 
under the Constitution.  The Supreme Court granted review under 
the name Morrison v. Olson.  In Morrison, a key question before the 
Supreme Court was whether the act “impermissibly undermine[d] 
the powers of the Executive Branch or ‘disrupt[ed] the proper bal-
ance between the coordinate branches [by] prevent[ing] the Execu-
tive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned func-
tions.”283  Although the Court noted that the Act “reduces the amount 
of control or supervision” the Executive Branch exercises over the 
“investigation and prosecution of a certain class of alleged criminal 
activity,” sufficient control existed to satisfy Article II concerns.284  The 
Court explained that because the Attorney General initiates the 
process by calling for the appointment of an independent counsel, 
the Act vested important authority within the Executive Branch.285  
Additionally, the Court found it significant that, once an independ-
ent counsel was appointed, the Attorney General defined the scope, 
or jurisdiction, of the prosecution, and the independent prosecutor 
was obligated to abide by the Justice Department’s policies.286  Finally, 
the Court noted that, because the Attorney General retained the au-
thority to remove the independent counsel for “good cause,” the Ex-
ecutive Branch enjoyed “substantial ability to ensure that the laws are 
‘faithfully executed’ by an independent counsel.”287  The Morrison de-
cision can thus be used as a template for permitting the private 
prosecution of federal criminal cases generally.288 
The independent counsel, to be sure, is not quite the same thing 
as a privately managed prosecution—largely in the sense that the na-
 
282 See In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 488–89 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that the Ethics in 
Government Act invades President’s executive privileges and responsibilities, endanger-
ing individual liberty as to be unconstitutional), rev’d sub nom. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 
654 (1988). 
283 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. at 695  (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (quot-
ing Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 856 (1986), and Nixon 
v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977)). 
284 Id. at 695, 696. 
285 Id. at 696. 
286 Id. 
287 Id. 
288 Professor Myriam Gilles has similarly argued for use of Morrison as a possible model for 
deputizing private citizens to enforce the nation’s civil rights laws.  See Myriam E. Gilles, 
Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation:  Deputizing Private Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil 
Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 1436–37 (2000) (addressing the question of whether the 
Executive Branch retains sufficient control of private enforcement actions). 
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ture of the prosecution is supposed to reflect the public’s interest and 
the targets are limited to certain high-level public officials.  Still, the 
independent counsel statute demonstrates a continued understand-
ing that government need not have289 an exclusive monopoly over the 
prosecution of criminal acts.  Presumably, if the requirements of Mor-
rison are met, privately managed prosecutions could be initiated in 
federal court for violations of federal criminal law. 
Though private prosecutions for violations of the federal criminal 
law have been virtually non-existent in modern times, they have oc-
curred in certain instances.  One such instance involves the appoint-
ment of private counsel to enforce court orders.  The Supreme Court 
in Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, S.A. considered the pro-
priety of appointing private counsel in a federal criminal contempt 
proceeding.290  Louis Vuitton Mallietier, the famed French fashion 
goods manufacturer, hired counsel to press a civil claim on its behalf.  
When the defendants in the civil suit violated the court’s order, the 
district court appointed Vuitton’s lawyers to prosecute the criminal 
contempt citation.291  The Vuitton lawyers obtained a conviction in 
federal district court.  Upon appeal, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit affirmed the convictions, relying in large 
part on the district court’s determination that the convictions did not 
result in injustice to the defendants.292  Not satisfied, the defendants 
petitioned the Supreme Court for review, arguing that the district 
court lacked the authority to appoint special prosecutors on the con-
tempt citations.293  The Supreme Court disagreed with the defen-
dants’ argument and instead found that the district court possessed 
the inherent authority to initiate the contempt proceedings as well as 
the power to appoint the special prosecutors.294 
 
289 Federal statutes creating private rights of action are as diverse and wide ranging as the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, the Americans With 
Disabilities Act, the Clayton Act, and the Consumer Products Safety Act.  Each of these 
acts requires, as a predicate, that the individual availing himself of the private right of ac-
tion be in some way harmed by the defendant’s ostensibly unlawful conduct.  For an in-
teresting discussion of the numerous private causes of action extant in federal law, see 
Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (2002). 
290 481 U.S. 787, 790, 808 (1987). 
291 See id. at 790–92 (describing how the Court permitted Vuitton’s attorneys to prosecute a 
criminal contempt action arising from the violation of the injunction against infringing 
Vuitton’s trademark). 
292 See United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. Klayminc, 780 F.2d 179, 180 (2d Cir. 1985). 
293 See Young, 481 U.S. at 800 (noting the unavailing contention of the petitioners that a con-
tempt prosecution may only be brought by the U.S. Attorney’s office). 
294 See id. at 800–01 (describing the rationale for allowing district courts to initiate contempt 
proceedings and appoint special prosecutors). 
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The Court avoided the question whether it was constitutional to 
permit private counsel to undertake the prosecution.  Instead, pursu-
ant to its authority to supervise lower federal courts, the Court held 
that it was impermissible for the attorneys who represented the party 
in the related civil matter to prosecute the adverse party for con-
tempt.295  In light of the fact that those lawyers represented an adverse 
party in the civil case, the Court reasoned that they might not be as 
sensitive to the public interest presented in the contempt citations.296  
The Court not only ducked the potential constitutional issue repre-
sented by having a private lawyer prosecute a criminal case, but it also 
limited its ruling to circumstances in which the prosecution was in-
exorably intertwined with a parallel civil proceeding.297 
2.  Federal Models of Private Justice 
While not criminal prosecutions per se, federal statutes permit 
private litigants to initiate qui tam actions and to act, in effect, as “pri-
vate attorneys general” in diverse circumstances.  Although federal 
law generally eschews private criminal law enforcement, a number of 
statutes do provide for alternative avenues by which an individual 
harmed by the defendant’s conduct may enjoy a private right of ac-
tion. 
a.  The False Claims Act 
The False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730, contains a provision for 
private qui tam actions that allows private citizens who provide infor-
mation to the government regarding fraud committed against the 
government to bring a civil action “for the person and for the United 
States Government” to obtain a portion of the assigned damages and 
penalties.298  The Latin phrase qui tam is a shortened version of the 
maxim “qui tam pro domino rege, etc. quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequi-
tur,” which translates roughly as “[w]ho prosecutes this suit as well for 
the king, etc. as for himself.”299  While the qui tam suit is almost the re-
 
295 See id. at 809 (“[C]ounsel for a party that is the beneficiary of a court order may not be 
appointed as prosecutor in a contempt action alleging a violation of that order.”). 
296 Id. at 805–06 (expounding on why the interest of the government and the interest of the 
private party may not be fully aligned). 
297 See id. at 814 (refusing to permit a prosecutor representing the private party beneficiary 
of a court order in a contempt action to also represent the government in the contempt 
action, as the attorney would be required to “serve two masters”). 
298 False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (1994). 
299 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 24, at *161 & n.*. 
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verse of a criminal suit, where the greatest harm presumably falls 
upon the private citizen as victim rather than the government, the 
underlying idea is the same:  leveraging private law suits to benefit 
the harmed individual as well as society in general.  A private action 
under the False Claims Act, however, is directly related to curbing 
criminal conduct by the putative defendant.300  Essentially, private 
parties who have investigated and believe that they can prove that 
other individuals or organizations have submitted false claims to the 
federal government may file a private claim in federal court.301 
b.  Environmental Crimes 
Several federal environmental protection statutes allow private 
parties to bring law suits against those who violate the nation’s envi-
ronmental laws;302 in fact, these citizen suits are relatively common-
place in environmental law enforcement statutes.303  The Federal Wa-
ter Pollution Control Act, for example, authorizes any “citizen,” 
defined broadly as “a person or persons having an interest which is or 
may be adversely affected,” to enforce certain provisions of the Act or 
to force appropriate governmental agencies to perform mandated 
duties under the Act.304  Similarly, the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, as amended 
(CERCLA), creates incentives for private parties to engage in envi-
ronmental clean-up operations when identified by a private party 
even before they have been sued by the government.305  In 2007, the 
 
300 See S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5267 (“[O]nly a 
coordinated effort of both the Government and the citizenry will decrease this wave of 
defrauding public funds.”). 
301 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729(a)(A), 3730(b) (2006). 
302 Cass Sunstein has examined the rationale for, and circumstances of, so-called “citizens’ 
suits.”  See Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan?  Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Ar-
ticle III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 165 (1992) (noting congressional attempts to control un-
lawfully inadequate law enforcement through the “citizen-suit” device). 
303 See JAMES T. BLANCH ET AL., CITIZEN SUITS AND QUI TAM ACTIONS:  PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT 
OF PUBLIC POLICY 50–51 (Roger Clegg & James L.J. Nuzzo eds., 1996) (“Citizen enforce-
ment of environmental laws has been enshrined in the major environmental statutes for 
years and is widely endorsed by state and federal environmental regulators, whose en-
forcement efforts are supplemented by citizen-plaintiffs at no cost to the public fisc.”); 
Bucy, supra note 289, at 32 (noting that citizen suit provisions exist in over twenty envi-
ronmental protection statutes). 
304 See Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 
Stat. 816, 888–89 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994)). 
305 See Transcript of Record at 44, United States v. Atlantic Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128 
(2007) (No. 06-562) (“There are more than 400,000 sites across the country that are con-
taminated by hazardous wastes.  The amici States recognize that if these sites are to be 
cleaned up, it’s going to take the work of private parties.  In turn, we recognize that pri-
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Supreme Court validated CERCLA privately initiated actions in United 
States v. Atlantic Research Corp., holding that the statute authorizes pri-
vate parties to bring cost recovery actions to recoup response costs 
they have incurred even where there has been no governmental en-
forcement activity.306 
Under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act’s (RCRA) cit-
izen suit provision,307 a private party may likewise bring suit against 
one who contributed to the “handling, storage, treatment, transpor-
tation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may present 
an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the envi-
ronment.”308  The RCRA citizen suit provision permits recovery of at-
torney fees.  The statute expressly authorizes the courts to “award 
costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness 
fees) to the prevailing or substantially prevailing party, whenever the 
court determines such an award is appropriate.”309  Although RCRA 
citizen suits may be limited to injunctive relief,310 they are nevertheless 
privately managed suits designed to enforce the nation’s environ-
mental protection laws. 
 
vate parties rely upon cost recovery to obtain their costs and financial incentives to do the 
site cleanup.”); see also Allied Towing Corp. v. Great E. Petroleum Corp., 642 F. Supp. 
1339, 1349 (E.D. Va. 1986) (establishing that the allegations in the private party’s com-
plaint state a claim for cost recovery under CERCLA).  At least one court has held that a 
private litigant suing under CERCLA must first obtain governmental approval before 
commencing remedial actions.  See, e.g., Bulk Distrib. Ctrs., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. 
Supp. 1437, 1439 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (holding that a private party could not bring a cost-
recovery action under CERCLA without first obtaining government approval).  The EPA, 
however, disagrees.  According to the EPA, it should be “absolutely clear that no Federal 
approval of any kind is a prerequisite to a cost recovery [action] under [CERCLA].”  50 
Fed. Reg. 47,934 (Nov. 20, 1985).  As the Honorable Judge Wallace of the Ninth Circuit 
noted in Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., “this reading . . . [is] consistent with 
CERCLA’s broad remedial purpose . . . [and] promotes the effectiveness of private en-
forcement actions under section 107(a) [of CERCLA] as a remedy independent of gov-
ernmental actions financed by Superfund.”  792 F.2d 887, 892 (9th Cir. 1986). 
306 Atlantic Research Corp., 551 U.S. at 139 (“By contrast, § 107(a) permits recovery of cleanup 
costs but does not create a right to contribution.  A private party may recover under 
§ 107(a) without any establishment of liability to a third party.”). 
307 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (2006) (“Except as provided in subsection (b) or (c) of this section, 
any person may commence a civil action on his own behalf . . . .”). 
308 Id. § 6972(a)(1)(B). 
309 Id. § 6972(e). 
310 See Annotation, Relief Available in Citizen’s Suit Under 42 U.S.C.S. § 6972 for Violation of Fed-
eral Requirements Relating to Solid or Hazardous Waste, 71 A.L.R. FED. 181, 182, 183 (1985) 
(noting that “RCRA does not specify the relief which may be available in such citizen 
suits,” but at least one court has held that “nothing in RCRA bars injunctive relief”). 
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c.  Antitrust Enforcement 
A long-standing feature of American antitrust law is to use private 
parties to enforce the nation’s laws prohibiting anti-competitive mer-
gers and acquisitions.311  Indeed, “[t]he reach of the U.S. antitrust 
laws, both in terms of subject matter and territorial application, is as 
broad for private lawsuits as for criminal enforcement actions by the 
federal antitrust authorities.”312  It is significant, then, that the reach 
of private lawsuits would be co-extensive with the reach of the crimi-
nal law in antitrust enforcement.  Presumably, the parties seeking en-
forcement have an interest in doing so as an interested party.  In fact, 
the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 allowed injured parties to seek en-
forcement of the nation’s antitrust laws by permitting them treble 
damages.313  The concept of using the injured party as a means of en-
forcing the law, then, has considerable purchase in federal law. 
Similarly, the Clayton Act authorizes a private right of action to al-
low injured parties to recover the monetary value of the injury in-
curred.314  The Act further authorizes private litigants to obtain in-
junctive relief.315  To this end, the court may even restructure the 
market to eliminate the competitive harm created by the unlawful 
conduct and to ensure that the sued parties cannot continue to pur-
sue unlawful enterprises.316  Moreover, Congress also expressly al-
lowed private litigants to obtain treble damages as a means of creat-
ing an incentive for private antitrust enforcement activity.317  
 
311 See 51 CONG. REC. 16,319 (1914) (“Under section 4 of the bill reported by the conferees 
any person injured in his business or property by anything declared to be unlawful in any 
antitrust law or by this act is entitled to go into any district court without regard to the 
amount in controversy and recover threefold damages.”). 
312 Neil R. Ellis, Private Lawsuits in International Antitrust 1 (Oct. 13, 2000) (unpublished 
manuscript, available at http://www.fdblawyers.com/PDF/private_law_suits_paper.doc.). 
313 See Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat 209, 210 (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006)) (noting that an injured party “shall recover three fold the damages 
by him sustained”). 
314 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006) (providing authorization for parties injured by acts forbidden un-
der the antitrust laws to initiate a private right of action and obtain monetary damages). 
315 Id. § 26 (affording private parties injunctive relief “against threatened loss or damage by a 
violation of the antitrust laws”). 
316 Interestingly, state governments may also initiate lawsuits challenging alleged antitrust 
violations under the federal antitrust laws on behalf of the consumers within their state.  
See id. § 15c(a) (authorizing state attorney generals to bring a civil action on behalf of the 
citizens within their respective states). 
317 See 51 CONG. REC. 16,319 (1914) (reporting the statement of Mr. Floyd that “[w]e have 
taken, by these provisions, the business public into our confidence as allies of the Gov-
ernment in enforcing the antitrust laws, and given to the business men of the country 
who are being imposed upon by unlawful combinations remedies by which they can re-
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Congress, understanding that federal enforcement authorities alone 
lacked sufficient resources, attempted to leverage private litigation as 
a way of improving antitrust compliance with the law. 
Interestingly, the ability to bring private litigation spans the full 
range of conduct deemed unlawful under the antitrust laws—
including not simply price fixing cartels, but also output restrictions, 
territorial allocations, resale price maintenance, other vertical re-
straints, and inappropriate mergers, for example.  Private parties can 
even challenge conduct that the government declines to pursue.  In 
fact, private parties can challenge a merger already approved by the 
relevant federal authorities and actually consummated.318  The Act 
encourages the leveraging of private resources to enforce the law and 
illustrates just how close the federal government is to using private 
prosecutions of the criminal law to enforce federal standards. 
d.  Private Enforcement of the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt 
Organizations Act 
The use of private enforcement has extended even to statutes 
such as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
(RICO),319 which is primarily a tool of criminal prosecutors.  Congress 
enacted RICO as part of a comprehensive crime bill intended to pro-
tect the public from “parties who conduct organizations affecting in-
terstate commerce through a pattern of criminal activity.”320  Gov-
ernment prosecutors use (and, some argue, abuse)321 RICO as a tool 
to obtain lengthy prison sentences, heavy fines, and the forfeiture of 
any ill-gotten gains from criminal enterprises or legitimate organiza-
tions operating in a criminal manner.322  Under RICO’s private attor-
ney general provision, private individuals harmed by alleged RICO 
violations are authorized to sue for treble damages and to collect at-
 
cover their own damages . . . without waiting upon the slow and tortuous course of prose-
cution on the part of the Government”). 
318 See 15 U.S.C. § 26 (2006) (enabling private parties injured from a violation of antitrust 
laws to seek injunctive relief). 
319 See Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2006) 
(providing that “[a]ny person injured in his business or propery by reason of a violation 
of . . . this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court”). 
320 115 CONG. REC. 9568 (1969) (statement of Sen. McClellan). 
321 David B. Sentelle, RICO:  The Monster that Ate Jurisprudence, Remarks at the CATO Institute 
Seminar on RICO, Rights and the Constitution (Oct. 18, 1989) (copy on file with the Ca-
to Institute). 
322 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962–63 (detailing criminal penalties for individuals convicted of receiv-
ing income derived from racketeering-related activities). 
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torney’s fees.323  Indeed, with the exception that privately led prosecu-
tions cannot seek prison terms for punishment, there is arguably little 
difference between private parties exacting heavy fines and the gov-
ernment doing so.  It is generally understood that RICO’s treble 
damages provision is intended to provide an incentive for private liti-
gants to bring claims.  Then-Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman 
Strom Thurmond explained that: 
[T]his private cause of action was included as an incentive for victims of 
organized crime activity to redress wrongful actions against their legiti-
mate businesses.  Because of the limited resources available to assist the 
Government in its fight against organized crime, it was believed that “pri-
vate attorneys general” could supplement Government efforts.324 
Senator Thurmond’s statement serves as acknowledgement that the 
private civil cause of action is a means to buttress federal criminal law 
enforcement efforts.  However, unlike the environmental and anti-
trust private rights of action aimed at enforcing federal regulations, 
the private attorneys general provision of RICO is specifically aimed 
at corrupt organizations and intended to vindicate the aims of federal 
criminal law.325 
III.  PRINCIPAL CRITICISMS OF PRIVATELY MANAGED PROSECUTIONS 
Without question, the notion of privately initiated, privately man-
aged, and privately financed criminal prosecutions remains contro-
versial.  Although commentators often see little problem with private 
civil law enforcement, such as in the antitrust or environmental are-
nas;326 arguments on behalf of private criminal prosecutions are often 
 
323 See id. § 1964(c) (describing civil remedies available to individuals harmed by alleged 
RICO violations). 
324 Oversight of Civil RICO Suits:  Hearings on Oversight on Civil RICO Suits Brought Under 18 
U.S.C. 1964(c) Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 2 (1985) (opening statement 
of Chairman Strom Thurmond). 
325 See S. REP. NO. 91-617, at 80–81 (1969) (elaborating on the rationale for permitting civil 
remedies for RICO). 
326 See Randall S. Abate, Massachusetts v. EPA and the Future of Environmental Standing in Cli-
mate Change Litigation and Beyond, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 121, 175 (2008) 
(describing how access to the courts for suits could facilitate combat against climate 
change); Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement:  A Preliminary 
Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 833, 957 
(1985) (noting that “private enforcement helped to keep compliance issues high on the 
agendas of top [environmental law] agency officials and gave additional urgency to their 
attempts to abate the most serious violations”); Mark Seidenfeld & Janna Satz Nugent, 
“The Friendship of the People”:  Citizen Participation in Environmental Enforcement, 73 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 269, 271 (2005) (commencing a discussion on enforcement mechanisms 
created by Congress to enable the Environmental Protection Agency to achieve compli-
ance with environmental regulation). 
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met with considerable hostility.327  The purpose of this section is to 
consider several of these arguments and to examine circumstances in 
which privately managed prosecutions might, like citizen suits, be 
used to serve both public and private interests. 
A.  Potential Constitutional Impediments to Private Prosecutions 
Of all the criticisms leveled against the use of privately managed 
prosecutions, the most damning are those that argue private prosecu-
tions are inherently unconstitutional.328  Such arguments, offered in 
both scholarly journals329 and judicial opinions,330 are generally tied to 
the Due Process and Equal Protection provisions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the Vesting Clause of Article II.  First, critics argue 
that criminal defendants have a right under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s Due Process Clause to an impartial prosecutor.331  In these 
criticisms, it is averred that a prosecutor who has any sort of stake in 
the criminal trial’s outcome violates the process owed the criminal 
defendant.  Second, critics argue that a system of private justice inevi-
 
327 See John D. Bessler, The Public Interest and the Unconstitutionality of Private Prosecutors, 47 
ARK. L. REV. 511, 557 (1994) (stating that “the time has come to end the anachronistic 
practice of allowing private prosecutors”); Julio Pérez Gil, Private Interests Seeking Punish-
ment:  Prosecution Brought by Private Individuals and Groups in Spain, 25 LAW AND POL’Y 151, 
162–65 (2003) (arguing that private actions neither strengthen democracy nor serve as a 
check on prosecutorial discretion); Matthew S. Nichols, No One Can Serve Two Masters:  Ar-
guments Against Private Prosecutors, 13 CAP. DEF. J. 279, 286 (2001) (noting that “the need 
for private prosecutors in Viginina no longer exists, and has not existed since the early 
eighteenth century”); Sidman, supra note 26, at 773–74 (same); John A.J. Ward, Note, 
Private Prosecution—The Entrenched Anomaly, 50 N.C. L. REV. 1171, 1171–79 (1972) (argu-
ing that private prosecutions violate due process and ethics rules).  Indeed, one of the 
rare articles advocating private prosecutions appeared in 1955.  See Comment, Private 
Prosecution:  A Remedy for District Attorneys’ Unwarranted Inaction, 65 YALE L.J. 209 (1955).  
More recently, Bruce L. Benson, in TO SERVE AND PROTECT:  PRIVATIZATION AND 
COMMUNITY IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1998), has encouraged private prosecution as a means 
of increasing victim restitution. 
328 See Bessler, supra note 327, at 558 (suggesting that “private prosecutors violate defen-
dants’ due process rights” because they “have financial incentives that public prosecutors 
do not” and because they “create, at the very least, an appearance of impropriety”). 
329 See, e.g., id. at 557–58 (suggesting the unconstitutionality of private prosecutions). 
330 See, e.g., Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. United States, 411 F.2d 312, 319 
(5th Cir. 1969) (noting the unconstitutionality of permitting private prosecutions); see al-
so People v. Calderone, 573 N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1007 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1991) (commenting on 
the unconstitutionality of permitting private prosecutions). 
331 See Bessler, supra note 327, at 552 (stating that “[f]airness of course requires an absence 
of actual bias in the trial of cases,” thus, “justice must satisfy the appearance of justice” 
(quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955))); Stuart P. Green, Private Challenges to 
Prosecutorial Inaction:  A Model Declaratory Judgment Statute, 97 YALE L.J. 488, 495 (1988) 
(“The primary problem with these statutes is that they compromise a criminal defen-
dant’s due process right to be prosecuted by a disinterested prosecutor.”). 
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tably benefits the rich.332  While this argument does not squarely fit 
into any specific constitutional right, it most likely implicates the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Finally, with 
respect to the private enforcement of federal criminal law, critics 
claim that permitting anyone outside the direct control of the Execu-
tive Branch to initiate a prosecution violates Article II’s Vesting 
Clause,333 which locates all executive power within the President. 
1.  Due Process Concerns 
Critics of privately managed prosecutions generally posit two in-
terrelated arguments in objecting to the appointment of such prose-
cutors.  Essentially, it is argued that criminal defendants are owed 
“impartial” prosecutors as a matter of fundamental fairness and that, 
as such, appointing private prosecutors to a criminal case violates due 
process because private prosecutions entail an inherent conflict of in-
terest.334 
Certainly, the overriding due process concern is to ensure that the 
procedures by which the laws are applied against the individual are 
carried out in an even-handed manner so that the accused is not sub-
jected to the arbitrary exercise of government power.335  Exactly what 
 
332 See Bessler, supra note 327, at 589–90 (comparing how public prosecutors treat criminal 
assaults on the poor just as seriously as they respond to those on the rich while private 
prosecutors treat wealthy individuals better than poor ones); Joseph E. Kennedy, Private 
Financing of Criminal Prosecutions and the Differing Protections of Liberty and Equality in the 
Criminal Justice System, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 665, 706 (1997) (“Privately financed vic-
tims will enjoy preferential access to justice.”). 
333 See Evan Caminker, Comment, The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341, 
346 (1989) (“[A]n enforcement remedy being pursued solely to protect the public inter-
est, as distinguished from a private attorney general action with public interest overtones, 
is exclusively within the province of the Executive Branch.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting William H. Lewis, Environmentalists’ Authority to Sue Industry for Civil Pe-
nalties is Unconstitutional Under the Separation of Powers Doctrine, 16 ENVTL. L. REP. 10101, 
10104 (1986))); see also Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 274, at 660 (showing that the 
power to prosecute public violations of the law was historically attached to the executive 
power). 
334 See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88–89 (1935) (suggesting the primary goal of pri-
vate prosecutors in criminal cases is not to ensure that justice is done but rather to win 
the case); People v. Calderone, 573 N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1007 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1991) (“[P]rivate 
prosecutions by interested parties or their attorneys present inherent conflicts of interest 
which violate defendants’ due process rights.”); Bessler, supra note 327, at 558 (“[P]rivate 
prosecutors violate defendants’ due process rights.”). 
335 In circumstances in which a criminal defendant has enjoyed a fair trial, represented by 
counsel, and with all the other benefits provided by the Bill of Rights, the issue is not how 
the procedure might have specifically affected him, but by general provisions of law ap-
plicable to all those in like condition, whether he is deprived of liberty without due proc-
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procedures are needed to satisfy due process, however, will vary de-
pending on the circumstances and the possible punishment the indi-
vidual is facing—for example, deprivation of liberty or property.336  
When due process is discussed, it is generally understood in terms of 
either procedural due process or substantive due process.337  As the 
nomenclature suggests, one arm of due process deals with specific 
procedural rights guaranteed the defendant, the other with more 
substantive rights enjoyed by the individual.  To determine whether 
procedural due process interests have been met, courts look to his-
tory.  Courts thus often determine due process requirements by ex-
amining the common law, including that of England during pre-
colonial times.  Depending upon one’s interpretive philosophy, spe-
cial consideration is afforded the public meaning of the law in place 
at the time of the Constitution’s ratification.338  Since private prosecu-
tions were practiced at the time of the Constitution’s adoption, they 
clearly satisfy this standard.  Nevertheless, reference to history is not 
always dispositive; otherwise, the procedure of the first half of the 
seventeenth century would be “fastened upon American jurispru-
dence like a straight-jacket, only to be unloosed by constitutional 
amendment.”339  Procedural guarantees to criminal defendants, in 
particular, experienced significant changes in the latter half of the 
twentieth century—changes adopted by courts to ensure greater fair-
ness to those accused of criminal conduct. 
Although due process tolerates certain variances in procedure 
“appropriate to the nature of the case,”340 common ground exists.  
First, “[p]rocedural due process rules are meant to protect persons 
not from the deprivation, but from the mistaken or unjustified depri-
 
ess of law.  See, e.g., Marchant v. Pa. R.R. Co., 153 U.S. 380, 386 (1894) (discussing the 
scope of the phrase “due process of law”). 
336 See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 537 (1884) (discussing what constitutes “due 
course of law” under the Connecticut Constitution); see also Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. 
No. 108, 111 U.S. 701, 708 (1884) (“It is sufficient to observe here, that by ‘due process’ is 
meant one which, following the forms of law, is appropriate to the case, and just to the 
parties to be affected.”). 
337 See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985) (emphasizing that the 
categories of substantive and procedural due process are distinct). 
338 See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 101 (1908) (alterations to due process require-
ments should never entirely disregard the fundamental principles of “ancient proce-
dure”); Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172, 175 (1899) (noting that, while states maintain 
control over the procedure of their courts, such procedure should not conflict with fun-
damental guarantees of the United States Constitution); Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 528 (“[A] 
process of law, which is not otherwise forbidden, must be taken to be due process of law, 
if it can show the sanction of settled usage both in England and in this country . . . .”). 
339 Twining, 211 U.S. at 101. 
340 Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). 
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vation of life, liberty, or property.”341  Due process thus lays down cer-
tain procedures to allow individuals to challenge the state’s attempt 
to deprive them of their rights.342  Principles established in the Bill of 
Rights, especially when it pertains to criminal law, establish the basic 
requirements:  grand jury indictment343 (although not incorporated 
against the states);344 notice345 and a jury trial346 before an impartial 
judge;347 an opportunity for confrontation348 and cross-examination of 
adverse witnesses;349 and representation by counsel.350  The Constitu-
tion, however, is silent on the nature or function of prosecutors. 
Beyond these basic requirements, courts, lawyers, and scholars 
have long debated precisely what procedures are constitutionally due 
the criminal defendant.351  Although the Constitution’s text estab-
lishes certain basic procedural requirements, the question as to 
whether a state-provided prosecutor is also “due” has never been an-
swered by the Supreme Court.  Similarly, the Court has never held 
that, as a matter of substantive due process, criminal defendants are 
entitled to an “impartial” prosecutor in the same way they are entitled 
to an impartial jury.  In fact, the Supreme Court has observed that 
 
341 Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978); see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 
(1976) (“[P]rocedural due process rules are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the 
truth-finding process as applied to the generality of cases . . . .”). 
342 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972). 
343 See Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 12 (1887) (explaining the history underlying the right to 
grand jury indictment). 
344 See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 516 (1884) (holding that Fourteenth Amendment 
due process does not necessarily require indictment by grand jury in a state prosecution 
murder). 
345 See Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29, 40 (1896) (describing a defendant’s right to know 
the “nature and cause of the accusation against him”). 
346 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 154 (1968) (holding that U.S. citizens are entitled 
to a trial by jury in serious criminal cases). 
347 See Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) (“The Due Process Clause entitles a 
person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal in both civil and criminal cases.”). 
348 See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 401 (1965) (describing the guarantee of the Sixth 
Amendment that a defendant in a criminal prosecution shall have an opportunity to con-
front witnesses against him). 
349 See Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 3 (1966) (accepting a statement by the defendant that 
“[i]f there was . . . a denial of cross-examination without waiver, it would be constitutional 
error of the first magnitude and no amount of showing of want of prejudice would cure 
it”). 
350 See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938) (noting that the Sixth Amendment estab-
lishes a defendant’s right to counsel). 
351 See Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 3–18 (2004) (exam-
ining debate over Miranda, Dickerson, and other constitutional doctrines); Benjamin J. 
Priester, Structuring Sentencing:  Apprendi, the Offense of Conviction, and the Limited Role of 
Constitutional Law, 79 IND. L.J. 863, 891–95 (2004) (dicussing constitutional interpretation 
of the Apprendi line of cases). 
714 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 12:3 
 
public prosecutors “need not be entirely ‘neutral and detached’”352 
and faced, in Faulder v. Johnson, with the issue of whether private 
prosecutions violated the Due Process clause, the Court declined to 
grant certiorari review.353 
The Court has, however, required that a state provide a jury trial 
before an impartial judicial officer,354 the right to an attorney’s help,355 
the right to present evidence and give argument,356 and the opportu-
nity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.357  The Court 
has even placed affirmative obligations on prosecutors, such as the 
requirement that each element of crime be proved beyond a reason-
able doubt,358 that exculpatory evidence be provided to the defen-
dant359 and that, pursuant to the defendant’s Fifth Amendment right 
to be free from compelled self-incrimination,360 the prosecutor not 
comment on the defendant’s exercise of her right to remain silent.361 
In Mathews v. Eldridge the Supreme Court established a framework 
for litigating due process claims and for determining what process is 
due the claimant.362  In its decision, the Court set forth three factors 
that courts needed to consider before a substantive due process right 
could be established.363  First, the Court found it necessary to deter-
mine the nature of the private interest “affected by the official ac-
tion.”364  Second, the Court required analysis of the possibility of “the 
risk of an erroneous deprivation of [the] interest through the proce-
dures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 
procedural safeguards.”365  Finally, the Court required weighing of the 
government’s concerns (as well as its interest in having clear proce-
 
352 Jerrico, 446 U.S. at 248. 
353 Faulder v. Johnson, 525 U.S. 1125 (1998). 
354 See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927) (expressing the right to an impartial judge). 
355 See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (requiring attorney representation at 
trial). 
356 See Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 739 (2006) (discussing the right to present evidence); 
Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 857–58 (1975) (emphasizing the defendant’s role in 
the fact-finding process). 
357 See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315–17 (1974) (expounding on the Sixth Amendment’s 
guarantee to confront witnesses). 
358 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361–62 (1970) (explaining the reasonable doubt re-
quirement). 
359 See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110–13 (1976) (requiring prosecutors to turn over 
material exculpatory evidence). 
360 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
361 See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (forbidding comment on the defen-
dant’s right to remain silent). 
362 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
363 Id. at 335. 
364 Id. 
365 Id. 
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dures) against whatever burdens the additional procedures might 
create.366  To some extent, Mathews v. Eldridge recognizes the benefit 
of examining the procedures applicable in the context of a specific 
case as opposed to articulating a specific list of procedures that are 
constitutionally due. 
It is possible to read the criminal procedure guarantees found in 
the Constitution as assuming that a prosecutor might in general be 
biased against the accused and will inevitably possess certain advan-
tages over the defendant.  By the time the prosecutor has initiated a 
case, she would be expected to harbor a bias in favor of conviction.  
Only during the investigative phase or at the point of deciding to 
pursue a prosecution might the public prosecutor be expected to be 
more impartial than a private one. 
Arguably, the stronger due process concern surfaces in the con-
text of a concern about the prosecutor’s motivations and the exis-
tence of an inherent conflict whenever a private attorney handles a 
criminal prosecution (I will have more to say about this issue below).  
It is generally understood that the duty owed by a lawyer to his client 
is that of “zealously assert[ing] the client’s position under the rules of 
the adversary system.”367  Presumably, that duty would extend to a pri-
vately hired prosecutor.  Such a prosecutor should, just as the plain-
tiff’s lawyer in a civil case should, vigorously prosecute the case on 
behalf of her client, presumptively the victim of the alleged crime.  
The Supreme Court, while never directly addressing the due process 
interest involved in the appointment of a private prosecutor, has rec-
ognized that prosecutors, unlike adversary counsel interested in pre-
vailing in civil litigation, have a larger public interest at stake in en-
suring that justice shall be done.  In Berger v. United States, the Court 
explained the prosecutor’s duty as follows: 
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party 
to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impar-
tially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose inter-
est . . . in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that 
justice shall be done.  As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense 
the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not es-
cape or innocence suffer.  He may prosecute with earnestness and vi-
gor—indeed he should do so.  But, while he may strike hard blows, he is 
not at liberty to strike foul ones.  It is as much his duty to refrain from 
 
366 Id. 
367 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. 2 (2006). 
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improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to 
use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.368 
The Court offers a compelling view of the prosecutor.  The implicit 
point made by the Court is that private counsel in civil suits are less 
interested in “justice” and more interested in winning the case.  
However, this view of the public prosecutor’s obligations is not strik-
ingly different from the obligation shouldered by any member of the 
bar.  After all, as a member of the legal profession, a lawyer is also “an 
officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special respon-
sibility for the quality of justice.”369 
While the stakes of a civil trial may at times be significantly more 
substantial than those of a criminal trial—for example, paying a 
$100,000 fine versus spending thirty days in jail—society tends to 
stigmatize criminal prosecution far more than a civil lawsuit.370  As a 
consequence, we mandate counsel for defendants in criminal trials 
but generally not in civil trials.371  The impecunious litigant must rely 
on a contingency fee to lure counsel to take a civil case.  Given the 
“all or nothing” stakes of a contingency fee, one would expect coun-
sel to be interested not only in prevailing, but in securing the largest 
award possible.  Therefore, public prosecutors may appear to have 
less at stake than a private prosecutor would.  If the private prosecu-
tor takes the prosecution on a contingency fee basis or is himself the 
victim, this may be true, but does not have to be the case.  To remedy 
the “self interest” effect, states could simply forbid contingency fees 
in criminal cases for private prosecutors in the same way that such 
fees are disallowed for criminal defense attorneys.  Similarly, states 
could adopt rules that place an affirmative obligation on private 
counsel to keep the interests of the state or the public in mind as she 
pursues a case.  And, in consideration of the adage that a man who 
represents himself in a proceeding has a fool for a client, states could 
disallow actual victims from themselves serving as prosecutors. 
 
368 See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (articulating the role of the prosecu-
tor). 
369 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. 1 (2006). 
370 See Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Challenges and Implications of a Systemic Social Effect Theory, 2006 
U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 721 (discussing “the distinction between civil and criminal sanctions” 
that creates a social stigma for the latter, but not the former). 
371 But see Assem. B. 590, 10th Sess. (Ca. 2009), available at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/09-
10/bill/asm/ab_0551-0600/ab_590_bill_20090225_introduced.pdf (proposed California 
“Civil Gideon” bill that was recently signed into law).  For a discussion of the “Civil Gide-
on’s” recent ascent to law in California and relevant criticisms, see The Blackbook Legal 
Blog, Introducing the “Civil Gideon,” http://blackbooklegal.blogspot.com/2009/10/
introducing-civil-gideon.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2010). 
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Still problematic, however, is the possibility that a private prosecu-
tor, motivated by the prospect of a fee, may decide to undertake a 
prosecution when, in a reasonable public prosecutor’s discretion, no 
prosecution should be undertaken at all.  However, no criminal de-
fendant has a right “not” to be prosecuted.372  Rather, in federal law, 
as in many states, the accused have a right to grand jury indictment.373  
Thus, most cases undeserving of prosecution ought to be weeded out 
as the Framers intended.  Even if the decision whether to take a case 
to the grand jury at all is a sensitive one, then certainly a private pros-
ecutor could be required to obtain the local public prosecutor’s ap-
proval before proceeding with a case—both in convening a grand 
jury or, even if a grand jury has already handed down an indictment, 
deciding whether it should proceed to trial.  In reality, fairly simple 
rules can be put in place to ensure defendants’ due process rights 
while still utilizing a private prosecutor. 
The more consequential issue may not be for the defendant, but 
for the complainant.  The defendant has no right to a conflict-free 
prosecution, but the complainant does, as does the public.  While a 
lawyer’s obligation is to represent zealously the interests of her client, 
constitutional requirements relating to the disclosure of exculpatory 
evidence to the defendant374 and, if the interests of justice demand it, 
to end the prosecution altogether,375 may conflict with the obligation 
to the complainant.  Similarly, the private prosecutor’s interests in 
advancing the complainant’s cause may cause tension with her re-
sponsibility to the public at large. 
It is possible, however, to mitigate the conflict in the same manner 
in which conflicts are handled in multi-defendant cases or where oth-
er conflicts of interest exist.  Courts allow defense lawyers to repre-
sent multiple defendants in circumstances in which conflicts may ex-
ist provided that those potential conflicts are revealed to the 
defendants,376 the defendants are made to understand them,377 and 
 
372 Cardenas, supra note 40, at 374–77 (examining a civilian’s ability to initiate a prosecu-
tion); Joan Meier, The “Right” to a Disinterested Prosecutor of Criminal Contempt:  Unpacking 
Public and Private Interests, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 85, 107–18 (1992) (arguing that public prose-
cution is not an element of fundamental fairness). 
373 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
374 See supra note 359 and accompanying text. 
375 See Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454, 457 (1868) (“[T]he prosecuting party may 
relinquish his suit at any stage of it, and withdraw from court at his option . . . .”). 
376 FED. R. CRIM. P. 44(c)(2) (stating that the court must advise each defendant in the case of 
a defense conflict of interest). 
377 See Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 797–98 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating it is 
accepted that “trial court inquiry into whether the defendant has made a knowing and vo-
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the defendants agree to waive their right to conflict-free representa-
tion.378  If the private prosecutor is held to the same standard of con-
duct as the public prosecutor, which must be the case if such a prose-
cution is to survive constitutional scrutiny, then the judge may 
inquire of the defendant whether he understands the nature of the 
potential conflict and is willing, nevertheless, to waive it.  In addition, 
if one understands the public prosecutor as the people’s representa-
tive, then his agreement to appoint, or to acquiesce in the appoint-
ment of, a private prosecutor may serve as a waiver of the public in-
terest in the prosecution. 
2.  Equal Protection Concerns 
The equal protection concerns are basically two-fold:  first, that 
the rich, who can afford private counsel, enjoy an advantage over the 
poor.  The wealthy can pursue a prosecution in circumstances in 
which a person of lesser means might not be able to.  Second, a de-
fendant privately prosecuted may be worse off than had he been 
prosecuted by a public official who, because the public prosecutor 
arguably bears a larger responsibility for pursuing justice than the vic-
tim-oriented private prosecutor; thus, he will be more balanced and 
objective in his prosecutorial approach. 
This concern about improved access to quality justice based on 
economic grounds is certainly a meritorious point when considering 
public policy, but it is difficult to fashion it as an equal protection ar-
gument.  The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment prohibits a state from denying any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws.379  In other words, the law must treat 
an individual in the same manner as others similarly situated.  Ordi-
narily, a violation of the Equal Protection Clause occurs when a state 
 
luntary waiver of his right to conflict-free representation is strongly encouraged, if not re-
quired”). 
378 Professor Davis makes a similar point with respect to private prosecutions in New York.  
See Davis, supra note 203, at 386–87 (noting that private prosecutors can avoid conflict 
problems under the existing framework under New York’s professional conduct rules that 
only allow a lawyer to represent clients with divergent interests after complete disclosure 
where it is obvious the lawyer can adequately represent both). 
379 See U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.  Professor Kennedy makes the related point that the 
“[p]referential access to justice” the wealthy may enjoy “threatens the defendant’s distinct 
interest in equality.”  Joseph E. Kennedy, Private Financing of Criminal Prosecutions and the 
Differing Protections of Liberty and Equality in the Criminal Justice System, 24 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 665, 705–08 (1997). 
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grants a particular class of individuals the right to engage in an activ-
ity and yet denies other individuals the same right.380 
The Supreme Court has established varying tests to determine 
whether an equal protection violation has occurred:  generally, it de-
pends on the type of classification the state has made and its effect on 
fundamental rights.  Traditionally, the Court finds a state classifica-
tion constitutional if it has a rational basis “related to a legitimate 
state interest.”381  The Supreme Court, however, will strictly scruti-
nize382 a distinction when it involves a “suspect distinction.”383  Here, 
the argument might be that the poor are discriminated against in a 
system that relies on private prosecution because they are unable to 
avail themselves of prosecutors.  “In order for a classification to be 
subject to strict scrutiny, however, it must be shown that the state law 
or its administration is intended to discriminate” and that there 
would be no legitimate state purpose.384  It would be difficult, if not 
impossible, to prove whether a state that permitted private prosecu-
tions intended to discriminate against anyone.  Moreover, the Court 
has never found economic status to be a “suspect class” in the same 
way as race or national origin.385  The Court also applies a strict scru-
tiny test if the classification interferes with a fundamental right—such 
as a First Amendment right or the right to vote.386  The Court, how-
 
380 See Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2152 (2008) (“Our equal protection 
jurisprudence has typically been concerned with governmental classifications that ‘affect 
some groups of citizens differently than others.’” (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 
U.S. 420, 425 (1961))). 
381 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 813 (2008). 
382 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 101 (1973) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting) (discussing fundamental rights subject to strict scrutiny); Delight, Inc. v. Balt. 
County, 624 F.2d 12, 14 (4th Cir. 1980) (describing strict scrutiny standard, but holding it 
does not apply); LOCAL GOV’T COMM’N, GEN. ASSEMBLY OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PA., 
PENNSYLVANIA LEGISLATOR’S MUNICIPAL DESKBOOK 49 (3d ed. 2006) (clarifying the three 
levels of scrutiny under equal protection analysis). 
383 See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 17 (1979) (referencing suspect classifications). 
384 Kermit Roosevelt III, Compelling State Interest, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN CIVIL 
LIBERTIES 341, 341 (Paul Finkelman ed., 2006) (stating that strict scrutiny applies where 
there is “discrimination either with respect to a fundamental right or on the basis of a 
‘suspect classification’”). 
385 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 29 (explaining that economic status does not 
receive strict scrutiny). 
386 Roosevelt, supra note 384, at 341 (“[S]ome (although not all) infringements on funda-
mental rights receive strict scrutiny.  Fundamental rights include textually specified rights 
such as the protections of speech and religion found in the Bill of Rights, and also some 
unenumerated rights, such as the right to travel interstate or the right of access to the 
courts.”).  For discussion of fundamental rights in another context, see Sarah Elizabeth 
Saucedo, Majority Rules Except in New Mexico:  Constitutional and Policy Concerns Raised by 
New Mexico’s Supermajority Requirement for Judicial Retention, 86 B.U. L. REV. 173, 194 (2006). 
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ever, has never found an affirmative “right to prosecution.”  Thus, it 
is difficult to see how the Court would countenance an equal protec-
tion challenge to a private prosecution on the ground of economic 
inequality.  And while the wealthy presumably would have better ac-
cess to more talented attorneys, it is unclear that the poor would be 
disadvantaged in a system that permitted private prosecutions as an 
adjunct to the general, and more common and equally available, sys-
tem of public prosecutions.  One could argue that, as a practical mat-
ter, if those who could afford private criminal prosecutions (like 
wealthy individuals or corporations) shouldered the financial burden 
for crimes committed against them, then more resources might be 
available for the government to pursue crimes committed against 
persons less fortunate and therefore less able to afford to hire private 
counsel—in turn, making “equal protection” more likely, not less. 
An alternative equal protection argument might be that a particu-
lar defendant was “selectively prosecuted” and that a public prosecu-
tor might not have brought the case.  Essentially, this criticism de-
mands that equal protection requires all individuals to be prosecuted 
by a public prosecutor and, that if some individuals were to be prose-
cuted by a private prosecution, as opposed to a public one, the Equal 
Protection Clause would be violated.  While this sort of argument is 
invoked in several contexts, it would be difficult to show that the “sys-
tem” of private prosecutions violated the Equal Protection Clause.  
After all, the system would function similarly to the public one in 
which one prosecutor in the District Attorney’s Office might be more 
inclined to recommend prosecution than another. 
More likely, in situations such as these a claim would be based on 
an “as applied” challenge levied against a particular prosecutor and 
would not invalidate a system using privately managed prosecutions.  
Even with respect to an “as applied” challenge to an individual prose-
cutor, however, the claimant would have to demonstrate that simil-
iarly situated individuals were not being prosecuted.  Aside from the 
practical difficulties of making such a showing, it is unclear a prose-
cution could be sustained absent a showing to the court of sufficient 
evidence consistent with guilt.  If grand jury indictment were re-
quired prior to commencing a private prosecution, presumably no 
case undeserving of prosecution would go forward.  Moreover, such 
concerns would also be alleviated to the extent that appointment of 
the private prosecutor was certified by the public prosecutor or the 
trial court.  In any event, an Equal Protection challenge to private 
prosecutions, especially a facial challenge to a statute or rule allowing 
such prosecutions, would likely be of little merit. 
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3.  A Unique Federal Concern:  Article II and the Unitary Executive 
An additional argument against the appointment of a private 
prosecutor—at least at the federal level—is that such an appointment 
violates Article II of the Constitution, which provides that “[t]he ex-
ecutive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of 
America.”387  The argument is that an “inherently executive function” 
vested in the President cannot be delegated out either to another 
branch of the government, to another governmental authority out-
side the Executive Branch or, presumably, to a private entity.388  The 
power to prosecute a criminal offense is such an inherently executive 
function, it has been argued, that a private prosecution would violate 
Article II. 
While a fulsome discussion of federal executive power and theo-
ries about a “unitary executive” exceeds the scope of this Article, it is 
noteworthy that the Supreme Court has never ruled that the prosecu-
torial function may be exercised only by Executive Branch officials.389  
The Court in Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., upheld a 
district court’s authority to appoint a private prosecutor in a criminal 
contempt proceeding, even where it disallowed it under the specific 
factual circumstances of that case.390  Of course, statutory authority 
similarly vests the district courts with the authority to appoint U.S. At-
torneys where vacancies occur that have not yet been filled by the 
President. 
In the seminal case of Morrison v. Olsen, the Supreme Court up-
held the appointment of an independent counsel under the Ethics in 
Government Act.391  The Court upheld the independent counsel’s 
appointment in no small part because that appointment did not rep-
 
387 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.  Obviously, such an argument would not be applicable to the 
states unless they had an Article II analogue in their own constitutions and their courts 
had adopted a unitary executive type understanding of state executive power. 
388 See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 697–98 (1997) (“[T]he doctrine of separation of pow-
ers places limits on the authority of the Federal Judiciary to interfere with the Executive 
Branch . . . .”).  For a discussion concerning delegations of executive power, see Paul R. 
Verkuil, Outsourcing and the Duty to Govern, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT:  OUTSOURCING 
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 310 (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009). 
389 See Clinton, 520 U.S. at 699–700 (showing the debate regarding executive functions); Mor-
rison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 685 (1988) (commencing discussion of whether the inde-
pendent counsel provision violates separation of powers principles); Janet Fairchild, An-
notation, Validity, Under State Law, of Appointment of Independent Special Prosecutor to Handle 
Political or Controversial Prosecutions or Investigations of Persons Other than Regular Prosecutor, 
84 A.L.R. 3D 29, 40–41 (1978) (discussing violations of separation of powers); Verkuil, su-
pra note 388, at 310 (laying out parameters of the duty to govern). 
390 481 U.S. 787, 809 (1987). 
391 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 695. 
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resent a situation in which Congress sought to increase its power at 
the expense of the executive authority.392  Thus, the Act posed no 
“dange[r] of congressional usurpation of Executive Branch func-
tions,”393 nor was it “a case in which the power to remove an executive 
official has been completely stripped from the President;” rather, 
“because the independent counsel may be terminated for ‘good 
cause,’ the Executive, through the Attorney General, retains ample 
authority to assure that the counsel is competentely performing his or 
her statutory responsibilities.”394 
Morrison implies that, for a private prosecution to occur at the 
federal level, the prosecutor must be controlled to some degree by 
the Executive Branch and may additionally require some sort of im-
primatur of the Judicial Branch.  To meet this standard, a private 
prosecutor could be retained and deputized by the federal prosecu-
tor’s office.  Moreover, the relationship between a private prosecutor 
and the U.S. Attorney might be fashioned far more closely than that 
with an independent counsel and thus, would more easily meet the 
constitutional threshold.  Indeed, the U.S. Attorney could retain con-
trol by approving the prosecution and, when necessary, terminating it 
if he or she believed it was in the interests of justice to do so. 
B.   Prudential Concerns 
In addition to the constitutional arguments raised against private 
prosecutions, at least two significant prudential concerns must be ad-
dressed:  namely, that a private prosecutor harbors an inherent con-
flict between the victim’s specific interests and society’s interest in jus-
tice; and secondly, that private justice systems have not generally 
proven successful in achieving important public policy objectives. 
The ethical issues raised by the potential conflicts faced by a pri-
vately hired prosecutor bear serious analysis.  Such conflicts, however, 
are not alien to the legal system and arise in a number of different 
contexts.  With respect to whether privately managed prosecutions 
will further the goals of the criminal justice system—including pun-
ishing the guilty, providing general and specific deterrence, and se-
curing domestic tranquility—so few such prosecutions occur that it is 
difficult to gauge their effect.  Nevertheless, scholars have examined 
other forms of so-called private justice, including the use of qui tam 
 
392 Id. at 694. 
393 Id. (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 727 (1986)). 
394 Id. at 692. 
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actions395 and the promotion of private causes of action to permit396 
those injured by certain activities to sue and, through the civil justice 
system, collect restitution.  I will consider each of these arguments in 
turn.397 
1.  Ethical Conflicts and the Private Prosecutor 
Ordinarily, the issue of a conflict of interest arises when counsel 
enjoys a pecuniary interest or has a fiduciary duty adverse to her po-
tential client.398  The underlying idea is that competing incentives 
prevent counsel’s interests from being as closely aligned with the in-
terests of the client.  In a private prosecution, the question is whether 
the private prosecutor can serve both the client’s presumable interest 
in convicting the defendant and the public’s interest in justice—for 
“the duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict.”399 
The American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct examine the relationship between a lawyer and his or her 
clients and defines what constitutes a “conflict of interest.”  Model 
Rule 1.7, which addresses conflicts of interest involving current cli-
ents, dictates that:  “a lawyer shall not represent a client if the repre-
sentation involves a concurrent conflict of interest.”  The Rule ex-
plains that such a conflict exists if: 
(1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to an-
other client; or 
(2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more 
clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another 
 
395 See generally James M. Atwood, False Claims Act—Section 3730(e)(3) of False Claims Act Bars 
Qui Tam Suit That Gives No Useful or Proper Return to the Government—United States ex rel. 
S. Prawer & Co. v. Fleet Bank, 24 F.3d 320 (1st Cir. 1994), 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 949 
(1995); Caminker, supra note 333; Dan D. Pitzer, The Qui Tam Doctrine:  A Comparative 
Analysis of Its Application in the United States and the British Commonwealth, 7 TEX. INT’L L.J. 
415 (1972); Charles N. Drennan, Comment, Qui Tam Actions under the 1899 Refuse Act:  
Possibility of Individual Legal Action to Prevent Water Pollution, 36 MO. L. REV. 498 (1971). 
396 See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney:  The Implications of Eco-
nomic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. 
REV. 669 (1986); James L. Miller, Federal Securities Laws:  Private Causes of Action Under Sec-
tion 17(a) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 13 AKRON L. REV. 362 (1979); Wilbur Owens, 
Export Controls—A Private Cause of Action Under the Export Administration Act of 1979, 15 GA. 
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 371 (1985); Rita M. Theisen, Recent Developments in Private Rights of Ac-
tion Under the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act, 23 TORT & INS. L.J. 19 (1987). 
397 While doubtless other arguments against private prosecutions may exist, those outlined 
here appear far more frequently both in the relevant literature and in judicial opinions. 
398 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7–.8 (2006) (barring lawyers from represent-
ing clients when there are personal or professional conflicts of interest). 
399 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:  PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3-
1.2(c) (1993). 
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client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the 
lawyer.400 
The Supreme Court in Young v. United States ex rel Vuitton et Fils S.A., 
touched on what it believed may be a conflict of interest in the con-
text of a privately managed prosecution.401  In that case, fashion 
leather goods manufacturer Louis Vuitton had brought suit against 
alleged trademark infringers who manufactured and distributed imi-
tations of Vuitton’s goods.  As part of a settlement agreement, the al-
leged infringers agreed to a permanent injunction against any such 
activity.402 
Having learned that the product infringement appeared to be 
continuing, Vuitton’s attorneys requested that the district court ap-
point them as special counsel to prosecute the criminal contempt ac-
tion for the alleged injunction violation.403  The district court granted 
the request, appointing them as special counsel,404 and a jury subse-
quently convicted the defendants of contempt.405  Appealing to the 
Second Circuit, defendants argued that the appointment of Vuitton’s 
attorneys instead of disinterested counsel was erroneous.406 
The Supreme Court held that counsel for a party that is the bene-
ficiary of a court order may not be appointed to undertake contempt 
prosecutions for alleged violation of that order.407  The Court noted 
that because federal prosecutors have the unique duty to seek justice 
and not merely convict, they are prohibited from representing the 
government in a manner where they, their family, or their business 
associates have any particularized interest.408  The private attorney 
who undertakes a prosecution, the Court concluded, should be simi-
larly “disinterested.”409  Here, because the lawyers who prosecuted the 
case could potentially benefit in a subsequent civil suit from obtain-
ing a criminal conviction in the case at hand, they could not be 
deemed “disinterested” prosecutors.410  The Court thus determined 
that the prosecutors were necessarily interested.  As a consequence, 
the Court refused to apply harmless error analysis in light of the per-
 
400 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a) (2006). 
401 481 U.S. 787 (1987). 
402 Id. at 790–91. 
403 Id. 
404 Id. at 791–92. 
405 Id. at 792. 
406 Id. at 793. 
407 Id. at 809. 
408 Id. at 803. 
409 Id. at 804. 
410 Id. at 805–06. 
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vasive effects of appointing an interested prosecutor.411  Explaining 
that it would require analysis not of what the private prosecutors did, 
but what they refrained from doing at trial and prior to trial, the con-
fidence in the integrity of the criminal proceeding was under-
mined.412  Nevertheless, the Court’s issue was not with the private 
prosecution per se, but with the fact that those particular private 
prosecutors had a parallel interest in the case and were not suffi-
ciently “disinterested.” 
Setting aside the practical concern of whether it is always the case 
that a prosecutor is “disinterested” in the outcome of a criminal trial, 
is it ever possible for a private attorney, especially one retained by the 
victim, to be sufficiently disinterested in a criminal prosecution?  The 
difficulty is more apparent with an attorney hired by the victim, be-
cause an attorney has a responsibility to vigorously represent the in-
terests of the client within the bounds of the law.  It is possible that, 
despite the lawyer’s obligation to the justice system, the incentive a 
lawyer has to advocate on behalf of her client may overwhelm that 
counsel’s interest in protecting the criminal justice system or in ful-
filling her duties as an officer to the court.  Of course, that is a risk 
that all defense counsel runs—that their obligation to their clients 
will blind them as to their obligation to justice, more generally, but it 
is traditionally a risk society is willing to run on behalf of the criminal 
defendant. 
It is markedly different when we consider a lawyer representing 
the interests of a victim in a criminal prosecution.  Because our sys-
tem is designed to give the criminal defendant the benefit of the 
doubt,413 and because we believe those who prosecute criminal cases 
must also have the larger interests of justice in mind, first and fore-
most, there is an uneasiness that attends a victim-centric criminal jus-
tice system.  Following Vuitton, the Fourth Circuit Court in Person v. 
Miller considered similar issues.414  There, the defendant challenged a 
judgment from a criminal contempt proceeding that he violated a 
court order prohibiting him from operating a paramilitary organiza-
tion.415  The prosecutor in the contempt proceeding had previously 
represented the plaintiffs in a suit against the defendant, resulting in 
the court order at issue.416  The district court held that the U.S. Attor-
 
411 Id. at 809. 
412 Id. at 809–14. 
413 See supra note 358 and accompanying text. 
414 854 F.2d 656 (4th Cir. 1988). 
415 Id. at 659. 
416 Id. at 658. 
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ney’s Office was required to take control, but that the interested at-
torney could still assist in the prosecution.417 
Ostensibly relying on the fact that Young does not prohibit inter-
ested attorneys from all involvement in a criminal contempt prosecu-
tion, but rather frowns on their management of such cases,418 the 
Fourth Circuit upheld private counsel’s participation so long as the 
government approved and retained control of the prosecution.419 
The Court’s underlying concern that the victims’ priorities may 
take precedence over the more ephemeral, but no less important, 
demands of “justice” is understandable.  This concern, however, 
bears closer scrutiny.  Does the public’s interest count for more than 
the victim’s interest?  Should it?  Are prosecutors, even those privately 
retained, who work under the same ethical constraints as public pros-
ecutors—albeit with perhaps different incentives—necessarily less 
likely to make decisions that benefit justice, writ large, to the benefit 
of their clients?  After all, public prosecutors may identify with their 
victims or may place political advancement paramount in their ca-
reers.  The ranks of elected officialdom are littered with former pros-
ecutors.  To think that a public prosecutor’s interests may be any 
more noble than a private attorney’s is likely more a hope than a real-
ity. 
Part of the answer to these concerns may depend upon the way in 
which the system of private prosecutions is structured.  The legal pro-
fession has long barred arrangements wherein criminal defense law-
yers are paid only if they win an acquittal for their clients.420  This may 
have something not only to do with the “troubling” incentive created 
when a lawyer is only compensated when he successfully obtains an 
acquittal, but also with the prospect of what lawyers may do to collect 
their fees.  Private prosecutors, if supervised by their public counter-
parts, and paid on an hourly, not a contingency basis, may not be any 
less likely to twist justice than a public prosecutor who becomes 
committed to the victim’s cause or who is using his office for political 
 
417 Id. at 659. 
418 See Young v. United States ex rel Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 806 n.17 (1987) (“The 
potential for misconduct that is created by the appointment of an interested prosecutor is 
not outweighed by the fact that counsel for the beneficiary of the court order may often 
be most familiar with the allegedly contumacious conduct.”). 
419 Person, 854 F.2d at 664. 
420 See Ormerod v. Dearman, 100 Pa. 561, 564 (1882) (rejecting such an arrangement); 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(d)(2) (2006) (prohibiting lawyers from enter-
ing into such fee arrangements); Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies:  
Hamlet Without the Prince of Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. REV. 29, 39–41 (1989) (discussing the 
policy of proscribing contingent fees in criminal cases). 
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ambitions.  Nevertheless, the conflict issue is one that bears further 
consideration. 
2. The Utility of Private Justice Models 
If the ends of the criminal law are to punish the guilty and thereby 
to ensure enforcement of the law by achieving a greater measure of 
deterrence, it bears considering whether the leveraging of private re-
sources will help attain these goals.  While there is an insufficient 
number of private prosecutions from which to draw any sort of verifi-
able conclusion, private justice has long been used to enforce rights.  
Private rights of action and qui tam suits have traditionally existed as a 
means of harnessing private resources to obtain significant public 
policy objectives.421 
Professor Pamela H. Bucy has produced one of the more thought-
ful examinations of the utlity of private rights of action.  Focusing on 
different forms of private justice—“victim” actions designed to make 
the victim whole, “common good” actions that permit anyone to 
bring suit to address public harms, and “hybrid” actions that contain 
elements of the other two422—Professor Bucy concludes that using 
private means to enforce public law has generally not performed well 
in the past.423  Although Professor Bucy acknowledged that “[p]rivate 
justice is inevitable,”424 she concludes that only the “common good” 
type qui tam action found in the False Claims Act425 is effective.  And 
she reasons that is so because, first, it enables a venue to recognize 
the value of inside information (namely, knowledge that someone 
has filed a fraudulent claim) and second, because it contains a “dual-
plaintiff mechanism” that permits both “government monitoring and 
control of private actions” and promotes “cooperation between pub-
lic and private regulators” to ensure that the privately managed litiga-
tion serves the public interest.426 
Professor Bucy measures “success” in somewhat different terms 
from what a successful criminal prosecution might bring.427  In par-
 
421 See Aaron R. Petty, How Qui Tam Actions Could Fight Public Corruption, 39 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 851, 863–64 (2006) (discussing the orgins of qui tam actions). 
422 Bucy, supra note 289, at 13. 
423 Id. at 62–68.  Several other examples highlight this criticism.  Bucy identifies the high 
dismissal rate of private prosecutions of RICO cases as an indication of lack of merit.  Id. 
at 22.  Bucy also identifies the burdens on defendants and courts from private securities 
litigation prior to congressional reform.  Id. at 26–29. 
424 Id. at 79. 
425 See supra note 298 and accompanying text. 
426 Bucy, supra note 289, at 80. 
427 Id. at 54. 
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ticular, she faults “victim” efforts that focus only on single instances of 
wrongdoing to recompense one specific victim and therefore have lit-
tle overall impact on the “overall regulation of complex economic 
wrongdoing.”428 Professor Bucy also criticizes “hybrid” efforts for fail-
ing to attract talented litigators.429 However, neither of these criticisms 
need to pertain to private prosecutions.  For example, if the concern 
is that existing citizen suits fail to attract sufficient legal talent to in-
vestigate or pursue the often complicated issues that arise in antitrust, 
environmental, or other regulatory suits, it must be understood that 
criminal prosecutions tend to involve both more motivated victims 
and considerably less complex factual predicates.  Few criminal 
prosecutions involve large corporate entities (the traditional targets 
of RICO, antitrust, and environmental litigation), nor are they in-
tended to contribute to a broader regulatory scheme.  Instead, even 
fairly minor criminal prosecutions (for violent crimes or drugs) are 
understood both to deter the individual malefactor (via selective in-
capacitation) as well as to contribute to a larger scheme of deter-
rence. 
That said, this is not to suggest that the government wholly abdi-
cate its traditional role in supervising criminal prosecutions.  Cer-
tainly, the presiding prosecutorial authority in a given jurisdiction 
could be required to sign off on the final decision to bring a case to a 
grand jury or even, in the event an indictment is handed down, to 
press on to a criminal trial.  Professor Bucy argues that governmental 
supervision is a necessary component of any scheme of private jus-
tice,430 and this important suggestion could be included in any system 
of privately managed criminal prosecutions. 
C.  Answering the Criticisms:  Legal Protections for the Accused 
Although the concerns raised about private prosecutions are not 
insubstantial, it must not be forgotten that legal protections for the 
accused permeate the criminal justice system.  Much of the Bill of 
Rights works as a code of criminal procedure, designed to protect the 
defendant’s liberty and property interests.  Those rights help ensure a 
fair trial by guaranteeing certain minimal procedural protections to 
the accused.  Those protections help to guarantee fairness and a 
credible outcome regardless of who prosecutes the case. 
 
428 Id. at 55. 
429 Id. at 56. 
430 Id. at 78. 
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1.  Pretrial Rights 
The accused’s interests are greatest before a prosecution even 
commences.  Nothing, of course, currently prevents a victim from re-
taining a private investigator and gathering evidence in a case.  While 
a private investigator’s powers pale in comparison to those of the po-
lice, they can undertake interviews and collect evidence—with some 
important exceptions.  The Fourth Amendment restricts the ways in 
which police may collect evidence.431  For example, if the police un-
lawfully gather evidence by conducting a search without a warrant, 
that evidence is excludable at trial.432  Similarly, if the police obtain a 
confession in violation of the Fifth Amendment, there is a good 
chance that confession will not be admissible.433  The safeguards of 
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, however, only apply to state ac-
tors.434  Therefore, private investigators are not subject to the same 
sort of rigor in terms of their collection of evidence and gathering of 
statements as their public counterparts. 
Although private parties currently may retain private investigators 
to collect evidence, one way of ensuring compliance with constitu-
tional norms would be for private prosecution statutes to exclude 
evidence gathered (by private parties) in violation of standard police 
practices.  At a minimum, such a rule would provide defendants with 
the same sort of procedural protections they enjoy when the police 
lead an investigation.  Of course, if the police were working with pri-
vate counsel, the same strictures would naturally apply. 
In addition, restrictions on standing would limit the universe of 
potential complainants.  If private prosecutions are available only to 
the victims themselves, or to their immediate families, vigilante-type 
actions initiated by interest groups would not be possible.  As with civ-
il lawsuits, keeping the potential pool of plaintiffs small serves a use-
ful function to ensure that cases are brought only where there is a 
real harm and a motivated victim. 
 
431 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding that evidence obtained by unconsti-
tutional searches and seizures is inadmissible in court). 
432 Id. 
433 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (holding that a prosecution may not use 
statements stemming from custodial interrogation of defendants unless necessary proce-
dural safeguards are followed).  For some of the possible exceptions, see Susan R. Klein, 
Miranda’s Exceptions in a Post-Dickerson World, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 567 (2001). 
434 See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (expaining that the Fourth 
Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures applies only to gov-
ernment actors). 
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Once evidence is collected, whether by private investigators acting 
at the behest of a victim, or by public law enforcement officials, a use-
ful safeguard would be to require the public prosecutor to certify that 
the case is neither frivolous nor a violation of the public’s interest.  
Prosecutors traditionally wield considerable power in deciding 
whether to go forward with a case: 
[T]he prosecutor has become the most powerful office in the criminal 
justice system.  The prosecutor’s authority is evident in bail hearings, 
grants of immunity, and in trial strategy.  But in the areas of charging, 
bargaining, and sentencing, it has become clear that the prosecutor plays 
the pivotal role in the criminal justice process.  Despite criticism, plea 
bargaining continues unabated.  While few courts have rather unsuccess-
fully attempted to formulate a ‘common law of prosecutorial discretion,’ 
the authority of the prosecutor continues to grow.435 
Given the understandable concerns about the interest motivating the 
private prosecutor, it is not unreasonable to interpose the public 
prosecutor in the decision whether to take a private prosecution to 
the grand jury (or to proceed with a criminal information). 
The ABA has, in fact, adopted standards for prosecutors with re-
spect to their charging decisions, including: 
(a) A prosecutor should not institute, or cause to be instituted, or 
permit the continued pendency of criminal charges when the prosecutor 
knows that the charges are not supported by probable cause.  A prosecu-
tor should not institute, cause to be instituted, or permit the continued 
pendency of criminal charges in the absence of sufficient admissible evi-
dence to support a conviction. 
(b) The prosecutor is not obliged to present all charges which the 
evidence might support.  The prosecutor may in some circumstances and 
for good cause consistent with the public interest decline to prosecute, 
notwithstanding that sufficient evidence may exist which would support a 
conviction. . . . 
. . . . 
(d) In making the decision to prosecute, the prosecutor should give 
no weight to the personal or political advantages or disadvantages which 
might be involved or to a desire to enhance his or her record of convic-
tions. 
. . . . 
(f) The prosecutor should not bring or seek charges greater in num-
ber or degree than can reasonably be supported with evidence at trial or 
than are necessary to fairly reflect the gravity of the offense.436 
 
435 Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717, 741–
42 (1996) (footnotes omitted). 
436 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:  PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3–
3.9 (1993). 
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While these rules lack the force of law, a statute allowing for pri-
vately managed prosecutions could make these rules or other similar 
rules binding on private attorneys conducting such prosecutions. 
Additionally, legislatures could limit the crimes available for pri-
vate prosecution.  Much like the creation of private rights of action in 
civil suits, policymakers could select those crimes that, as a policy 
matter, make the most sense as private prosecutions.  One could ar-
gue that fairly trivial crimes, such as shoplifting or misdemeanor 
theft, might be more appropriate for private prosecution.  Shop own-
ers, for example, might be perfectly situated to pursue minor shop-
lifting offenses.  Alternatively, in circumstances of truly serious crime, 
it might be in the interests of the community to leverage private in-
terests as a means of securing more efficient law enforcement.  De-
termining precisely what crimes may be pursued by private prosecu-
tion should be entrusted to legislators, who work to secure the 
interests of those they represent and who can, more adroitly than the 
courts, adjust those determinations in light of the actual results of 
cases privately prosecuted. 
Finally, grand juries could be used to screen out trivial matters or 
cases that are more about personal vendetta than justice.  In the fed-
eral system, grand juries serve to decide whether a criminal case may 
go forward.  Although the grand jury requirement of the Fifth 
Amendment has never been incorporated against the states,437 many 
states already have grand juries and they can be used as an important 
barrier against the possibility of frivolous or malicious prosecution. 
2.  Trial Rights 
Once the decision has been made to go forward with a criminal 
case after grand jury indictment, important trial rights exist to secure 
the accused’s interests.  Regardless of the grand jury’s decision to in-
dict, public prosecutors could still enjoy the authority to decide 
whether the interest of justice demands trial—exactly as they do in 
cases which they themselves manage. 
Protections for the defendant, whether a case is managed privately 
or not, are numerous.  A judge presides over the trial itself438 and has 
 
437 See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 521 (1884). 
438 See Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 87 (1976) (stating that “the judge must exert 
substantial control over [judicial] proceedings”); Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 
469 (1933) (describing the discretionary power of a judge in a jury trial). 
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an obligation to ensure that the defendant’s rights are preserved.439  
Even in plea bargains, where the defendant elects to waive trial, a 
judge ordinarily must accept the terms of that agreement.440  In a sit-
uation involving a privately managed prosecution, the public prose-
cutor might also ensure that the plea reflects the interests of justice 
and the trial judge might subject such agreements to closer scrutiny 
before approving them. 
The same judges who preside in prosecutions managed by public 
officers would, of course, preside in trials managed by privately hired 
prosecutors.  Judges in such privately managed prosecutions might, 
as in pro se cases, be somewhat more inclined to police the proceed-
ings to ensure that private counsel acts in an appropriate manner.  
Indeed, an additional layer of protection could be adopted by requir-
ing judges to certify the appointment of a private prosecutor retained 
by the victim. 
As with public prosecution, all the rights and privileges accorded 
the criminal defendant would be present in a private prosecution.  
The private prosecutor would be required to prove each element of 
the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt.441  The defendant 
would enjoy the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-
incrimination,442 be able to present witnesses443 and subpoena those 
who refused to testify voluntarily,444 enjoy the right to counsel,445 and 
maintain all the other attendant trial-related rights.  Most impor-
tantly, the greatest guarantor of liberty, the right to a jury determina-
tion, would similarly be preserved.446  The only functional difference 
between the privately managed prosecution and the public prosecu-
tion would be the nature and authority of the individual presenting 
the case. 
 
439 See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 71 (1942) (stating that the judge must ensure 
that the defendant’s essential rights are protected). 
440 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(4). 
441 See supra note 358. 
442 See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S 479, 485–86 (1951) (describing Fifth Amendment 
prohibition on any person being a witness against himself). 
443 U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967) (explaining that 
the right to present witnesses is an element of due process of law). 
444 U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 56 (1987) (stating that 
criminal defendants have the right to government’s assistance in compelling the atten-
dance of favorable witnesses at trial). 
445 U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37–38, 40 (1972) (holding 
that no person may be denied his liberty who has been denied the assistance of counsel). 
446 U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149–50 (1968) (holding 
that the Constitution guarantees a right of jury trial in serious criminal cases). 
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While the Framers of the Bill of Rights included numerous proce-
dural protections for the accused, at no point did they guarantee the 
nature or quality of the prosecutor. Neither the Framers nor those 
who drafted the various state constitutions deemed it necessary to in-
clude public prosecutors as part of the “protections” guaranteed to 
criminal defendants.  In fact, given the Framers’ interests in balanc-
ing natural avarice and ambition through a carefully calibrated sys-
tem of checks and balances, it would be surprising if they would con-
sider a public prosecutor’s interest in “justice” to be an appropriate 
check against untoward behavior.  Procedural rules, bar discipline, 
impartial judges, and, ultimately, the buffer provided by a jury of 
one’s peers, would likely have been deemed a better means of guar-
anteeing the defendant’s rights in the context of an adversarial trial. 
3.  Ancillary Protections 
Aside from the traditional protections granted the defendant, sev-
eral other potential means of guaranteeing the defendant’s interests 
could also be considered.  First, since the early establishment of pub-
lic prosecutors, such government officials have often enjoyed the au-
thority to terminate a case,447 even after grand jury indictment,448 if the 
public interest demanded it.  Public prosecutors could thus enjoy the 
authority not only to certify a prosecution and approve the appoint-
ment of particular counsel, but also to terminate a case at any stage of 
the proceeding.  The power to terminate a prosecution on public in-
terest grounds could be a significant means of preventing the possi-
bility of an inappropriate prosecution or one that violates the public 
interest. 
Two additional protections could also be considered:  suits for ma-
licious prosecution449 and the assessment of defense costs on the 
complainant if any inappropriate conduct is found with respect to the 
private counsel.  The threat of a suit for a malicious prosecution 
could serve as a significant deterrent to someone filing a suit to har-
ass the accused or that is otherwise inappropriate.  While public 
prosecutors are protected by sovereign immunity, if immunity protec-
 
447 See United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 513 (5th Cir. 1975) (stating that the termination 
of a prosecution should not be determined by a judge). 
448 See United States v. Carrigan, 778 F.2d 1454, 1463 (10th Cir. 1985) (describing a prosecu-
tor’s authority to dismiss indictments). 
449 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (allowing civil suits against state actors for civil rights viola-
tions). 
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tion was waived when private counsel undertook a case, the possibility 
of a tort action could serve as a deterrent against misconduct.450 
Similarly, if a court decides that the prosecution was not con-
ducted in good faith, defense costs could be assessed against the 
complainant.  Such a deterrent would likewise not be available 
against a public prosecutor, but it would be useful in discouraging in-
appropriate private prosecutions. 
Finally, as with all criminal prosecutions, statutory rights of appeal 
ensure that an appellate court (either federal or state) will have the 
opportunity to review the trial record to consider any claims the de-
fendant might make as to the appropriateness of the privately man-
aged prosecution.  Appellate courts can thus act as a check upon any 
problems fomented by the use of a private prosecutor. 
IV.  PRIVATE PROSECUTORS AND THE PUBLIC GOOD RECONSIDERED 
Presently, most law enforcement strategies demand government 
participation in the form of investigating alleged criminal conduct, 
leading the prosecution, collecting the fines, or running the prison 
facilities.  At least part of the reason government came to dominate 
criminal prosecution stems from the notion that law enforcement 
represents a public good that is best financed by society and delivered 
by public actors.  The prosecution guilds of the past simply merged 
and transferred their authority to government while spreading the 
costs to society as a whole.  The state, however, need not monopolize 
the investigation and prosecution of crime.  The public may benefit 
from the government leveraging private resources in the form of in-
creased criminal prosecutions and conserved public expenditures.  
Several examples exist in which society may gain from permitting pri-
vately managed prosecutions as an addendum to public efforts.451 
A.  Contours of a Model Statute 
If one accepts that private resources ought to be harnessed to en-
force the law and that privately managed prosecutions may prove to 
be one vital piece of that effort, it is worth considering what a model 
statute authorizing private prosecutions might contain.  I suggest only 
the basic contours of such a stature here, as the numerous potential 
 
450 See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 272–73 (1993) (describing how a public prose-
cutor’s absolute immunity extends to actions preliminary to the initiation of a prosecu-
tion and actions apart from the courtroom). 
451 See generally Comment, supra note 327 (arguing private prosecution could remedy unwar-
ranted inaction by public prosecutors). 
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jurisdictions involved—the fifty states, the District of Columbia, and 
the federal government—will undoubtedly have idiosyncrasies of 
their own when it comes to how their criminal justice systems func-
tion. 
First, private prosecutions should only be limited to certain classes 
of crimes.  While, for reasons discussed below, it may be useful to 
permit private prosecutions for both felonies and misdemeanors, cer-
tain crimes do not readily lend themselves to private prosecutions.  
The most obvious example of crimes that ought to remain within the 
exclusive purview of public prosecutors is strict liability offenses.452  
Strict liability offenses are unique within the criminal law as they re-
quire no proof of intent; such crimes generally reflect society’s deci-
sion that certain acts merit criminal punishment regardless of wheth-
er the perpetrator intended to commit them.  Because society decides 
to exempt certain offenses from mens rea requirements, it makes sense 
to allow only public prosecutors to bring those cases.  The mens rea 
requirement in traditional offenses453 provides the defendant with an 
additional protection against ill-advised prosecution and, hence, it is 
more suitable for private prosecution.  Similarly, public order of-
fenses, such as rioting or disorderly conduct where there is no dis-
cernable victim, and crimes against the state, such as treason, espio-
nage, or counterfeiting, should be left to public prosecutors. 
In most other respects, a private prosecution would mirror a stan-
dard public prosecution.  The process for initiating a case would be 
kicked off like any standard criminal prosecution.  A complaint would 
be sworn out, evidence collected and analyzed, and the private prose-
cutor would determine which, if any, crime was committed.  The pri-
vately retained counsel would then bring the case to the appropriate 
public prosecutor to determine whether the action ought to be main-
tained.  The public prosecutor could choose to pursue the prosecu-
tion in house, quash the prosecution altogether, send the private 
prosecutor back to assemble more evidence, or authorize the private 
prosecutor to go forward. 
Second, some level of oversight of private prosecutions by their 
public counterparts will counter concerns that a privately managed 
prosecution may be little more than a thinly veiled vendetta.  Thus, 
an appropriate statute might require the public prosecutor to sign off 
 
452 See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150–51 (1959) (recognizing the use of strict liability 
offenses); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251–52 (1922) (explaining that scienter is 
not always necessary to prove a crime). 
453 See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951) (noting that most federal criminal 
laws require a mens rea element). 
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before a case is brought before a grand jury or before a criminal in-
formation is submitted.  Typically, any case brought by a private pros-
ecutor ought to face scrutiny by a grand jury, and formal indictment 
ought to be the means by which a private criminal prosecution is 
commenced.  Interposing both the public prosecutor and the grand 
jury between the filing of a case and trial should help prevent the fil-
ing of frivolous or revenge-driven prosecutions.  In fact, if the juris-
diction does not permit indictment by grand jury, but only provides 
that a criminal information be filed, all cases filed by a private prose-
cutor ought to be approved by a public prosecutor. 
While the private prosecutor need not be officially “deputized” by 
the U.S. attorney or the district attorney, all relevant constraints on 
prosecutors generally, peculiar to the jurisdiction in which the prose-
cution is taking place, should likewise be made explicitly applicable 
to private prosecutors.  Private prosecutors, in fact, could be obli-
gated to swear out a certificate in open court that they will abide by 
the rules applicable to public prosecutors and that the prosecution 
itself is being pursued in the interests of justice.  Although public 
prosecutors are generally shielded from suits for frivolous or vindic-
tive prosecution—largely as a result of the immunity they enjoy as 
state employees454—such immunity should be waived for private pros-
ecutors.  Thus, a private prosecutor could face personal liability if, for 
example, he failed to disclose Brady455 material, knowingly brought a 
prosecution to harass the defendant, or did not file the suit in the in-
terests of justice or to address the victim’s legitimate interests. 
Moreover, to discourage frivolous or otherwise meritless prosecu-
tions, a “loser pays” provision might be included so that in the event 
the prosecutor failed to obtain a conviction and the judge found ex 
ante that the case was not brought in good faith,456 the defendant 
would be entitled to a reimbursement for attorney’s fees and court 
costs.  Although such a provision merits consideration, it must be ap-
proached with trepidation for two reasons in particular.  Because 
many defendants might have pro bono or state-provided counsel, 
some reimbursements would go to the state, which may be inappro-
priate in the context of a criminal prosecution.  Likewise, this incen-
 
454 See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427–28 (1976) (holding that a state prosecutor en-
joys absolute immunity from suit). 
455 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding suppression of evidence by the 
prosecutor violates due process “where the evidence is material either to guilt or to pun-
ishment”). 
456 See David A. Root, Attorney Fee-Shifting in America:  Comparing, Contrasting, and Combining the 
“American Rule” and “English Rule”, 15 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 583, 589–90 (2005) (dis-
cussing the history of the “Loser Pays” rule in England). 
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tive to “win” the case might conflict with the interests of justice, which 
may become apparent only as the case unfolds.  It may prove prob-
lematic to hinge the payment of defense attorneys’ fees and court 
costs on whether a prosecution is successful.  Nevertheless, such an 
arrangement is worth considering. 
Third, at the time of trial, the judge should be informed of, and 
ultimately approve of, the appointment of private counsel to manage 
the prosecution.  A judge’s involvement in a privately managed pros-
ecution may be useful in ensuring that such a prosecution is not 
maintained for improper motives.  As the New York Court of Appeals 
once explained: 
A prudent magistrate should proceed with the utmost caution when he 
has reason to suspect that a criminal proceeding was commenced before 
him, not to vindicate public justice, but to serve some private purpose, 
and should withhold process until satisfied that the complainant is acting 
in good faith in behalf [sic] of the people, and not to aid personal ob-
jects.457 
This is perhaps overstated in that, with a privately initiated prosecu-
tion, one would expect a personal interest motivating the prosecu-
tion, but that ought not be the sole motivation for pursuing the 
cause.  Nor is it clear why a personal motivation, as long as it is one 
supported by evidence sufficient to support a grand jury indictment, 
is necessarily a bad thing; requiring the trial judge to formally ap-
prove the appointment of private counsel at the time of trial may be a 
prudent measure given the relative uniqueness of the proceeding.  It 
might be expected that, with the certification of the public prosecu-
tor at the start of the process, judges would routinely consent to the 
appointment of private counsel, but still, requiring judicial approval 
at such a crucial stage in the proceeding establishes an additional lev-
el of protection to the defendant.  In addition, all plea agreements 
between a private prosecutor and the defendant should be approved 
by the public prosecutor’s office in addition to the judge.  Judges, of 
course, supervise plea bargains458 and must ultimately approve 
them.459  Seldom will a judge refuse a plea bargain negotiated by 
counsel,460 but a judge apprised that the agreement was negotiated by 
a private prosecutor might scrutinize such deals more carefully. 
 
457 People ex rel Livingston v. Wyatt, 79 N.E. 330, 333 (N.Y. 1906). 
458 See Joseph A. Colquitt, Ad Hoc Plea Bargaining, 75 TUL. L. REV. 695, 747 (2001). 
459 See id.; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3)(A). 
460 See Máximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations:  The Globalization of Plea 
Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 36 
(2004) (explaining that a judge will usually accept an agreement reached by the parties). 
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Fourth, private prosecutors should not be permitted to collect fees 
contingent on a “successful” prosecution.  The Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct have long banned the collection of contingency 
fees in criminal cases.461  Although this ban has been attacked by some 
commentators,462 it remains in place in virtually every jurisdiction in 
the United States.  “[C]ontingent fees,” it has been explained, “create 
complementary dangers of overzealous and compromised represen-
tation.”463  Effectively, this overzealous representation theory “begins 
from the premise that contingent fees make an attorney and her cli-
ent, in essence, joint venturers for the purpose of the litigation.”464  
And, “[b]ecause the lawyer’s fee, as well as her psychic satisfaction 
and future reputation, will depend on the outcome of the proceed-
ing, she will have, it is thought, a greater incentive to win, and thus a 
greater incentive to engage in corrupt practices that enhance her 
prospects of winning.”465  While this arrangement was analyzed in the 
context of contingent fees for defense lawyers, the same basic reason-
ing applies to private prosecutors as well.  Although Professor Pamela 
Karlan questions whether this is a legitimate assumption to make, and 
notes that “no hard empirical support [exists] for the proposition 
that criminal defense lawyers are less capable of resisting these incen-
tives than . . . their civil counterparts,”466 one can perhaps make a 
greater claim that a prosecutor, who has certain obligations beyond 
those to the client/victim, ought not be in the position of accepting 
fees contingent upon a successful prosecution of the defendant.  To 
remove all possibility of concern, the ban on contingency fees in 
criminal cases ought to be maintained. 
Similarly, prosecutors ought not be allowed to share in the pro-
ceeds from the collection of a criminal fine.  A private prosecutor 
should not be incentivized to seek the highest possible fine in order 
to enrich himself.  The simple solution to discourage such behavior is 
simply to prevent either the lawyer or the client from sharing the 
proceeds of any available fine.  This differs, however, from the collec-
tion of restitution.  The amount of restitution must be proven by the 
victim; hence, it may not be inappropriate for a private prosecutor to 
 
461 See supra note 420 and accompanying text. 
462 See Pamela S. Karlan, Contingent Fees and Criminal Cases, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 595, 595 (1993) 
(suggesting that a continuing ban on contingent fees in criminal cases should be re-
laxed). 
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enter into an arrangement in which he will share in the proceeds of 
any court-ordered restitution. 
Fifth, the supervising public prosecutor should be able to termi-
nate the prosecution “in the interests of justice” at any point either 
prior to trial or on appeal.  Endowing the public prosecutor with 
such authority is plainly in accord with historical arrangements be-
tween public and private prosecutors, and furthers the government’s 
interest in controlling criminal litigation.  The defendant should al-
ways have the option of appealing to the public prosecutor to quash 
the proceeding.  This ability to terminate a prosecution will ensure 
that frivolous or vengeful prosecutions are kept to a minimum. 
B.  Paradigmatic Examples Illustrating the Utility of Private Prosecutors 
Private prosecutions, if they are to be resurrected and placed back 
into the criminal justice system’s mainstream, must confer a benefit 
on that system and should enjoy a comparative advantage over public 
prosecutions in certain cases.  Several concrete examples exist in 
which, for a variety of reasons, a private prosecution may be pre-
ferred, or act as a compliment to a public prosecution. 
If the overall number of prosecutions increases by permitting pri-
vately initiated cases, deterrence efforts ought to be more successful.  
An increased number of prosecutions should have an effect upon 
specific deterrence,467 in that a greater number of criminals will pre-
sumably face consequences for their actions.  In the event the num-
ber of prosecutions increases, general deterrence efforts should also 
benefit,468 as potential offenders see more individuals being prose-
cuted.  Similarly, if the private bar is incentivized to engage in a cer-
tain amount of private sleuthing, the detection of crime will improve, 
thereby providing greater bite to deterrence strategies. 
Second, by leveraging private resources, state prosecutorial re-
sources may be conserved and better directed at state or national pri-
orities which may benefit indigent victims.  While it has been argued 
that private prosecutions inevitably allow the rich “better justice” than 
the poor, there are alternate ways of looking at the issue.  If the rich 
command greater attention in the criminal justice system by virtue of 
their wealth, one might argue they are already over-represented when 
it comes to the investigation and prosecution of crime.  The govern-
 
467 See Johannes Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 949, 
950 (1966) (describing the effects of punishment on deterrence). 
468 See id. at 960 (“Very few people would violate the law if there were a policeman on every 
doorstep.”). 
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ment operates with scarce resources; therefore, for every prosecution 
it undertakes on behalf of a corporate victim—which may be benefi-
cial because of the number of victims or the perceived benefit of a 
greater deterrence—it must forgo (holding resources otherwise con-
stant) some other potential prosecution.  If, however, a well-heeled 
victim can bring his own prosecution relying on his own resources, 
then (provided the government’s commitment to criminal prosecu-
tion remains the same) the government’s resources are freed up and 
may, arguably, be used on a prosecution that might benefit a victim 
with access to fewer resources. 
Aside from the overarching interests of improving deterrence ef-
forts by increasing the overall number of prosecutions and conserv-
ing scarce government resources, private prosecutions may enjoy cer-
tain comparative advantages over those initiated by the government.  
In certain situations, for example, the putative victim may have know-
ledge or skill lacked by the government to pursue a case.  In such cir-
cumstances, a private prosecutor may be in a better position to press 
a case.  Moreover, some fairly common sorts of crimes may be diffi-
cult to prosecute either because they are so large they may consume a 
disproportionate share of prosecutorial resources, and involve multi-
ple victims, or are so small that they are simply ignored by prosecu-
tors. 
Finally, conflicts within a prosecutor’s office or circumstances in 
which the police may be the offenders may demand that prosecution 
comes from outside the public offices—much like the former federal 
independent counsel statute, which prized independence from the 
government in pursuing the prosecution of a public official.  I will 
thus offer several paradigmatic examples in which private prosecu-
tions may offer a comparative advantage. 
1.  Specialized Knowledge 
a.  Computer Crime 
With the transition of so much personal,469 financial,470 and corpo-
rate471 data to the Internet, not to mention the ability to communicate 
 
469 See Reid Kanaley, The E-Files, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 8, 1999, at F1 (discussing the extent to 
which individuals reveal personal information on the internet). 
470 See Letitia Stein, Health Records Go from Cabinet to Computer, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 22, 
2009, at A1 (describing how people have become comfortable managing their financial 
information online). 
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anonymously with people all over the world,472 the Internet has be-
come a favorite target for fraudsters, hackers, and garden variety 
thieves.473  Successful cybercrime, however, often requires fairly so-
phisticated perpetrators who engage in careful planning.474  With the 
world wide web being a vast collection of computers and servers scat-
tered over the globe, cybercrime, in all its various guises, can be diffi-
cult to detect.475  Even where the crimes themselves may be discov-
ered, it is often difficult to identify the perpetrator.476  Such hurdles 
make cybercrime challenging to prosecute.  While governments 
around the world have increased dramatically their efforts to battle 
cybercrime, this is an endeavor in which government lacks any sort of 
comparative advantage over private industry. 
Private industry, with its access to well-paid programming talent, 
enjoys an advantage over the government in terms of preventing, in-
vestigating, and detecting cybercrime.477  This is not, however, to de-
nigrate government efforts:  “[I]t is simply not possible for investiga-
tors and prosecutors to become instant experts in every type of 
system, in light of the wide array of computers and operating systems 
on the market. . . . We will often need the victim to assist us in our ef-
forts.”478  The government does not, and cannot, maintain a monop-
oly over the specialized knowledge to detect and prosecute cyber-
 
471 See Erin Ailworth, Firms Sending Investors to the Web:  While Corporations Save Cash by Putting 
Shareholder Data Online, Printers Lose Business, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 4, 2009, at B5 (describ-
ing how much corporate data is posted online). 
472 See Al Teich et al., Anonymous Communication Policies for the Internet:  Results and Recommen-
dations of the AAAS Conference (The Info. Soc’y, Working Copy Version 14, 1999) (noting 
that anonymous communication is a valuable feature of the internet). 
473 See Federal Trade Commission, Facts for Consumers:  Dot Cons (Oct. 2000), 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/tech/tec09.shtm (last visited Feb. 16, 
2010) (describing ways in which con artists use the internet to defraud consumers). 
474 See Phillip Hallam-Baker, Prevention Strategies for the Next Wave of Cyber Crime, NETWORK 
SECURITY, Oct. 2005, at 12, available at http://complianceandprivacy.com/WhitePapers 
/VeriSign-NESE-20051005.pdf (analyzing various types of cyber crime). 
475 See Securities Fraud on the Internet:  Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, 
Comm. on Gov’t Affairs, 106th Cong. 25–31 (1999) (statement of Richard J. Hillman, Asso-
ciate Director of Financial Institutions and Markets Issues, General Government Division) 
(noting some of the challenges of regulating cybercrime). 
476 See id. at 27 (“Another ongoing challenge is coordinating oversight 
amongst . . . regulators[.] . . . Internet frauds can be initiated from virtually anywhere in 
the world.”). 
477 See Michael Edmund O’Neill, Old Crimes in New Bottles:  Sanctioning Cybercrime, 9 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 237, 279 (2000) (describing private victims’ ability to detect and punish 
cybercriminals). 
478 Id. at 276–77 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Scott Charney & Kent Alexan-
der, Computer Crime, 45 EMORY L.J. 931, 946 (1996)). 
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criminals.479  If the talent to pursue cybercriminals lies in the hands of 
private industry, so does the incentive to ferret it out: 
The infrastructures at issue are largely privately owned.  Those pri-
vate owners have a substantial economic stake in protecting their invest-
ments . . . . Those who own and operate these systems are in the best po-
sition to understand and prioritize this range of threats and what is 
necessary to mitigate them.480 
Indeed, government officials have themselves recognized the need 
for private actors to become involved: 
[G]overnments, even if we all work together, will not be able to meet 
these challenges alone.  We need the private sector to be involved.  In 
fact, the private sector must take the lead in certain areas, especially in 
protecting private computer networks, through more vigilant security ef-
forts, information sharing, and, where appropriate, through cooperation 
with government agencies.481 
While the government may need to target more immediate needs, 
and distribute its resources accordingly, the private sector may be 
able to commit its resources, particularly adept at detecting and in-
vestigating, to prosecute certain cybercriminals. 
In fact, cooperation among private sector industries may work to 
provide significant deterrence for potential cybercriminals.  Compa-
nies may have the same incentives that the guilds of old had to band 
together and fund the investigation and prosecution of cybercrimi-
nals.  Where prosecution is all but assured once a cybercrime is de-
tected, the private sector players may be incentivized to cooperate to 
deter such crimes.482  Ultimately, such private efforts may dramatically 
increase the security of the internet. 
 
479 See Internet Security:  Hearing Before the Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 106th 
Cong. 26 (2000) (statement of Michael A. Vatis, Deputy Assistant Director, FBI, National 
Infrastrucure Protection Programs) (describing the use of cyber intrusion to implement a 
criminal conspiracy by Vladimir L. Levin); see also James K. Robinson, Assistant Attorney 
Gen. for the Criminal Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at the International Computer 
Crime Conference:  Internet as the Scene of Crime (May 29–31, 2000), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/roboslo.htm (arguing that government 
cannot meet the challenges of cybercrime without support from the private sector). 
480 Michael J. O’Neil & James X. Dempsey, Critical Infrastructure Protection:  Threats to Privacy 
and Other Civil Liberties and Concerns with Government Mandates on Industry, 12 DEPAUL BUS. 
L.J. 97, 103 (1999/2000) (footnote omitted). 
481 Robinson, supra note 479. 
482 For a demonstration that people often resolve their disputes cooperatively without the 
use of law, see ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW:  HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE 
DISPUTES (1991).  See also Bruce L. Benson, Emerging from the Hobbesian Jungle:  Might Takes 
and Makes Rights, 5 CONST. POL. ECON. 129, 129 (1994) (suggesting that violence over 
scarce resources may be avoided if property rights develop along with voluntary participa-
tion in a governance scheme). 
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b.  White Collar Financial Fraud 
A second example where privately managed prosecutions might 
prove beneficial is in the context of pursuing white collar fraud 
crimes.  As of this writing, the United States is in the middle of its 
most significant economic recession in at least a quarter-century.  
Fraud cases abound.  In certain situations, victims may be better posi-
tioned to mount an investigation and then marshal the resources to 
privately prosecute a cause.  Shareholder suits have been useful tools 
to address shareholder losses.483  Suits such as those brought by Tyco 
International shareholders against PricewaterhouseCoopers for its 
role in an accounting fraud scheme that ended with several of Tyco’s 
principal executives going to prison have been successful.484 
Under such circumstances, the opportunity for disgruntled share-
holders to bring a privately managed criminal case against the frau-
dulent players may be a reasonable way of ensuring justice.  The vic-
tims, for example, may be able to provide forensic accounting 
methods far superior to those available to the government.  More-
over, they may be better situated to invest the resources necessary to 
pursue a complex fraud case of this sort not only by expending re-
sources, but also by being in a better position to organize potential 
witnesses. 
A complex fraud investigation of this sort can demand an enor-
mous commitment of resources, not just in terms of attorney time, 
but also in the services of economists, forensic accountants, and fi-
nancial analysts.485  The government might find its resources 
stretched to the breaking point if it were forced to investigate multi-
ple fraud cases of this magnitude and might be forced to forgo cer-
tain investigations or prosecutions altogether.  By leveraging private 
resources, it becomes easier to pursue multiple fraud investigations, 
and if corporations with substantial resources pursue fraud, govern-
ment resources may be freed to assist fraud victims who lack the abil-
ity to prosecute themselves. 
 
483 See Reinier Kraakman et al., When Are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder Interests?, 82 GEO. L.J. 
1733, 1733 (1994) (explaining that shareholder suits are the primary mechanism for en-
forcing the fiduciary duties of corporate managers). 
484 See Chad Bray, Court Upholds Convictions of Former Tyco Executives, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2008, 
at B3 (reporting that the New York Court of Appeals upheld the convictions of former 
Tyco officials); Sarah Johnson, PwC Settles Tyco Case for $225M, CFO, July 6, 2007, 
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/ 9461453?f=related (describing $225 million dollar class 
action settlement). 
485 See Aviva Abramovsky, An Unholy Alliance:  Perceptions of Influence in Insurance Fraud Prosecu-
tions and the Need for Real Safeguards, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 363, 366 (2008) (not-
ing the many resources necessary to stage a financial fraud prosecution). 
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c.  Trademark and Copyright Enforcement 
Another useful avenue for private prosecutions might be in the 
context of criminal trademark and copyright violations.  With the ad-
vent of the Internet, and the ease with which media may be copied 
and distributed, copyright law has become increasingly important.486  
Illegal music downloading has been rampant,487 and in the last dec-
ade, the recording industry has sought to pursue illegal download-
ers.488  While the publishing and recording industries have sought, 
with limited success, to enjoin violators,489 criminal prosecutions have 
also been used in an effort to deter unlawful conduct.490  In 2008, for 
example, Kevin Cogill pleaded guilty to one count of misdemeanor 
criminal copyright infringement for illegally uploading nine pre-
release Guns N’ Roses tracks for the long-awaited album, “Chinese 
Democracy.”491  Geffen Records, a division of the largest record label 
group, Universal Music Group (UMG),492 pressed the case.493 
While no one would begrudge Geffen’s right to distribute its 
property as it (and Axl Rose) sees fit, one might question the alloca-
tion of government resources to prosecute an individual (not an or-
ganization) who distributed nine pre-release Guns N’ Roses tracks.  
Geffen would doubtless be in a better position than the government 
 
486 See Peter S. Menell, Envisioning Copyright Law’s Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 63, 63–
65 (2002/2003) (describing copyright law as an evolving body of law capable of providing 
protection for creative works in the digital age). 
487 See Chad Silver, Censure the Tree for Its Rotten Apple:  Attributing Liability to Parents for the Cop-
yright Infringement of Their Minor Children, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 977, 977 
(2006) (“Illegally downloading music is a common practice among children and one 
more serious than it may initially appear.”). 
488 See Mikel R. Boeve, Will Internet Service Providers Be Forced to Turn in Their Copyright Infring-
ing Customers?  The Power of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s Subpoena Provision After In 
Re Charter Communications, 29 HAMLINE L. REV. 117, 118–20 (2006) (describing Re-
cording Industry Association of America efforts to curb copyright infringement, includ-
ing software tracking and copyright infringement suit filing). 
489 See Niels Schaumann, Copyright Infringement and Peer-to-Peer Technology, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 1001, 1018 (2002) (noting negotiations with the record companies and music pub-
lishers “did nothing to prepare either one for the vastly increased ability of consumers to 
themselves copy and distribute sound recordings”). 
490 See Valerie R. Sherman, Note, Bootleggers Beware:  United States v. Martignon Upholds Con-
gressional Power to Enact “Copyright-Like” Legislation Through the Commerce Clause, 58 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 185, 188 (2008) (noting that 18 U.S.C. § 2319A “imposes criminal penalties on a 
person who infringes an author’s copyright by recording and distributing the author’s 
live musical performances”). 
491 Dave Itzkoff, Copyright Guilty Plea, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2008, at C2. 
492 Kate Holton, Warner Overtakes EMI in Recorded Market Share-Data, REUTERS, July 18, 2007, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/ technology-media-telco-SP/idUSL1781138320070718. 
493 Michelle Quinn & Swati Pandey, Blogger Arrested in Music Leak, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2008, 
at C1. 
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to track and identify those who would infringe upon its property 
rights.  And, in the event blood could not be squeezed from a turnip 
in the context of a civil suit, why not permit the company to prose-
cute the case itself? 
A similar situation arises in the context of movies and books.  Why 
not permit Marvel Comics the opportunity to track and prosecute 
those persons who would illegally distribute pirated copies of the 
Spider-Man or Ironman movies or their companion comic books?  In 
all likelihood, many of those violating criminal copyright and trade-
mark laws would not be organized criminal conspiracies, but would 
instead be individuals.  Given the amount of illegal downloading and 
distribution of copyrighted materials on the web, it would be more 
efficient to let the companies with an interest in protecting their co-
pyrighted materials monitor, track, and ultimately prosecute those 
who would violate their rights.  The sheer volume of such infringe-
ments makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the government to pur-
sue such violations. 
Nor is it at all clear that the government should, or would, priori-
tize such cases.  To an interested industry, however, considerable mo-
tivation would exist for them to pursue violators.  Presumably, if a 
larger number of violators were prosecuted without using scarce gov-
ernment resources, greater deterrence would be obtained and the 
overall number of such violations might decrease.  As it stands, many 
offenders discount the likelihood they will ever be apprehended, 
much less prosecuted. 
2.  Collective Action Issues 
a.  Environmental Crimes 
Environmental crimes typically involve the unauthorized disposal 
of hazardous material or discharge of pollutants.494  Such crimes have 
increasingly come to the fore as society has gained a greater under-
standing of the seriousness of such offenses.495  Even a fairly small in-
fraction, such as dumping used batteries in a landfill or draining 
chemical fertilizers into creeks and ponds may have dangerous long-
term effects.  Often, it is not a single action, in and of itself, that 
 
494 Martin Harrell et al., Federal Environmental Crime:  A Different Kind of “White Collar” Prosecu-
tion, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Winter 2009, at 3, 3. 
495 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?:  Reflections on the Disappearing 
Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 217 (1991) (“Obviously, envi-
ronmental crime is important, and knowing violations . . . do not merit leniency.”). 
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causes significant harm, but instead the culmination of a series of 
such acts.496  Unfortunately, the resources committed to fight envi-
ronmental crimes tend to trail those committed to investigate and 
prosecute traditional common law crimes that are commonly viewed 
as more serious and immediately threatening to society.  To the ex-
tent such prosecutions are brought, they tend to be brought against 
large players and for grave infractions.  Fairly minor offenses, despite 
their potential harm, tend to go unremarked, and the sentences for 
environmental crimes seldom reflect their harm to society.  Concern 
about harsh sentences, particularly in innocuous cases where the 
criminal intent is unclear, has led to complaints about raising penal-
ties for such offenses. 
Environmental lobbying groups, however, enjoy considerable 
popular support497 and are often well-funded.498  If such groups were 
empowered to investigate and prosecute environmental crimes on 
behalf of specified victims, it might be possible to increase levels of 
awareness about such crimes and, correspondingly, increase deter-
rence such that penalties themselves need not be adjusted.  An in-
crease in the likelihood of prosecution, in and of itself, may help dis-
courage such activities and, as a result, the penalties themselves may 
not need adjusting. 
b.   Community Initiatives 
Other more minor crimes, which nevertheless can have a signifi-
cant cumulative effect, may also be good candidates for private pros-
ecutions.  Shoplifting, one of the most common crimes in the United 
States, is not often prosecuted.  District attorneys’ offices seldom want 
to commit substantial resources to combat what is a fairly minor of-
fense.  However, such offenses are costly to the retail industry.  Not 
unlike the problem with environmental crimes, shoplifting has an 
enormous cumulative effect upon the economy.  While the penalties 
for shoplifting could be increased substantially, few would consider 
that fair.  Instead, a sound deterrence strategy would be to increase 
the likelihood of detection and prosecution.  If detection is in-
 
496 Jason M. Lemkin, Deterring Environmental Crime Through Flexible Sentencing:  A Proposal for 
the New Organizational Environmental Sentencing Guidelines, 84 CAL. L. REV. 307, 330 (1996). 
497 See William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation:  Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling Dis-
tinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1567 (2007) (describing popular support for a clean envi-
ronment). 
498 See Robert V. Percival, Environmental Legislation and the Problem of Collective Action, 9 DUKE 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 9, 27 (1998) (“Former student protesters may now be active primar-
ily through their checkbooks . . . .”). 
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creased, without the threat of a subsequent prosecution, however, de-
terrence efforts would founder.  Nevertheless, it remains unlikely that 
public officials will ever commit significant resources to prosecute 
such offenses.  If a large retailer such as Walmart, however, when pla-
gued with losses stemming from shoplifting, could prosecute these 
infractions, they might be able to attain a greater level of deterrence, 
or again like the guilds of bygone eras, the retailers in a shopping 
mall may unite to prosecute shoplifters.  Presumably, at least some of-
fenders, faced with an increased likelihood of both detection and 
prosecution, may be deterred. 
This “broken windows”499 approach to minor offenses extends also 
to interested communities.  Numerous communities across the coun-
try are plagued with “open air” crimes such as drug trafficking or 
prostitution.  While vice squads will occasionally conduct neighbor-
hood sweeps, many such crimes, even if readily detected, go unprose-
cuted.  And for good reason—available public resources tend to be 
devoted, as they should, to more serious offenses.  If a community 
decides that to improve its quality of life it needs to work with the po-
lice to bring private prosecutions for relatively minor offenses such as 
public drunkenness, prostitution, or overt drug dealing, then permit-
ting it to do so may well go far in cleaning up troubled neighbor-
hoods.  While it is true that many such neighbors will lack sufficient 
resources to hire a private prosecutor, some will be able to gather the 
necessary resources and others may have the opportunity for pro bo-
no legal assistance from the private bar.  Regardless, if some prosecu-
tions occur, they may prove to have a significant deterrent effect in 
neighborhoods blighted by criminal activity.  Often, it may not be 
enough simply for the police to disrupt such activities; instead a pros-
ecution must follow.  If private resources can be marshaled to im-
prove the community’s health, should they be prohibited? 
3.  Alleviating Potential Conflicts Within the Public Prosecutor’s Office 
One additional circumstance in which privately managed prosecu-
tions might play a role is when the public prosecutor’s office may 
have a conflict of interest.  Ordinarily, in situations such as when a 
member of the prosecutor’s office is under criminal investigation, the 
 
499 James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Making Neighborhoods Safe, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, 
Feb. 1989, at 46, 46–52, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
crime/safehood.htm (“[T]he problem of ‘broken windows’:  If the first broken window in 
a building is not repaired, then people who like breaking windows will assume that no 
one cares about the building and more windows will be broken.”). 
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prosecution will be maintained by a different office (either a neigh-
boring jurisdiction or a separate sovereign)500 or will be brought by 
specially appointed independent counsel.501  With respect to federal 
law, Congress enacted the Ethics in Government Act of 1978,502 which 
created the independent prosecutor as an acknowledgement of the 
inherent conflict that exists whenever a member of the Executive 
Branch comes under criminal investigation.503 
While most offices presumably have protocols in place for dealing 
with official misconduct and while criminal violations by government 
actors hopefully are aberrations, it has been argued that in certain 
circumstances government agencies are slow to prosecute wrongdo-
ing by government actors.  Human Rights Watch, for example, has 
accused local governments and federal officials alike of failing to pur-
sue instances of police brutality.504 
The organization alleges that shoddy internal investigations failed 
to hold police officers accountable for abusive acts and that prosecu-
tors seldom pursued criminal investigations.505  Whether such abuses 
are as common as they have been alleged, an important point re-
mains:  government is probably not at its best when forced to investi-
gate itself.  The Constitution’s Framers understood the need for a sys-
tem of carefully calibrated checks and balances.  The various bar 
associations throughout the country similarly understand the impor-
tance of addressing potential conflicts of interest.  It is doubtless dif-
ficult to investigate and prosecute, one of your “own.”  In fact, the 
criminal prosecution of police officers remains infrequent.  “Local 
prosecutors might be reluctant to pursue cases against officers ac-
cused of criminal civil rights violations because they typically work 
closely with police to prosecute criminals.”506  The federal prosecution 
of officers under criminal civil rights statutes is equally rare.507  In Fis-
 
500 CODES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:  ETHICS STANDARDS IN BUSINESS, HEALTH, AND 
LAW 777–78 (Rena A. Gorlin ed., 4th ed. 1999). 
501 Id. at 778. 
502 See Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, § 594, 92 Stat. 1824, 1869 
(1978) (“[A] special prosecutor . . . shall have . . . full power and independent authority to 
exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions and powers of the Department of 
Justice . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
503 Donald C. Smaltz, The Independent Counsel:  A View from Inside, 86 GEO. L.J. 2307, 2310 
(1998) (describing the history of the Ethics in Government Act). 
504 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE:  POLICE BRUTALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
IN THE UNITED STATES 25 (1998). 
505 Id. at 85. 
506 Id. 
507 See id. at 93 (reporting that of the 10,129 civil rights cases reviewed in 1996, merely .2 per-
cent “resulted in official misconduct cases filed for prosecution”). 
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cal Year 2007 (the latest date for which information is available), for 
example, the Justice Department touted: 
From fiscal year 2001 to fiscal year 2007, the Department of Justice con-
victed over 50 percent more defendants with official misconduct, or color 
of law, violations than were convicted from fiscal year 1994 through fiscal 
year 2000 (391 vs. 256).508 
Three hundred ninty-one prosecutions in a six-year period in light of 
the thousands of state and federal law enforcement officials suggests 
that either the ranks of law enforcement are particularly pure, or 
such cases are simply not being pursued. 
While special counsels can be established to pursue such cases, 
there exists a role for privately managed prosecutions undertaken by, 
or on behalf of, victims.  Civil rights organizations, for example, 
might be eager to pursue such cases.  Although care must be taken in 
such situations, basic conflict of interest principles suggest that a 
prosecutor acting outside the government’s employ may be well-
positioned to pursue such cases. 
CONCLUSION 
The power to bring a criminal prosecution carries with it great re-
sponsibility.  So great is that responsibility and so awesome the power 
wielded by a prosecutor that it is cabined by numerous procedural 
protections such as grand jury presentment and judicial approval.  As 
a historical matter, victims once often initiated criminal prosecutions.  
For the victim, the criminal prosecution enabled him to vindicate his 
interests, receive restitution for his loss, and achieve a certain amount 
of personal justice.  Over time, with the expansion of government, 
the number of private prosecutions began to wane and government 
began to monopolize law enforcement.  Such prosecutions never 
wholly disappeared, however; indeed a number of states continue to 
allow privately managed criminal prosecutions.  At the same time pri-
vate criminal prosecutions have waned, the use of private attorneys 
general and the institution of private causes of action have become 
common means of augmenting states’ law enforcement efforts. 
Although many scholars have argued that criminal defendants 
have a constitutional right to an “impartial” (i.e., public) prosecutor, 
the Supreme Court has never so held.  Nor is it clear that defendants 
ought to possess such a right on due process or equal protection 
 
508 Dep’t of Justice, Fact Sheet:  Hate Crimes and Prosecution of Civil Rights Violations (Nov. 
15, 2007), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2007/November/07_crt_921.html (last visited 
Feb. 16, 2010). 
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grounds.  The Framers of both the Constitution and Bill of Rights, 
doubtless aware of the existence of private criminal prosecutions, 
recognized the need to protect defendants’ interests, and therefore 
established important procedural protections to ensure that criminal 
trials would be fair.  While the Framers explicitly provided rights to 
counsel, grand juries, impartial judges, public trials, and petite juries, 
private prosecutions were never forbidden. 
Empowering victims to bring such actions, in addition to com-
manding historical support, has considerable attraction.  Aside from 
providing the victim with a sense of “justice,” privately managed crim-
inal prosecutions may improve criminal law enforcement overall.  
Not unlike Adam Smith’s theory of the “invisible hand,”509 private 
prosecutions themselves may benefit not only the individual victim, 
but the public at large.  Private vengeance, rightly pursued, may lead 
to public good.  After all, the resources government may designate to 
enforce criminal laws are necessarily scarce.  As criminals, at least 
those for whom crime is a rational choice, decide to engage in pro-
hibited conduct, they inevitably weigh the likelihood of detection, 
prosecution, and expected punishment.510  Accordingly, as the re-
sources of private prosecutors are combined with those of the state, 
the greater is the community’s capacity to detect and prosecute 
crimes and punish the duly convicted. 
Arguably, the most efficient way of increasing the deterrent effect 
of the criminal law is to increase the likelihood of detection.511  If in-
creased detection, however, is not buttressed by the likelihood of sub-
sequent prosecution, deterrence goals may not be attained.  Given 
the limitations on increasing sanctions, private prosecutions may pro-
vide a useful means of leveraging private resources to combat crime 
and thereby increase the likelihood of deterrence.  If common-sense 
restrictions of private prosecutions are adopted to protect the defen-
dants’ interest in fair trials and to vindicate the public’s interest in 
criminal law enforcement, such prosecutions should be permitted, 
especially in circumstances in which the private prosecutor may hold 
a comparative advantage over the public prosecutor, or in situations 
in which the cost of a prosecution to the government may outweigh 
its interests in pursuing the cause.  Private prosecutions, while hardly 
a panacea, may nevertheless usefully augment the efforts of govern-
ment in enforcing the criminal law. 
 
509 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
510 Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment:  An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 176 
(1968). 
511 Id. at 176. 
